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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the evolution of colonial policy within 
British West Africa, and is based largely on unpublished 
correspondence between the Colonial office and colonial 
governors, held in the Public Record Office in London. It 
argues that the colonial states were unable to generate or 
implement a satisfactory strategy for capitalist development. 
In the first twenty years of colonial rule, various projects 
were outlined, which assumed the introduction of private 
property in land, the encouragement of direct investment by 
European capital, and the formation of a class of wage 
labourers. The absence of a working class, and the political 
impossiblity of the disruptions necessary to create such a 
class, forced a retreat from these projects, and led to the 
articulation of a West African Policy, premised on peasant 
production. This reversed the earlier commitment to private 
property and proposed a defence of communal property relations, 
with Africans restrained from buying, selling or mortgaging 
land. With the exception of mining, private capital was to 
be restricted to a merchant role, and discouraged from setting 
up plantation production. 
In the decades between the First and Second World Wars, 
this conception of West African development provided the 
framework for colonial practice, but became increasingly 
incoherent and untenable. The colonial states were unable, 
within the confines of a peasant strategy, to promote desired 
changes in agricultural productivity, and could not offer 
adequate support to attempts to introduce mechanical processing 
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into palm oil production. They came into conflict with mining 
companies over labour supplies, and with Lever over his 
attempts to introduce capitalist relations into the cultiva- 
tion and processing of palm fruits. The commitment to 
communal ownership of land was challenged by Africans who 
demanded the right to buy and mortgage, and these demands 
were supported in the 1920s and 1930s by some key administra- 
tors who saw the West African Policy as a constraint on 
agricultural development. The world crisis of the 1920s and 
1930s undermined the viability of African farming, and produced 
unemployment. By the time of the Second World War, the 
colonial states were forced to recognise African wage labour, 
and abandon the original model of a peasant economy. 
The thesis argues that the fragility of colonial control 
prevented pursuit of coherent strategies. The policies adopted 
should be viewed as a product of compromise between conflicting 
pressures, rather than as a pure strategy for capital. The 
thesis thus challenges the assumptions of underdevelopment 
theory, which has claimed the failure to create conditions 
for capitalist development in the African colonies as a 
deliberate product of capitalist interests. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ENIGMA OF COLONIALISM 
As colonialism was dismantled in Africa, assessments of its 
record divided into two schools: apologetics or condemnation. 
The 'imperial balance sheet' (1) was added up; an arithmetic 
used by some to demonstrate the benefits colonialism brought 
to its subjects; and by others to show the exploitation it 
practiced on them. In this world of moral judgements, 
defenders of colonialism relied on a contrast between pre- 
and post-colonial conditions, stressing the advantages of 
roads, railways or schools over the uncertainties of earlier 
existence (e. g. Gann and Duignan, 1968). From this perspec- 
tive, the 'failures' of colonialism were only those revealed 
by subsequent history: with hindsight, it could be said that 
more was needed to develop social services, promote political 
participation, or establish the basis for industrialisation; 
but colonial officials at the time were understandably slow 
to recognise such possibilities. By the new development 
criteria which entered the common-sense of the post-war 
world, Africa fell short of target, but criticisms based on 
such criteria could be dismissed as anachronistic. Where 
failures were too evident for evasion, defenders of colo- 
nialism tended to emphasise its ad hoc nature, substituting 
a mild critique of colonial incompetence for the more 
devastating attacks on colonial brutality. 'Had the British 
been able to forsee how quickly they would devolve power to 
the indigenous people after World War II, and had they not, 
as it were, decolonised so absentmindedly, they might have 
equipped their charges in a more adequate fashion for future 
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independence. ' (Gann and Duignan, 1968: 375). 
In the debate over colonialism, those sympathetic to its 
achievements had one powerful point in their favour: for 
Africa at least, it was hard to present the colonial experi- 
ence as one of subordination to the demands of capital. By 
the end of the colonial era, capital had made little headway. 
Investment was low, and what there had been was concentrated 
in a few mining enclaves. Gold and diamond mines in South 
Africa had attracted private capital, but beyond this, most 
investment was public. Investment in the British colonies 
was estimated in 1936 as £941m.: of this £523m. was in the 
Union of South Africa, and of the total, approximately 48% 
came from government funds (2). Lord Hailey used these 
figures in 1938 to appeal for a new development initiative, 
but in 1956, he was still painting a gloomy picture (Hailey, 
1956). Africa had not attracted significant capital from 
America, and as a 1953 report to the President of the United 
States indicated, this pattern seemed likely to continue: 
'with the exception of petroleum reserves and 
mineral deposits elsewhere, the opportunities 
for profitable employment of capital on this 
continent (i. e. America) are too numerous and 
too great to induce any large outflow on private 
account into enterprise overseas. ' (3) 
The investments undertaken by the Colonial Development Cor- 
poration (4), set up partly in response to Hailey's earlier 
warnings, were not successful and by 1955, only one of the 
African enterprises financed by the Corporation was making 
a net trading profit (Hailey, 1956: 1344). Last ditch 
attempts to promote development came too late, and when the 
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colonial experiment was formally concluded, Africa was all 
too obviously marginalised in the world economy. 
The problem was not just a quantitative one, of too little 
investment. Africa emerged from colonial rule with few of 
the pre-conditions for sustained capital accumulation. 
Colonialism undoubtedly established the dominance of commo- 
dity production, transforming previous subsistence farmers 
into producers of export commodities, but beyond this, its 
services to capital seemed negligible. In most of the con- 
tinent, pre-colonial property relations had survived, at 
least to the extent of providing relatively easy access to 
land. Producers were not separated from their means of pro- 
duction, and the capitalist wage relation was not prevalent. 
The forms of exploitation practiced in colonial Africa were 
more akin to those which characterised early capitalist 
development in Europe: the 'robbery' of mercantile capital, 
which buys cheap and sells dear; or the extraction of an 
absolute surplus value from labourers paid a bare subsistence. 
In the political economy of colonialism, the extraction of 
relative surplus value was a rare exception. 
Yet in the advanced countries, the differentia specifica 
of capitalist development has been the separation of pro- 
ducers from their means of production, and the extraction 
from them of a relative surplus value. Capitalism does not 
effect exploitation by dragging down living standards 
-a 
strategy which is limited by nature 
- 
but by increasing the 
productive powers of labour. With control of the labour 
process, capital can harness the productive forces to the 
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task of accumulation. It can break those natural barriers 
which constrain mercantile capital, and impose limits to the 
extraction of absolute surplus value. By raising the pro- 
ductivity of labour, capital can reduce labour costs without 
destroying subsistence, and embark on the process of continual 
expansion which has characterised its most dynamic periods. 
But to achieve this, capital demands certain conditions: 
primarily, the creation of 'free' wage labour 
- 
freed from 
ownership of the means of production, freed from control over 
the production process, and freed to sell its labour-power 
as a commodity. Only with these conditions, can capital 
shake off the limitations of its earlier forms of exploitation. 
Such conditions did not exist in the colonies, and those 
first critics who talked of colonialism as the forced creation 
of a proletariat (e. g. Woddis, 1960) carried little convic- 
tion. Forced to recognise this, Marxist analysis came to 
rest its case on the backwardness of the exploitation 
colonialism had imposed. Thus Suret-Canale, in the most 
impressive of the early critiques, argued: 
'The very limited funds provided by capitalist 
investment were applied not to progress in pro- 
duction or in technical fields, but essentially 
to the extraction of high profits with no 
modification of pre-colonial techniques 
- 
in 
other words, principally by intensifying the work 
demanded of the population. ' (Suret-Canale, 
1971: 294) 
Colonialism's crime, in this view, was that it failed to 
impose normal capitalist exploitation, and relied instead 
on the brutalities of intensifying work, reducing the level 
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of subsistence, and lengthening the working day. Defenders 
of colonialism could turn this on its head, as when Gann and 
Duignan replied to Marxist critics that 'the real trouble 
with many colonies was not the extent of enterprise but its 
relative absence; there were usually too few capitalists, 
rather than too many' (Gann and Duignan, 1968: 375). 
The paradox of colonialism was heightened by the seemingly 
anti-capitalist bias of its officials. Not only did colo- 
nialism fail to impose capitalist relations, but more than 
this, its practitioners gloried in their role as guardians of 
a pre-capitalist order. As Hetherington (1978) has argued, 
colonial officials practiced a form of paternalism, premised 
on the dangers of the modern economy for African communities. 
'Sometimes the emphasis was on the administrative 
policy of indirect rule, which was supposed to 
prevent too rapid change; sometimes it was on the 
necessity for a restraint on commercial and 
industrial activity so that teachers and mission- 
aries could undertake the transformation of 
African society before the individual lost 
contact with the economic and social security of 
tribal life. ' (Hetherington, 1978: 71) 
With all the variations, colonial practice seemed to draw on 
the values of feudalism rather than those of capitalism, and 
to judge from official attitudes, the task of colonialism 
was to retard capitalist development, rather than to hasten 
it. 
Policies in British West Africa, where economic develop- 
ment centred on African commodity production, seem to 
exemplify this 'autocratic paternalism' (McPhee, 1971). 
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The colonial era was celebrated for its enlightened encourage- 
ment of peasant production, and its avoidance of the evils 
of wage labour. In his influential testament to The Economic 
Revolution in British West Africa, first published in 1926, 
Allan McPhee praised this policy, and contrasted it favourably 
with the excesses of the Belgian Congo. Resistance to 
European plantation estates, restriction of capital to a 
merchant role, discouragement of private property in land 
- 
all these were central planks in the West African Policy as 
perceived in the inter-war years. The phenomenal rise of the 
cocoa industry, entirely on African initiative (5), and 
supposedly within peasant relations of production, was cited 
as proof of this 'policy', and successive Governors affirmed 
West Africa as the antithesis to the 'capitalistic policy'. 
Far from imposing capitalist relations, the colonial states 
seemed committed to protecting Africans from the depredations 
of European capitalists, and the debates which dominated the 
1920s centred around the problems of preserving West Africa 
from the destructive tendencies of modern individualism. 
Thus in a language which recurred throughout these inter-war 
discussions, McPhee trusted that 'the spirit of individualism' 
which had triumphed in England, would not become dominant in 
West Africa. He hoped that 'the survival of the communal 
spirit among the natives' would be strong enough to counteract 
'the Anglicised and individualistic tendencies of the Coastal 
natives'. He looked forward to a new species of regional 
development 
... 
confirming the truth of the old saying "Ex 
Africa semper aliquid novi"' (McPhee, 1971: 311). 
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In this conception, the task of colonialism was not to 
separate producers from the means of production and trans- 
form them into wage labourers. On the contrary, the priority 
was to ensure that Africans were protected from that priva- 
tisation of land which characterised the development of 
capitalism in Britain. The colonial governments, McPhee 
urged, should prohibit free sale and mortgaging of land, 
since otherwise 'the land system of British West Africa will 
slide down the slippery slope into landlordism and native 
expropriation, which is the very antithesis of the present 
"West African" policy of development' (McPhee, 1971: 308). 
The preferred ideal was that of a peasant community, pro- 
ducing commodities for the world market. Capital was to be 
limited to a merchant capacity, except in the mining sector 
which was assumed to require foreign investment. In British 
West Africa at least, it seemed that colonialism deliberately 
withdrew from the project of imposing capitalist relations 
of production. 
This marked pattern in colonial thinking has been attri- 
buted to the accidents of colonial recruitment. Heussler 
(1963) has argued that officials were recruited from the 
younger sons of the landed aristocracy, people whose own 
class position left them uneasy with the values of contemporary 
capitalism. Sir Ralph Furse, who controlled recruitment to 
the colonial service in the inter-war years, was 'unswervingly 
aristocratic' in his assumptions (Heussler, 1963: 69), and 
preferred applicants who were what Heussler describes as 
the 'organisation eccentric': 
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'modern industrialisation and urbanisation were 
anathema to him, as were the nouveaux who epito- 
mised these trends. He cared little for money 
as such; he preferred the country to the city, 
and was usually happy in an exclusively male 
society'. (Heussler, 1963: 104) 
The description is apt, as examination of official thinking 
in British West Africa will demonstrate, but the explanation 
is unsatisfactory. However ad hoc colonial policies appear, 
they cannot be reduced to the accident of one man's dominance 
in official recruitment. The apparently anti-capitalist bias 
of colonial policies demands further explanation. 
For those who rejected such idealist interpretations of 
history, the arguments of underdevelopment theory provided 
a welcome relief. Beginning in the work of Baran (1957), 
and continuing through Frank's analyses of Latin America 
(Frank, 1969a; 1969b) and Amin' s analyses of Africa (Amin, 
1973; 1975; 1977), underdevelopment theory argued that capital 
accumulation characteristically 'blocks' development in the 
peripheries. Capitalism necessarily divides the world into 
two parts: that which enjoys 'normal' capitalist development, 
and that which suffers underdevelopment. Countries in the 
former category extract a surplus from the latter 
- 
whether 
through direct investment, as Frank argues, or through trade, 
as Emmanuel (1972) argues 
- 
and in the process generate 
structures of underdevelopment which induce further stagna- 
tion. From this perspective, it is no paradox that colonialism 
failed to develop capitalist relations in Africa; this very 
'failure' proves the dynamics of world capitalism. 
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Crucial to the argument is the assumption that capital 
asserts its dominance through a variety of relations of 
production. The differentia specifica of capitalism is not 
the extraction of relative surplus value from wage labour. 
Rather it is this division of the world into two; monopoly 
and satellite; centre and periphery; developed and under- 
developed. Capitalism exists wherever a region is integrated 
into the world market and whenever producers are forced to 
serve the needs of this market. The precise relations of 
exploitation 
- 
whether serf labour, petty commodity production 
or wage labour 
- 
are of secondary significance. The 
mechanisms of 'primitive accumulation' are as much a part 
of modern capitalism, or even, in the strongest versions, the 
most effective means of exploitation. Thus, if colonialism 
relied on 'backward' forms of exploitation, this is no sur- 
prise to underdevelopment theorists. Capitalism thrives on 
what may appear 'traditional' or pre-capitalist forms; far 
from imposing 'normal' capitalist development on the colo- 
nised territories, capital will seek to block such in the 
interests of world accumulation (6). 
As long as this paradigm dominated analysis, the enigma 
of colonialism escaped attention. It was possible to explain 
away the absence of capitalist development, without falling 
back on Heussler's thesis of the aristocratic recruitment 
procedures. The defence of pre-capitalist property relations, 
or the glorification of a commodity-producing peasantry no 
longer appeared paradoxical; on the contrary, they served as 
evidence for the process of underdevelopment. 
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In recent years, underdevelopment theory has fared less 
well. Its assumptions have been widely challenged, and its 
solution to the enigma of colonialism correspondingly under- 
mined. Criticisms include: 
(1) underdevelopment theory's confusion of relative and 
absolute surplus value, and hence its false identification 
of intense poverty (which does characterise ex-colonies) with 
high rates of exploitation (which does not) (Kay, 1975) ; 
(2) its reference to an often unspecified standard of 
'development', which draws partly on the past history of the 
advanced countries, and partly on an idealised version of 
'desirable' development, and which as a consequence defines 
a combination of conditions which no contemporary country 
could achieve (Phillips, 1977); 
(3) its anachronistic insistence on a cycle of under- 
development, in a period marked by a massive shift of capital 
investment from the advanced to 'underdeveloped' countries 
(Warren, 1973; 1980; Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980); 
(4) its simplistic assumption that local capital must 
play a dependent role in accumulation, and its misperception 
of the complexity of class relations in underdeveloped 
countries (7) 
. 
For the analysis of colonialism, the crucial weakness was 
underdevelopment theory's assumption that capital is both 
rational and omnipotent. Born as it was out of the successes 
of post-war capitalism, when the advanced countries at least 
seemed to have discovered the key to crisis-free accumulation, 
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and when the conflicts between capital and labour seemed 
temporarily moderated by decades of growth, underdevelopment 
theory accepted the new consensus of a capitalism without 
contradiction. What capitalism 
- 
and by extension colo- 
nialism 
- 
had created, must be what capitalism desired. 
The classical images of a system torn by contradictions, 
unable to fulfil even its own limited objectives, doomed to 
promote the very forces which would destroy it, these images 
were abandoned in the post-war gloom and capitalism was pre- 
sumed to be only too successful in its pursuits. Under- 
development was what capitalism had produced; hence, 
underdevelopment was what capitalism must have wanted. 
While this assumption is increasingly abandoned in 
analyses of contemporary Africa, it is less frequently 
challenged in analyses of colonialism. Such work has too 
often contented itself with documenting the underdevelopment 
which resulted from colonial rule (e. g. Howard, 1978) and 
has rarely posed the question: why was colonialism unable to 
promote capitalist production? Colonialism has been pre- 
sented as a relatively straightforward phenomenon, and it 
has been left to more orthodox historians to emphasise its 
makeshift nature. Debate has remained frozen within the 
confines of underdevelopment thinking. 
One major exception to this has been in the work of 
Rey (1971), who has produced a different version of the 
colonial experience in the French Congo. Rey rejects the 
underdevelopment assumption, and starts from the thesis that 
16 
capitalism does indeed require the separation of producers 
from their means of production. The problem in Africa, was 
that such a separation could be effected only through vio- 
lent disruption of the existing order. In contrast to 
feudal relations in Europe, which generated out of themselves 
a transition to capitalism, the societies of pre-colonial 
Africa contained no historical movement towards capitalist 
production. The historical task of colonialism was to pro- 
vide the disruption necessary to shake these pre-capitalist 
relations; and the brutalities of railway construction, the 
years of forced labour, the technically irrational waste of 
human labour in the building of the Congo railway, were a 
crucial part of this process. Within this analysis, 'under- 
development' indicates the resistance of pre-capitalist modes 
to the imposition of capitalist relations. Colonialism had 
to destroy in order to rebuild, and the stagnation described 
in works on underdevelopment testifies only to the incom- 
pleteness of the project (8). 
In similar vein, Taylor (1979) attributes underdevelopment 
to the contradictory requirements of capital in its different 
phases of penetration. In the mercantile phase, capital 
simply reinforcing existing 
- 
non-capitalist 
- 
modes of 
extracting surplus labour, and concentrated on increasing 
the quantity of the surplus. It was not until the second 
phase, under the dominance of commodity export, that non- 
capitalist modes were first challenged. At this point, they 
were required to provide commodities for export, and simul- 
taneously markets for imports; the basis of their own 
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reproduction was undermined (the classic example being the 
destruction of the Indian textile industry under the impact 
of English manufactures). The last and imperialist phase 
now demands the transition to fully capitalist relations of 
production, but since previous penetration has shored up 
non-capitalist modes, underdevelopment has been the unintended 
result. 
The argument of this thesis begins, with Rey and Taylor, 
from the assumption that a failure to develop capitalist 
relations requires investigation, and cannot be explained 
away as the expected consequence of world accumulation. But 
in contrast to their work, it takes the relationship between 
state and capital as problematic, and argues that the 
development of colonial policies must be examined in the 
context of the political constraints which faced colonial 
officials. In one important respect, the arguments of Rey 
and Taylor have merely mirrored those of underdevelopment 
theory. For the latter the colonial state intervened as an 
agent of capital to obstruct the development of indigenous 
capitalism; for the former it intervened as an agent to 
promote the development of capitalist relations. In both 
cases the colonial state is presented as simple agent of 
capital, and capital as a logic which dictates determinate 
forms of either development or underdevelopment. 
Thus at a time when Marxism has largely retreated from 
a crude identity of state and capital in the advanced 
countries (e. g. Poulantzas, 1969; Miliband, 1970; Holloway 
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and Picciotto, 1978), discussions of colonialism have accepted 
a version of the state as mouthpiece of capital. The intri- 
cacies of modern state theory have bypassed the analysts of 
colonialism. The colonial state was imposed externally at 
the instigation of European capitalists, and was relieved of 
the burdens of universal franchise; on such tenuous grounds, 
it appears, critics of colonialism have presumed a state 
which could serve unconditionally the interests of capital. 
Yet as Lonsdale and Berman (1979) have argued in analysis 
of Kenya, 'the state cannot be the obedient servant of capital', 
a claim which is no less true of the colonial state than of 
its progenitor in Europe. 
The constraints on the colonial state were greater than 
those which operate in Europe, precisely because of the vio- 
lence it required to carry through any transformation. In 
Britain, the compulsion to labour was constructed over cen- 
turies. One by one, alternative means of subsistence were 
stripped away, and the necessity of wage labour imposed. 
Subsistence came to depend on the consumption of commodities, 
and money became the only medium through which needs could 
be met. Once this situation became routine, and only then, 
could the state enjoy its liberalism. With needs defined 
through commodities, and wages the only access, the compul- 
sion to labour appeared as natural necessity. The force 
which had created, and continued to impose, 'free' labour, 
was generalised throughout society and became virtually 
invisible. 
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In Africa, this generalised force which guarantees the 
wage relation was absent. Needs were still expressed in 
terms of use-values, and dependence on a money income was 
limited. Relatively free access to land ensured subsistence 
to most Africans, and for those producing cash crops, pro- 
vided some money earnings. As Rey correctly emphasises, 
wage labour could be imposed only through direct coercion. 
Yet the state which inherited this task was incomplete and 
undeveloped: a political power which was in many ways a mere 
facsimile of a state. Colonial rule could be sustained only 
through a complex of shifting alliances with local rulers, 
and colonial officials were acutely aware of the limitations 
of their control. Colonialism was necessarily a makeshift. 
Its history was one of adjustment to conditions it could 
not dictate, and the abruptness of decolonisation gave open 
expression to a lack of control which had existed all along. 
It is against this background that the formation of 
colonial policies must be understood. The anti-capitalism 
which apparently characterised so much of colonial thinking 
arose out of the constraints of local conditions. It was 
determined neither by the demands of capital accumulation, 
nor by the peculiarities of colonial recruitment. Rather 
it was forged out of the experience of colonial administra- 
tion, and emerged as an uneasy resolution to the often 
conflicting requirements of colonial rule. 
In particular, the political weakness of the colonial 
state limited its capacity for direct coercion, and this 
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soured its relations with private capital. The state was 
forced into an alliance with local chiefs as the only 
reliable guarantors of labour, which in turn dictated the 
terms on which colonialism operated. The recurrent problems 
of land and labour revolved around this alliance with chiefs. 
Free access to land precluded the formation of a landless 
proletariat, and was ensured by relations of communal land 
tenure which installed the chiefs as agents of political 
order. The coercive powers of these chiefs provided the 
colonial state with the means to recruit labour, but to 
sustain these powers, the right to alienate land had to be 
curtailed. There was no way out of this circle. The pro- 
letarianisation which could in principle have broken through 
it, was well beyond the capacity of the colonial states. 
The importance of local constraints in determining the 
course of official thinking is confirmed by the discontinuity 
in colonial policies. The history of British West Africa 
divides, I argue, into two phases. The first, from effective 
colonisation in the 1890s to the outbreak of the First World 
War, was one of experimentation, in which the colonisers 
pursued projects for importing private property and wage 
labour wholesale into Africa. At this point, the anti- 
capitalism described by Heussler was rarely evident. The 
British arrived in West Africa confident that they could 
write history. The viewed their new estates as a tabula rasa 
on which entirely novel relations of production could be 
inscribed. They expressed impatience with the backwardness 
of local conditions, and viewed communal property relations 
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as a constraint on development. They anticipated a trans- 
formation of ex-slaves into wage labourers, and when such 
dreams proved a chimera, they toyed with the alternative of 
importing wage labourers from other colonies. At this stage, 
it was accepted that the colonial administrations should 
serve private capital, and the future development of the 
colonies was assumed to rest on attracting further private 
investment. 
The recalcitrance of local conditions soon forced a 
retreat to what I call the West African Policy. This was 
most clearly articulated in the deliberations of the West 
African Lands Committee (set up in 1912), and affirmed the 
peasant road of development. By this time, private land 
tenure was regarded as a problem rather than a solution; and 
private capital as a disturbance, except when it restricted 
itself to merchant activities. The report of the West African 
Lands Committee never achieved the official stamp of approval, 
but its basic principles informed colonial practice in sub- 
sequent years. History was re-written, to provide an 
apparent continuity with earlier policies; but as I argue, 
this new consensus was a recognition of previous defeats, 
rather than a continuation of original proposals. Capital 
did find a niche for itself in these newly constrained 
surroundings. Merchant firms continued to dominate in West 
Africa, as they had before the advent of colonial rule, and 
industrial capital largely mimicked these firms by leaving 
production in the hands of African peasants. At certain 
points, capital sought to push beyond these limits, but in 
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the crucial case of Lever Brothers (discussed in Chapter 5), 
was thwarted by the state. 
In this second phase, between the two world wars, the 
colonial states confronted the inadequacies of their new 
policy, which began to fall apart from the day of its formu- 
lation. The model of West Africa never fully corresponded to 
the reality, and colonialism became a series of ad hoc adjust- 
ments to the changes which threatened political order. The 
favouring of peasant production deprived both capital and the 
state of control over colonial production, and efforts to 
force peasants to act as their masters desired were generally 
unsuccessful. The independence which peasants retained may 
have been partly illusory, since what they produced and when, 
was determined by the market. But they continued to control 
their own labour process and resisted proposals for 'improved' 
techniques. Colonial officials (and after them African 
politicians) were convinced that the peasants were wrong: 
they set up commissions on 'quality control' to grapple with 
the task of introducing improved methods of production. But 
to enforce such improvements, they had at their disposal 
only market prices and administrative decrees. They could 
not enter directly into production and dictate the changes 
they desired. These disadvantages of peasant production were 
supposed, in the colonial conception, to be balanced by the 
political stability of a peasant order. But here too the 
model barely approximated to real conditions. The development 
of commodity production refused to remain within the confines 
of an idealised peasantry. African farmers accumulated land, 
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employed wage labour, got themselves into debt, and generally 
refused to remain model peasants. The colonial states were 
attempting to freeze the development of commodity production 
at that utopian point which allowed them to maintain their 
control. They were forced to contain the process, as it 
threatened to get out of hand, and much of the inter-war 
policy deliberations were concerned with this problem of 
re-establishing the ideal equilibrium. As a consequence, 
they were unable to promote even their compromise solution 
of a peasant road. The Chief Census Officer of the Gold 
Coast admitted in 1931, 'it is probable that the nation is 
advancing faster than may seem good to the Government, who 
actually has had occasion to act as a brake rather than as 
an accelerating force' (Cardinall, 1931: 75). 
This second phase then, was one of adjustment, compro- 
mise and ultimately defeat, as the impossibility of the 
colonial balancing act became clear. By the time of the 
Second World War, the failure of colonialism was apparent, 
as the forces it had unleashed threatened to destroy the 
fragile political order on which it relied. The pace of 
accumulation was outstripping the capacities of the state, 
and the colonisers abandoned their territories when they could 
no longer paper over the cracks. Decolonisation was a 
recognition of the failures of colonialism, rather than a 
response to the powers of nationalism. The independence 
movements which took over in Africa did not inherit a stable 
polity, but one which was already coming apart at the seams. 
The resultant chaos, partially described in the literature 
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on underdevelopment, was only to be expected. 
Colonialism, in this analysis, was essentially a make- 
shift settlement. And to this extent, its character has been 
more readily perceived by orthodox historians, with their 
insistence on the ad hoc nature of colonial rule, than by 
radical critics, who have too easily assumed a logic of capi- 
tal behind the manoeuvres of local officials. Policy was 
formulated against a backdrop of recalcitrant conditions, and 
was, as a result, marked by discontinuities and inconsis- 
tencies. I argue, nevertheless, that there was a policy, 
articulated in Colonial Office writings, in statements by 
Governors, and ultimately in a public version (such as 
McPhee's book) of what the West African colonies represented 
in comparison to colonial policy elsewhere. But within this 
policy there were disagreements, and in colonial practice, 
it was impossible to find a consistent expression of the 
supposed objectives of colonial rule. The variations and 
inconsistencies do not undermine the claim that there was a 
West African Policy: rather they indicate the makeshift 
nature of the colonial consensus, which could not provide 
solutions to every problem that arose. Tensions and conflicts 
existed throughout the formation of colonial policy, and 
indeed it is only possible to explain the rapid shift in the 
1940s by reference to these. The West African Policy was a 
consensus built on shifting sands. It was an attempt to hold 
together in harmony a number of conflicting processes, a 
complex of objectives which were often denied in colonial 
practice, frequently challenged by administrators, and 
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ultimately incompatible. But the incompatibility does not 
detract from the persistence with which it was prosecuted. 
The thesis is based on examination of Colonial office 
correspondence, supplemented by published material such as 
Legislative Council Debates, Departmental Reports, Blue Books, 
and Sessional Papers. It focusses on changing policies with 
regard to land and labour issues, as and when they were con- 
sidered of sufficient moment to demand consultation by 
Governors and Colonial Office. It is not a complete study 
of the effects of colonial policy. Since Governors were 
notoriously ill-informed of developments within their colonies, 
it can be assumed that the actual consequences of colonialism, 
those changes which from a distance will appear as of greatest 
historical importance, may not have surfaced directly in this 
correspondence. In terms of an overall analysis of colo- 
nialism, these unreported developments are crucial. But for 
an analysis of the strategies pursued by the colonial states, 
and the dilemmas confronted in this process, what matters are 
the terms of reference provided by the Governors themselves. 
The thesis concentrates on the experience of the Gold 
i 
Coast and Nigeria, which between them accounted for the over- 
whelming proportion of the British West African trade. The 
economically marginal colonies of the Gambia and Sierra 
Leone are discussed only at those points where their experi- 
ence was significant to the formation and tensions of the 
West African Policy in general: i. e. in the first twenty 
years, when the principles of land and labour policy were 
being forged, and in the case study of Lever and the palm 
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oil industry, when Sierra Leone became one of the sites for 
Lever's projected developments. Beyond these, the analysis 
of the West African Policy in the inter-war years, as it 
pursued its troubled course through a territory it could not 
control, is based on the tensions which arose in the two 
major West African colonies. 
This selectivity inevitably limits the conclusions 
which can be drawn. The thesis deals only with land and 
labour issues, and not with the entire range of concerns 
which could come under the rubric of 'development'. In 
addition, it focusses on parts of British West Africa, and 
derives from these an argument on the nature of British West 
African policy in general. That there was indeed a pattern 
to official thinking, will I hope become clear, but since the 
argument of the thesis is that colonial policies developed 
in response to local constraints, a more detailed study of 
local variations can be expected to throw up further com- 
plexities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRE-COLONIAL WEST AFRICA 
As has been indicated, West Africa came to be regarded as 
the home of peasant production, and by the twentieth cen- 
tury the 'myth of the amorphous peasantry' (Hill, 1968) was 
born. This characterisation soon established itself as 
orthodoxy, and West Africa was presented as a world of 
homogeneous communities, made up of a mass of small farmers, 
engaged in a combination of subsistence farming and pro- 
duction for export (1). Central to the colonial version 
of this mythology was the favouring of communal land tenure 
over private, and family labour over waged work; production 
of export crops for the modern world could build on tradi- 
tional African relations of production. One argument of 
this thesis is that a commitment to peasant production arose 
in the course of colonial rule. It was not dominant in 
earlier colonial thinking, which by contrast assumed the 
development of both wage labour and private property in 
land as normal elements in the expansion of colonial trade. 
The commodity producing peasantry was largely a product of 
colonialism. Neither the idealised version which informed 
colonial policies, nor the more complex reality which 
troubled local administrators, existed at the time of 
colonisation. Commodity production certainly pre-dated 
colonialism, but the relations under which it operated were 
varied, and relied more extensively on slave labour than 
the first officials liked to admit. The aim of this chapter 
is to sketch out some of these variations. 
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Africa in the nineteenth century had already experi- 
enced several centuries of trade with the outside world. 
West Africa in particular had supplied gold for European 
expansion from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries, 
and later been a source of slaves for the plantation econo- 
mies of the West Indies and the Americas. Internal and 
external trade were well developed. Local markets 
- 
largely 
under the control of women traders 
- 
existed throughout 
most of West Africa. Long distance trade between West and 
North Africa dated from at least 1000 B. C.: by the Middle 
Ages, a flourishing trans-Saharan trade had been established, 
with gold, cotton goods and slaves from the south being 
exchanged for cowries, salt, and weapons from the north. 
Trade with Europe began in the eleventh century, and though 
small in volume, was crucial in content, since West Africa 
became a major source of gold. By the sixteenth century, 
the Gold Coast was providing the bulk of the world's gold 
supply, and competition for it resulted by the end of the 
seventeenth century in the establishment of a number of 
trading outposts along the coastline. But it was the 
creation of the sugar plantations in the West Indies which 
transformed West African trade. From the seventeenth cen- 
tury onwards, slaves replaced gold as the major export, 
and Portuguese and Dutch traders, representatives of the 
'old' world economy, gave way to the French and British. 
Millions of Africans were tracked down, captured and 
exported over the next two centuries, to provide the labour 
for plantation economies across the Atlantic. 
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The increased demand for slaves stimulated slave- 
raiding and slave-dealing, and while African slavery long 
pre-dated the Atlantic trade (Goody, 1980), the new con- 
ditions undoubtedly intensified the reliance on slave labour. 
Slave wars became a profitable option, and under the influence 
of the new markets, military aristocracies rose to power. 
The creation of a complex infrastructure for the procurement 
of slaves simultaneously increased the numbers available 
for local use, and as Rodney (1966) has argued, provoked 
the employment of slaves in local production (2). The slave 
ships set off at lengthy intervals; periods between capture 
and export were often prolonged; inevitably the mass labour 
force accumulated for export was set to work in the interim 
within West Africa. The Atlantic trade did far more than 
increase the volume of trade between Africa and the rest 
of the world: it generated new political structures in the 
more centralised states, and increased the reliance on 
slaves in domestic production. 
In the kingdoms and states of pre-colonial West Africa, 
slave labour was widely used in agriculture, mining, and war. 
In the Ashanti empire, which by the early nineteenth century 
claimed formal control over an area of 125,000 
- 
150,000 
square miles, and jurisdiction over a population of 3-5 
million people (Hymer, 1970), slaves played an important 
role within the domestic economy. Some spheres, such as 
gold-mining, depended entirely on slave labour, since free- 
born Africans refused to work in them (Wilks, 1975). Slaves 
made up the core of the standing army. They were used in 
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the manufacture of armaments (mainly bullets), and were a 
major source of labour for clearing uncultivated land and 
setting up plantations. Estimates of the slave population 
of West Africa are notoriously ureliable, since early 
European travellers rarely distinguished between slaves and 
low status Africans, and probably exaggerated the extent 
of slavery to justify colonial intervention (3). Neverthe- 
less, the recurring estimate that slaves made up one quarter 
to one half of the total population, gives some indication 
of the magnitude (Miers and Kopytoff, 1977: 60-61). 
Arguments over the extent of slavery continue to be 
clouded by the suggestion that West African slavery was a 
peculiarly 'benign' version, which allowed the slaves 
considerable freedom and the possibility of redemption. 
'What gives African "slavery" its particular stamp in con- 
trast to many other slave systems', wrote Miers and Kopytoff, 
'is the existence of (the) "slavery"-to-kinship continuum' 
(4) According to this view, slaves were merely the most 
marginalised in societies with many gradations of kinship 
and quasi-kinship, and were ultimately likely to be inte- 
grated. The argument derives from what was indeed a 
peculiarity of African slavery 
- 
the limitations conventionally 
imposed on the rights of masters to re-sell their slaves. 
In West African slave societies, a slave captured in the 
course of a military campaign, or purchased at a slave 
market, was simply a commodity, to be bought or sold at 
will. But a slave born in servitude could not normally be 
separated from his/her family except as punishment for 
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serious acts of disobedience. In addition, slaves had the 
right to purchase their freedom, and favoured slaves would 
be granted land which they were free to work in the two 
days a week when their labour was not required. The picture 
was further complicated by the intermediate relationship 
of 'pawning'. Indebtedness could lead a free African to 
pawn himself (or more frequently, his girl children into a 
relationship of slave prostitution), and agree to work as 
a slave for a number of years, or until the debt was can- 
celled. Much has been made of the parallel between this 
form of 'voluntary servitude' and non-slave forms of patron- 
client relationship. A recent study of Sierra Leone defends 
this as a form of dependence voluntarily sought 'in order 
to escape the dangerous exposure that not infrequently 
resulted in involuntary servitude' (Abraham, 1978: 20). 
The argument is self-defeating, since it has to acknowledge 
the extent of slavery proper in order to explain the so- 
called voluntary servitude. Moreover, the defence of West 
African slavery on the grounds that it was no more oppressive 
than the normal relations between chiefs and commoners can 
be turned on its head, and employed to illustrate the degree 
of coercion embodied in 'normal' non-slave relationships. 
The form of domestic slavery which features in such 
defences was, in addition, only one of the many variants 
of slavery found in pre-colonial West Africa. Domestic 
slaves did work alongside freeborn Africans and lived in 
similar conditions; they could reasonably hope that their 
descendants would be assimilated into the community as free 
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members even though these descendants were excluded from 
becoming chief, and cultural prejudices against them sur- 
vived their formal liberation. But where clear distinctions 
were made between the work of slaves and that of free 
Africans, even this incomplete assimilation did not occur. 
Where slaves were made to work part of the week on their 
master's land, and the rest on a personal plot which pro- 
vided means of subsistence, the extraction of labour rent 
continued from generation to generation. The only relaxation 
was that the proportion of time demanded for the master's 
land could be reduced over the years, with the possibility 
that proceeds from the personal plot might be enough for 
redemption. In the third form of slavery, the slave villages 
or 'plantations' where slaves were completely segregated 
from free Africans, and required to deliver a rent in kind 
or money to the owner of the village, prospects for redemp- 
tion or assimilation were virtually non-existent. 
In the nineteenth century, slave production was massively 
intensified, despite the abolition of the slave trade, and 
the rise of the alternative 'legitimate commerce' in palm 
products. As Klein (1971) has argued, 'legitimate commerce 
did not replace the slave trade. Instead it contributed to 
the last brutal phase and led to the extension of European 
control over the continent' (p. 28). The abolition of the 
slave trade remained largely a formality until the abolition 
of slavery itself in America in 1862. Denmark declared 
slave trading illegal in 1802, and Britain followed suit 
in 1807, even taking on responsibility for enforcing its 
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laws on all merchants on the West Coast, with an anti- 
slavery patrol to police the coastline. But despite this, 
and the remarkable growth in the alternative trade in 
vegetable oils 
- 
British imports from West Africa rose from 
1,000 tons in 1810 to 10,000 in 1830 and over 40,000 by 1855 
(Hopkins, 1973: 128) 
- 
the traffic in slaves continued, and 
even increased throughout the period. Moreover, where the 
Atlantic trade was seriously threatened, the tendency within 
West Africa was to redeploy slaves into domestic production 
in Africa. 
In the slave empire of Dahomey, the kings simply used 
slaves who would previously have been exported, to produce 
the new palm products 
- 
'military aristocrats were converted 
into planters, and slave merchandise into producers' 
(Meillassoux, 1971: 59). In the Ashanti empire, pressures 
towards redeployment of slaves were intensified by the 
political dangers of a surplus of slaves. In empires orga- 
nised around military campaigns, which could generate up 
to 20,000 captives in a single expedition, the potential 
loss of the American market threatened disastrous conse- 
quences. As Wilks (1975) has shown, there was much concern 
in the years 1810-1820, that the accumulation of slaves 
inside the empire might end with the slaves outnumbering 
their rulers; long before this, an alliance might emerge 
between the growing numbers of slaves and the poorest of 
the free Ashanti. Two solutions were possible, and in 
Ashanti both were adopted. The supply of slaves could be 
brought under control, primarily by a restriction of 
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military activity, and it is significant both that a decree 
was passed freeing all Muslim slaves in 1808, and that the 
influence of the 'war party' began to decline from this 
period onwards. Or the slaves could be dispersed and iso- 
lated from potential allies among the poorest Ashanti: they 
could be sent off to slave villages, settled on previously 
uncultivated land, and segregated from free Africans. Thus 
the abolition of slave trading by the European powers set 
in motion pressures towards an intensification of slavery 
as a mode of production in Africa. Slaves were increasingly 
used, not just as additional members of a household, but in 
specifically slave enterprises which had much in common 
with the plantation developments of the West Indies. 
The development of slave villages was most marked in 
the area which subsequently became Northern Nigeria. Here 
the Hausa rulers who had dominated the area for centuries 
were dislodged in a series of holy wars, which led to the 
formation of the Sokoto Caliphate 
- 
the largest state in 
pre-colonial West Africa, covering approximately 250,000 
square miles (Adeleye, 1971). An Islamic revivalist move- 
ment was launched in 1804 by the Fulani pastoralists who 
had settled the area from the sixteenth century. The war 
was supported by Muslim and non-Muslim Hausa, disaffected 
with their corrupt rulers, and over a period of thirty years 
an Islamic empire was forged. This was organised into a 
number of emirates, owing allegiance to the Caliph at 
Sokoto. Numerous slave villages were set up in the emirates 
in the course of the nineteenth century. In these villages, 
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agricultural production was carried on almost entirely by 
slave labour, and a proportion of the products was duly 
remitted to the owners of the village. The extent of this 
development is hard to estimate, but Mason (1973) has shown 
that 1,611 such villages were created in the Bida Emirate 
alone in the last half of the nineteenth century, and 
suggested that as much as half the population of the Emirate 
could have been working on these slave farms (5). Again, 
the evidence points to the nineteenth century as a period 
of intensification of slavery, rather than its decline. 
Against such evidence, the notion of an amorphous 
peasantry seems absurd, and it may appear extraordinary that 
later commentators could describe West Africa as 'democratic 
communities consisting of multitudes of small farmers or 
peasant proprietors', or claim that the 'temporal lord 
scarcely exists on the West Coast, and there is no conception 
of a landlord in the European sense' (Jones, 1936: 51). The 
societies which the British colonised in West Africa con- 
tained two major empires: the Ashanti empire which covered 
the central region of what was to become the Gold Coast; and 
the Sokoto Caliphate, which extended over the vast area of 
Northern Nigeria. In the former, a class of wealthy 
financiers had emerged 
- 
the asikafo 
- 
who controlled large 
estates, owned substantial wealth in the form of gold dust, 
and were in a position to make loans to the state. Their 
capacity to accumulate was constrained by the state: in the 
early nineteenth century the Kings of Ashanti imposed extra- 
ordinarily high death duties to limit the inheritance of 
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wealth. But such laws could be evaded. The asikafo were 
prominent first in the financing of wars, and later in 
running the Company of State Traders, which was set up in 
the nineteenth century with a monopoly over long distance 
trade. Trade chiefs were appointed with exclusive licences 
and responsibility for recruiting the carriers (largely from 
the slave and female population). They received a commission 
on the profits, which went to the state treasury. The agents 
of this company accumulated significant fortunes (Wilks, 
1975). In the Sokoto Caliphate (otherwise known as the 
Fulani empire), the power of the state was considerable, 
as the following comment indicates: 
'The Caliphate government, through its local 
village heads and other officials, distributed 
land to freemen, but only to those who had 
effectively become citizens and who paid taxes. 
Outside these places, farmers were subject to 
enslavement, and annual expeditions organised at 
various levels of government, including emirates 
and their numerous dependencies, cleared the 
countryside of independent peasants and effectively 
limited access to land. Land was not usually 
marked, but was tightly controlled. ' 
(Lovejoy, 1973: 349) 
In the Ashanti empire, the nineteenth century did 
ultimately witness a decline in slave production, and at 
the same time a weakening in the power of the state itself. 
By 1874, the Ashanti had suffered serious military defeat 
at the hands of the British, and the Gold Coast Government 
felt able to enforce the abolition of slavery within the 
hinterland areas of the Gold Coast Protectorate. In the 
Fulani emirates, however, slave production was intensified; 
and even in the southern Yoruba states, some of the important 
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chiefs and rulers set up palm oil estates worked by slaves 
(Hopkins, 1973: 143). In the inland parts of what was to 
become Sierra Leone, slavery remained an important source 
of labour power (Abraham, 1978). Moreover, the development 
of legitimate commerce, which before colonisation centred 
on the great Niger Delta, relied extensively on slave labour 
for transport. Trade was controlled by trading 'houses', 
whose chiefs mediated between European merchants and markets 
in the interior (Dike, 1956), and these houses used slaves 
to transport goods up and down the Niger. 
It has been argued (Hopkins, 1973) that the rise of 
legitimate commerce nevertheless marked an important shift, 
and began the transition to the peasant production which 
was viewed as West Africa's defining characteristic by the 
twentieth century. In the last twenty years of the nine- 
teenth century, vegetable oils and kernels made up over 70% 
of the value of exports from the Gold Coast, over 80% from 
Lagos, and over 90% from the Niger Delta (Hopkins, 1973: 141). 
And while Hopkins admits that some of the production (as 
well as much of the transport) relied on slave labour, he 
argues that most of the new exports came from the multi- 
plicity of small farmers. His argument is that the early 
centuries of overseas trade were relatively insignificant 
for West Africa, whose real economic history began with the 
development of palm oil production. The slave trade, he 
suggests, barely touched the surface of African societies, 
while legitimate commerce by contrast, finally drew the mass 
of small farmers into trading relations with Europe. 
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'The capital and labour requirements of slave 
raiding and trading had encouraged the rise of 
a relatively small group of large entrepreneurs, 
many of whom became the rulers or senior officials 
of great states in the Western Sudan and in the 
forest. Producing and selling palm oil and 
groundnuts, on the other hand, were occupations 
in which there were few barriers to entry. 
Legitimate commerce therefore enabled small- 
scale farmers and traders to play an important 
part in the overseas exchange economy for the 
first time. ' (pp. 125-6) 
Moreover, he argues, the imports from the earlier trade 
were limited to the restricted market of wealthy Africans: 
state necessities such as guns, or luxury commodities for 
the ruling elites. By contrast, the imports exchanged for 
the nineteenth century palm products 
- 
cheap textiles, iron 
goods and alcohol 
- 
sought out a potentially mass market 
of ordinary Africans. 'Modern economic history' thus began 
here. It was not until the overseas trade embraced this 
mass of small farmers that the transformation of the West 
African economies got underway. 
The argument is important, and there can be no doubt 
that the implications of mass commodity production are 
radically different from those of trade in gold, ivory and 
slaves. But in terms of an understanding of colonial 
policies, Hopkins' analysis is unhelpful, since it reads 
back into the nineteenth century developments which were 
not to become apparent until later years. Significantly, 
the model for discussions of peasant production 
- 
the Gold 
Coast cocoa industry 
- 
established itself only after colo- 
nisation. The cocoa farmers of Akwapim began their westward 
migration to the empty forest lands of Akim in the 1890s 
39 
(Hill, 1963), and cocoa production in Ashanti developed 
some twenty years later. At the time of colonisation, the 
only significant 'peasant' sector was in palm oil produc- 
tion, and as has been shown, much of this still relied on 
large estates and slave labour. The vision of British West 
Africa as a world of small peasants became possible in the 
twentieth century, but was not yet determined in the years 
of colonial conquest. 
West Africa in the 1890s still offered scope for con- 
trasting conceptions of development. It contained its 
centralised states and empires, with their history of slave 
production, and their evidence of social differentiation; 
but at the same time, it contained the basis for a future 
peasantry. The discrepancy between the two views of West 
Africa stems partly from the peculiarity of African modes 
of production, which as recent French anthropology has 
emphasised (6), seemed to permit a coexistence of subsis- 
tence farmers and centralised states, with the latter only 
barely impinging on the former. As Cocquery-Vidrovitch 
(1976) has argued, the 'African despot exploited less his 
own subjects than the neighbouring tribes' (p. 105). Where 
slave labour was important to an economy, it drew on 
captives from slave wars, rather than the indigenous 
population; and where military conscription was built 
into the structure of a state, it was usually the slaves 
or their descendants who were called up for service. The 
subsistence communities who lived under the formal rule of 
such states retained considerable autonomy, particularly 
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since the power and wealth of their rulers was not derived 
from ownership of the land. 
As Hymer (1970) has argued in relation to pre-colonial 
Ghana, 'such leisure classes as there were depended upon 
gold-mining and long-distance trade rather than land' (p. 34), 
and this limited their impact on subsistence farmers. It 
is this characteristic of land tenure in pre-colonial West 
Africa which has sustained images of a classless society, 
against all the apparently conflicting evidence of social 
differentiation and centralised states. To the extent that 
valid generalisations can be made, a common pattern was 
settlement by lineage groups, who asserted their claims 
to land by migration and cultivation (Ward Price, 1933; Meek, 
1968; Elias, 1951). The disposition of this land normally 
rested with chiefs or elders, who were in a position to 
determine the allocation of unused land to strangers 
entering the community. In addition, they were responsible 
for re-distribution, within the lineage, of land which fell 
into disuse when families migrated or died out. Generally 
two principles operated: (1) anyone seeking access to land 
had to ask permission of those who claimed jurisdiction over 
it, and was normally granted this permission on condition 
of acknowledging that jurisdiction through a (usually token) 
gift; (2) anyone who already had land could expect to retain 
it for ever, but had no right to alienate it; in other 
words, a system of usufruct existed, but not freehold 
ownership. Variations developed according to (1) the 
nature of political authority within the group, some of 
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which had chiefs, but not all; (2) the extent to which the 
groups came under some wider political authority, which 
might insist on consultation over disposition of the land; 
and (3) the development of a money economy, which affected 
the nature of the 'gifts' paid, and transformed them into 
a kind of ground rent. 
Colonial officials came to describe this system as 
'communal land tenure'. Their description conjures up a 
false vision of primitive communism, and encouraged a pic- 
ture of West Africa as an area untouched by the social 
divisions which attend the accumulation of wealth. What 
truth was there in this? It was indeed the case that 
(freeborn) Africans had easy access to land. Throughout 
most of West Africa, large tracts of uncultivated land were 
available, and strangers were generally welcomed to a 
community since their presence and allegiance increased 
the prestige of chiefs. Furthermore, the natural abundance 
of land was not artificially constrained by the emergence 
of a landlord class. Since land could not be alienated 
as private property there was no possibility of the polari- 
sation into a landlord class on the one side and a landless 
proletariat on the other. It would be wrong however to 
conclude that pre-colonial Africa was a congenial 'state 
of nature' such as that Locke (1690) envisaged before the 
introduction of money 
-a rural idyll where no-one infringed 
on the rights of another, and differences between individuals 
arose exclusively from their own labour. Quite apart from 
the qualifications of slavery and centralised states, this 
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communal land tenure permitted relations of coercion 
between chiefs and commoners. 
Even in those parts of West Africa correctly regarded 
as more homogeneous (such as parts of Eastern Nigeria), 
power structures existed which gave chiefs and elders 
extensive control over women and younger men (e. g. Ottenberg, 
1971). Though distinctions in wealth were minimal, the 
elders controlled the movement of women and the access of 
men to marriage; and dictated contributions to the communal 
labour of weeding common land, clearing bush, and main- 
taining paths. For the young men who performed this labour, 
such relations were generally acceptable, since time would 
ensure that they too became elders. But with the advent 
of colonialism, such mechanisms of control over communal 
labour were to provide an important source of labour power 
for the colonial states. 
The argument of this chapter is that while pre-colonial 
West Africa contained large numbers of subsistence farmers, 
who by virtue of their usufruct rights in land could poten- 
tially become the peasant proprietors described in twentieth 
century accounts, the West African peasantry was not yet 
established at the time of colonisation. The Gold Coast 
cocoa farmers had not yet made their mark, and the develop- 
ment of palm oil exports, largely from the Niger Delta, was 
by no means wholly premised on the work of small scale 
farmers. Slavery remained an important part of the economies 
in the north of Sierra Leone and Nigeria, and while these 
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areas were to be relatively marginal in the subsequent 
development of colonial trade, in the 1880s and 1890s the 
future scenario was unknown. It is only with hindsight 
that West Africa appears as a world of peasants. When the 
new governors arrived to take up their duties 
- 
often from 
prior service in colonies which relied on indentured labour 
- 
they did not begin from this assumption. 
The formation of colonial policies began, to this 
extent, in a vacuum. West Africa was by no means a tabula 
rasa, and centuries of trade had laid the foundations for 
a further development of African commodity production. But 
in the late nineteenth century, the trajectory of West 
African development was ill-defined, a claim which is con- 
firmed by Hopkins' argument that colonial rule was imposed 
in a period of crisis in legitimate commerce. Prices for 
palm oil peaked in the 1850s, and fell over the next twenty 
five years by nearly 50% (Hopkins, 1973: 133). The volume 
of oil exports stagnated, and it seemed that only active 
colonial intervention could rescue the West African trade. 
The administrators who took on this task began with little 
sense of the specificity of British West Africa, and were 
by no means wedded to the limitations of peasant production. 
Their conception of what was possible in these colonies 
ranged more widely, and as will become clear, it was only 
out of the experience of the first twenty years that the 
peasant road became an attractive alternative. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
'DEVELOPING THE ESTATES': THE PROBLEM OF LABOUR 
'We are landlords of a great estate; it is the 
duty of the landlord to develop his estate. ' 
(Joseph Chamberlain to Birmingham Jewellers and 
Silversmiths Annual Banquet, 1 April 1895) 
Until 1885, colonial possessions were restricted to the 
small coastal Colonies of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the 
Gold Coast and Lagos, and even this limited presence was 
criticised earlier by a Parliamentary Committee which 
recommended withdrawal. The subsequent Protectorates were 
established from this time onwards through a combination 
of treaties with African chiefs and wars of conquest. The 
extension of the Gambia to a strip of land 200 miles up 
the river began in 1891; the Sierra Leone Protectorate was 
declared in 1896; Ashanti was finally occupied in 1895 and 
declared 'open to British trade' (1) the following year, at 
which point the various treaties with chiefs in the Northern 
Territories also became effective. The vast colony of 
Nigeria was the last to be established: the territory 
occupied by the Royal Niger Company was not taken over by 
the Colonial Office until 1900, when it was joined with 
the existing Niger Coast Protectorate in Northern and 
Southern Nigeria. The continuing wars of occupation delayed 
the establishment of effective colonial administration until 
1906 (Crowder, 1962: 189). All four colonies remained 
administratively divided into the Colony proper and Pro- 
tectorates. Nigeria was in addition divided into a Southern 
and Northern Nigeria Protectorate, and before amalgamation 
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in 1914, these retained separate Governors. The Gold Coast 
was similarly sub-divided into the Ashanti Protectorate and 
the Northern Territories. Though from 1914 onwards, each 
colony came under the jurisdiction of a single Governor, 
the internal divisions remained important, since admini- 
strative decrees varied from one part of the colony to 
another. 
In the earlier period, the small coastal administra- 
tions-were reluctant to assume an active role. Even in the 
Gold Coast, where legends of Ashanti gold inspired a minor 
'gold boom' from 1878-1882, the colonial government was not 
prepared to intervene to aid the new mining companies 
(Dumett, 1966: ch. 2; Silver, 1981: ch. 2), and most of 
these early mining companies disappeared into oblivion. 
The major change in official attitudes coincided with the 
appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies in 1895. Chamberlain was a committed imperia- 
list, and more radical than his contemporaries in insisting 
on the role of public investment in 'developing the colonial 
estates'. His vision of the desired relation between Britain 
and the colonies was not in itself unusual: the colonies 
were to serve as sources of raw materials for British 
industry, and simultaneously as markets for its products. 
Where he differed was in his sense of the urgency of the 
task; with the rise of German competition, it became 
necessary to create new markets as well as consolidate old 
ones. Private capital was to be encouraged to invest, with 
government financed railway schemes as the main attraction. 
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State investment in railways could serve a dual purpose: 
provide outlets for British capital goods, and inducements 
to future colonial investors. In his insistence on the role 
of state railways, Chamberlain pursued a strategy which went 
beyond the immediate self-interest of private firms. He 
resisted private pressures for railway contracts, and con- 
tinued, in the face of some criticism, to insist that only 
the state could adequately undertake such major investment 
(2) The potential fruits of such development were, in his 
view, too important to countenance possibly ineffective and 
under-capitalised private ventures. 
The visions sanctioned by Chamberlain were on a grand 
scale, and presupposed colonial states powerful enough to 
effect radical change. The colonies were to be opened up 
to capital. Hopes centred especially on the Gold Coast 
mines, where Chamberlain now predicted a 'gigantic industry 
springing up' (3), and where a new railway was promised, 
to link the Tarkwa gold area with the port of Sekondi. 
Plantation developments were also projected, as they had 
been before the arrival of Chamberlain. A 1889 Report on 
Economic Agriculture on the Gold Coast took it for granted 
that future development would combine the 'petite culture' 
of Africans with the establishment of large European owned 
estates; indeed the report called for the training of 
Africans as managers of such estates, since the dangers of 
the West Coast climate would discourage lengthy residence 
by Europeans (4). Confidence was high, but as the exagge- 
rated expectations from Gold Coast gold indicate, knowledge 
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was limited. Proposals were both naive and sweeping, as 
when a 1897 memorandum on British Possessions in West Africa 
discovered the Hausas as 'quite the best native material', 
and recommended a railway network to encourage their 
migration: 'if we could gradually substitute the Hausa 
for the low-type Coast Native, there would be a great future 
for our West African Colonies' (5). Similar delusions were 
to surface later in plans to import the Orient, and sub- 
stitute hard-working Indians and Chinese for the unpromising 
Africans. 
Railways, mines and plantations alike depended for 
their success on the availability of workers, and in the 
first twenty years of administration, the British confronted 
the problems of labour supply and the difficulties of 
creating 'free' labour. In Britain, the compulsion to work 
was constructed over centuries, but with relatively few 
exceptions, Africans would 'work' only when forced to. In 
a world where most producers were guaranteed access to land, 
and hence to subsistence, direct compulsion was required to 
produce wage labourers on a sufficient scale. As was soon 
to become apparent, the problem of development was not con- 
fined to the construction of railways; more fundamentally, 
it rested on the difficulties of creating a labour force 
for public and private employment. 
The colonial governments first faced this problem when 
they sought out the mass of unskilled labour necessary to 
complete the conquest of West Africa, and carry out the 
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initial programmes of road and railway construction. With- 
out trains or motor transport, the numbers of porters alone 
were immense: it took 1,000 to transport a regiment of 
soldiers from one part of West Africa to another (6). The 
limitations of the labour market were quickly demonstrated, 
and in the first decades of administration, colonial offi- 
cials cast around for any solution. They toyed with the 
idea that ex-slaves could become the future reserve army 
of labour; in the interim they experimented with purchasing 
slaves for government work. They looked to the few coastal 
towns (particularly Freetown and Lagos), where some rudi- 
mentary labour market existed, as recruitment centres for 
all four West African colonies. When this proved impossible, 
they turned their gaze to the Orient, and speculated on 
the prospects for mass importation of Indian or Chinese 
labour. All of these alternatives were unsatisfactory, and 
the colonial governments came to depend on the chiefs as 
their main recruiting agents, a dependence which provided 
a link with the emerging policies on land (see Chapter Four). 
Since the chiefs derived their powers from their role in 
the allocation of communally held land, the demands of 
labour supply reinforced a commitment to communal land 
tenure. By the time of the First World War, a new pattern 
had emerged: the chiefs could serve as guarantors of 
political order, recruiters of unskilled labour, and 
simultaneously protectors of the peasantry from the ravages 
of private property. 
The story which was to lead to this resolution began 
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with the problem of slavery. As has been shown, master- 
slave relations existed on a significant scale in pre-colonial 
Africa, and these relations persisted under colonialism, 
though their extent is poorly documented. The Colonial 
Office maintained a discreet silence on the subject: as one 
official remarked, 'it is not an issue on which it is 
advisable to say much' (7). British rule was supposed to 
imply the abolition of slavery, and Governors who wrote to 
London for advice were often reprimanded for bringing such 
matters to the attention of colonial officials. Despatches 
referring to slavery provided too easy an ammunition to 
the anti-slavery societies (8). 
But despite the distortions and confusions imposed by 
the policy of 'judicious silence' (9), it is clear that at 
the time of colonisation, slavery persisted in agricultural 
production in the north of Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and 
continued to exist within the Northern Territories of the 
Gold Coast (10). Colonial administrators feared a premature 
abolition of slavery. In particular, the slave villages 
established in the emirates of Northern Nigeria were re- 
garded as fundamental to agricultural production. In 1900, 
the Resident of Bida described the plight of the master 
whose slaves had deserted him: 
'His farms lie idle for want of hands to till 
them, his house falls down for lack of hands to 
care for it; his wives or at any rate concubines 
have gone with their, i. e. his (sic) children, 
he is left destitute and as the farm slaves have 
been careful on going to take all the grain and 
crops that are their master's property he has 
not even food to support the remnant that remain 
with him. ' 
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He went on to predict devastation for the future: 
'If slavery 
- 
the native labour system 
- 
be 
abolished, with what are we to replace it? It 
will take years 
- 
generations 
- 
to teach the pagans 
who form the slave population the meaning of hired 
labour, and if the existing labour system is 
broken down before there is a new one to replace 
it nothing but ruin and famine can result. ' (11) 
In this comment, there was no hint of the future vision 
of a peasant agriculture. The Resident assumed that the 
choice was between slavery or free labour, and he doubted 
the ease of the transition from one to the other. Given 
this, he argued, slavery must be condoned. 
The problem was most acute in Northern Nigeria, where 
the scale of slavery is indicated by an estimate in 1908, 
that emancipation with compensation at the going rate 
would cost the colonial treasury several million pounds 
(12). In Southern Nigeria, the problem was what to do 
with the canoe slaves, since the colonial government feared 
the disruption of trade if these were to claim their free- 
dom. In Sierra Leone, ironically the colony established 
as a haven for freed slaves from Britain (13), agriculture 
in the Protectorate was similarly dependent on slavery; as 
late as 1925, it was estimated that slaves still consti- 
tuted one-seventh of the population (14). 
The colonial governments accepted and utilised slavery, 
not only to preserve existing agriculture and trade, but 
to recruit labour for government work. The principled 
opposition to slavery which supposedly characterised British 
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intervention in Africa was evident only in the efforts 
to eliminate slave raids. Early legislation was designed 
to bring an end to slave raiding and dealing, but without 
premature disruption of slavery itself. This practice had 
been initiated by the Royal Niger Company, which in 1897 
proclaimed the abolition of the 'legal status of slavery' 
within the Niger Territories it controlled, a cryptic 
formulation which was meant to establish slaves and free- 
men as legal equals, without necessarily dismantling 
slave relations. The absurdity was seized upon by the 
slaves, who deserted en masse (15). The colonial govern- 
ments tried to hold the situation in a series of similar 
ad hoc measures, all characterised by the same obscurity. 
In 1900, the Colonial Office drew up a proclamation for 
Nigeria, which remained silent over the existence of 
slavery per se, but firmly asserted slave raiding and dealing 
as punishable offences. Similar legislation had been 
adopted without difficulty in the Gold Coast, and was 
accepted in the Slave Dealing Proclamation (1901) for 
Southern Nigeria. Lugard considered even this too radical 
for the North, and introduced his own variant, the Slavery 
Proclamation (1901), which merely outlawed slave raids. 
No-one doubted the importance of eliminating these raids, 
which kept the regions of Northern Nigeria in a constant 
state of war and devastation, and interfered with agri- 
culture. But on this issue too, discretion was advisable: 
a memorandum distributed to officers in the North in 1901, 
warned against 'needless' harassment of caravans in the 
search for recently captured slaves (16). 
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Given the vigilance of the anti-slavery societies, it 
was impossible to pass legislation which explicitly admitted 
the maintenance of slavery, and this created endless space 
for confusion. The first difficulty for colonial governors 
was what to do with runaway slaves? They could turn a blind 
eye to slavery without too much fear of scandal, but how 
were they to respond to co-operative chiefs who requested 
assistance in the recapture of deserters? The problem was 
first presented to the Colonial Office by the Governor of 
Sierra Leone in 1894, producing this exasperated comment: 
'This is one of these awkward questions for the 
Government at home which no-one but a weak 
Governor like Sir F. Fleming would think of 
bringing before us. I would be almost inclined 
especially as Sir F. Fleming has come away, to 
preserve a judicious silence and return no 
answer to this despatch. ' (17) 
On this occasion, a cryptic despatch was sent to Sierra 
Leone, approving the Governor's conduct in refusing assis- 
tance. A similar despatch from the Governor of Lagos in 
1897 led to a more lengthy answer. Governor McCallum 
proposed that any runaways who made it to Lagos should be 
accorded government protection, but that runaways inside 
the Protectorate should be returned, so as to 'counteract 
the social disorder which any continuance of such absconding 
would bring about' (18). In terms which were echoed by 
the later Resident of Bida, he argued: 
'any sudden interference with domestic slavery 
is to be deprecated 
... 
(it) should not be 
annulled until we have a much closer hold over 
the country than we have at present and until 
we can by our own influence and example show 
gradually how free labour can be substituted 
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for serf labour without loss to the masters and 
without dislocation of industries, trade and 
agricultural enterprise. ' (19) 
Here, as in other instances, the assumption was that free 
wage contracts would eventually replace slavery. The issue 
was not how to transform these slaves into self-sufficient 
peasants, but how to regularise the master-slave relation, 
and give it the modern form of wage labour. The Colonial 
Office shared this concern, and the minutes on the despatch 
consisted of a lengthy discussion of the problems of 
creating a free labour market in Nigeria. On his specific 
proposal for assisting the return of runaways in the Pro- 
tectorate, the Colonial Office was more circumspect, 
particularly as McCallum was preparing to commit himself 
in writing in a circular to African rulers. As always on 
the topic of slavery, nothing should be put on paper: 
'Whether the policy be right or wrong, such a 
letter would be most injudicious. Copies of it 
would certainly reach this country, and it would 
be difficult to defend the Governor's conduct. 
Colonel McCallum should be instructed on no 
account to write any such letter and as far as 
possible to avoid committing himself in writing 
to any general statement of policy on slavery. ' (20) 
The 1901 Proclamations hardly dissipated these problems. 
The Northern Nigeria Proclamation, in particular, was a 
classic example of colonial evasion, which sought to elimi- 
nate future sources of slaves, by abolishing slave raids 
and declaring the freedom of all born after the Proclamation, 
but at the same time to keep existing slaves firmly within 
their bondage. The slaves were more simple-minded, and 
decided they were free. As the Acting Governor complained 
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in 1901, colonial officials who sought to return the 
resulting runaways were now in the position of breaking 
their own law, which made action to return runaways a 
punishable offence (21). The 'anarchy' precipitated by 
the Proclamation, and aided by some over-fervent admini- 
strators, who shared the slaves' interpretation of the 
legislation, was described by the Resident of Nupe Province: 
'the farm slaves of the Sarikin Paieko were 
apparently told by Major O'Neill that they were 
free. They immediately considered that they were 
also free to appropriate their master's property, 
seized the farms on which they were employed, 
took their master's produce and sold it to the 
whiteman and up till now have prevented their 
master from sending other men to work his farms 
or from collecting his property. Two messengers 
sent by me to Paieko to induce the tributary 
towns to their allegiance are at present held up 
in Paioko by these slave bandits who are lying 
in wait on the Paieko-Argeye road to catch and 
kill them. Such is the natural result of the 
indiscriminate freeing of slave low class pagans 
before they have been educated to know the 
meaning and duties of freedom. ' (22) 
Despite Colonial Office pressure, Lugard declined to modify 
the legislation to resolve this 'anomaly'. He preferred 
the more discreet process of sending memoranda to his 
political officers, to guide their efforts to 'discourage 
the assertion of freedom' (23). The colonisers were well 
aware of the complexities of the situation, as the 1902 
memorandum on farm slaves indicates: 
'"Plantation slaves", usually called "farm slaves" 
in Nigeria are not in all cases (or even gene- 
rally) household slaves. Their status I think 
more generally approximates to that of serfs 
attached to the soil than of slaves, that is to 
say they are inalienable from the land, cannot 
be sold, and have certain rights as regards 
produce, the houses they live in, or the hours 
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or days they are allowed to work for themselves. 
It is important that these farm servants or serfs 
should not leave their traditional employment 
in agriculture, and be induced to flock into the 
big cities as "free" vagrants without means of 
subsistence. Residents will therefore do their 
best to discourage wholesale assertion of "freedom" 
by such persons, explaining to them the difference 
between their status as serfs, and the status of 
a real slave. On the other hand where possible, 
and by gradual means it will be the object of the 
policy in the Protectorate to induce masters to 
enter into a form of labour contract which will 
grant greater freedom to the individual. ' (24) 
There were plenty of mechanisms at hand for 'dis- 
couraging' runaway slaves. If slaves had no access to land, 
and were denied government assistance in finding jobs, they 
could be treated as vagrants and returned to the only work 
they knew, i. e. to their old masters. The solution to 
the canoe-slaves problem represented the height of such 
techniques. The Southern Nigeria House Rule Ordinance 
(1901), together with the Masters and Servants Proclamation 
(1903), managed to reinforce 'slavery' without explicitly 
using the term. The slaves were treated as 'members of a 
Native House', and the head of the house was confirmed in 
powers very like those of slave masters. No member of a 
house could take up alternative employment without the 
permission of the head, who in turn could insist that a 
proportion of the wages be paid to the house. A system of 
12 year apprenticeship was introduced, and was explicitly 
discussed in Colonial Office documents as the alternative 
to slave raids in recruiting labour (25). Anti-slavery 
societies remained unconvinced, and continued to raise 
scandals when a colonial government intervened to return 
runaway 'slaves' to these houses (26). 
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Legislation for the preservation of slavery, both 
implicit and explicit, was protracted over many years. The 
Native House Rule ordinance was not repealed until 1914, 
and in Sierra Leone slavery was not abolished until 1927. 
As late as 1925, when a new ordinance was being proposed 
for Sierra Leone, Governor Slater argued against legislation 
to prevent detention of slaves against their will: 
'in theory at least it makes such immediate eman- 
cipation possible, and if a large number of slaves 
forthwith elected to claim their freedom on 
learning that their masters could no longer detain 
them against their will, the Chiefs and other 
slave owners might well become gravely distracted, 
and that at a time when we wish them to concentrate 
all their energies and goodwill on the furtherance 
of a vigorous programme of agricultural develop- 
ment. ' (27) 
The 1926 Ordinance still compromised with slavery, but was 
enough to produce the anticipated desertions, and the 
government was faced again with the dilemma of whether to 
enforce the return of runaways (28). At this point, it 
gave up, and finally passed the Legal Status of Slavery 
(Abolition) Ordinance. But as the Southern Nigeria legis- 
lation established, abolition of slavery per se did not 
entail dissolving the coercive powers of chiefs or former 
slave owners; if anything, formal abolition was premised 
on the retention of such powers. In Sierra Leone legis- 
lation survived which gave chiefs the right to control the 
movements of their people, and even to demand payment (2/- 
to 4/- perhead) from anyone wishing to leave their juris- 
diction (29). 
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These examples clarify the degree to which slavery 
was condoned in Colonial West Africa. More important to 
the argument was the employment of these relations to 
provide workers for the state. Slave labour was widely 
used for porterage, railway construction and military con- 
quest, and the government was even prepared to purchase 
slaves when necessary. In the 1890s, for example, the 
Governor of Lagos pursued a number of schemes for utilising 
slave labour, one of which was simply to buy slaves. He 
asked the Colonial Office to approve the payment of bounty 
to slave masters who could provide much needed military 
recruits, and asked further, if he could 'redeem' slaves 
in local slave markets (30). The proposal was always 
referred to as 'redemption' or 'ransoming' of slaves; the 
idea was to buy slaves at the going rate of £2 per head, 
deduct the purchase price from their wages, and release 
them after their time was served. The scheme was open to 
misinterpretation: anti-slavery 'fanatics' might read it 
as an acknowledgement of the right of masters to sell their 
slaves. But such criticism, it was hoped, could be 
deflected, when the ultimate result was a freed slave. 
The Colonial Office had no objections, and Governor McCallum 
went ahead with his plans. A later request for the payment 
of £1 bounty to masters of Yoruba slaves recruited for 
military service was, however, refused. On this occasion, 
officials in London feared that recruits purchased in such 
a way might make poor soldiers: 'If the Yorubas are so 
likely to desert, it is not worth while to offer a bounty 
of £1 to get them' (31) 
. 
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One of the difficulties with slaves was that they were 
unreliable. It was thought that they had an easy life in 
their slavery, and were not yet educated to the values of 
hard work. Thus McCallum was pessimistic about the long- 
term benefits of employing ex-slaves. Another of his 
schemes involved the recruitment of slaves for work on the 
railway extension to Ibadan7 in this plan, part of their 
wages would be given to their masters and the rest set aside 
to pay for their 'redemption'. But: 
'I had not been many weeks in the Colony before 
I saw that any such expectation was futile. 
Yorubas held in slavery enjoy any amount of free- 
dom, and from all I can ascertain they would not, 
in most instances, take their redemption even if 
offered to them. They have time to themselves 
to work in gardens of their own; they are well 
taken care of by their masters and the whole 
institution (now that dealing in slaves has been 
abolished) is of a patriarchal character. ' (32) 
The statement is hard to reconcile with the simultaneous 
fears that slaves would desert their masters, and testifies 
more to the unpleasantness of government work than to the 
joys of 'patriarchy' 
. 
Nevertheless, this unfavourable 
assessment of slaves was echoed many times over. There 
would be no easy transition from slave to free labour. 
Liberated slaves were more likely to migrate to the cities 
and swell the ranks of urban malcontents than to present 
themselves in orderly fashion for work (33). 
The only places where ex-slaves did become available 
for waged work were in Freetown and Lagos, and though this 
offered a temporary respite to the problems of labour 
recruitment, it was not to be a permanent solution. Slaves 
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escaping their servitude in Sierra Leone and Nigeria flooded 
to these coastal towns, and Freetown in particular became 
a potential labour reserve for all of West Africa. This 
dismayed the chiefs who saw a mass exodus of their labourers 
to the coast (34), and caused consternation to the Sierra 
Leone Government which found itself with stagnant production 
in the Protectorate and a swollen city in Freetown (35). 
Mass urban employment of the kind which was to become 
common throughout West Africa after the Second World War, 
developed at the beginning of the twentieth century in 
Sierra Leone. This reserve army was a source of labour 
for many parts of the colonies, but as soon became clear, 
it too was fraught with difficulties. 
The Colonial Office first recognised the emergence of 
this labour reserve in 1897, when the Governor reported on 
the scale of emigration for work in the Belgian Congo, 
Fernando Po, Sao Thome and elsewhere: no less than 4,415 
workers had been recruited for employment outside British 
West Africa in the preceding two years (36) 
. 
Recruitment 
for the Congo had already been a cause for concern. The 
Congo Free State had been taking workers from Sierra Leone, 
Lagos and the Gold Coast since the 1880s, and reports of 
ill-treatment had regularly reached colonial governors. 
As it became clear that workers hired for the Congo Railway 
were being commandeered into military service for the state, 
the Colonial office intervened to halt recruitment by the 
Congo Free State (37). Recruitment for private capital on 
the railway was allowed to continue, and it was not until 
1897 that recruitment for service outside the British 
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colonies was halted. 
Demands were constantly made from other parts of 
British West Africa for Sierra Leone workers, and especially 
from the Gold Coast, where the government was unable to 
raise enough labour for railway work. A major confrontation 
soon developed between the Governors of Sierra Leone and 
the Gold Coast over this recruitment. In 1901, King-Harman, 
Governor of Sierra Leone, refused the Gold Coast request 
for permission to recruit 400 carriers, arguing that the 
export of labour was leading to serious decline in agri- 
culture: 
'In the Colony, I meet men of property who have 
formerly employed and are anxious to employ 100- 
200 men, daily, on their farms and plantations 
and who can now obtain but a dozen or two, and it 
is pitiful to travel, as I have done, through 
miles of fertile land uncultivated for want of a 
population. In the Protectorate, the unanimous 
and ever present complaint is the desertion of 
the "boys" [1. e. slaves] and the absence of 
labour. The natural wealth of the Protectorate 
is to a large extent not harvested and undeveloped, 
and the trade of the Colony is thereby seriously 
interfered with. We want at least double the 
population we have and I would not willingly spare 
a single man. ' (38) 
Nathan, Governor of the Gold Coast, responded by raising 
his demand to 1,000, and produced a lengthy rebuttal of 
the arguments against recruitment: 
'The labour of a Mendi or Timani will produce a 
bigger profit if he leaves the Sierra Leone Pro- 
tectorate for regular work than if he remains in 
it to cultivate the soil, and further that profit 
goes to himself instead of being partly devoted 
to support in idleness a chief and his dependants. 
Naturally of course the chief prefers the man to 
remain in his country to contribute to his support 
but it is questionable how far the Government is 
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justified in advantaging the chiefs at the 
expense of their people. The Governor of Sierra 
Leone uses as an argument against labour going 
from the Colony that the payment of the house 
tax there is "largely dependent on the gathering 
of the palm kernels and the rice crops, and that 
this has been interfered with by the deportation 
voluntary though it may be of the youth and strength 
of the country". This is quite possible but if the 
youth and strength return to the country with 
money with which to buy imported goods and so 
voluntarily pay customs duties, the receipts from 
these dues are increased, probably 
- 
by reason of 
the much larger sums of money earned 
- 
to an extent 
that compares very favourably to the amount of the 
tax that would have been unwillingly paid by the 
same people had they remained in the Protectorate. 
I do not attribute much weight to the further argu- 
ment that men return to the Protectorate with a 
taste for drink and a distaste for agricultural 
labour. The possession of money enables them to 
satisfy whims which in time become wants that only 
fresh labour can supply. It is by the creation 
of wants in the natives of West Africa that a 
gradually growing inclination to work will be 
produced 
- 
not by keeping them to a labour which 
while it provides them with rice and palmwine gives 
no margin for luxuries. ' (39) 
Nathan's arguments failed to convince the Colonial Office, 
which pointed out that as Acting Governor of Sierra Leone 
in 1899, he had produced cogent arguments himself against 
such recruitment (40). The fact that Nathan as Acting 
Governor of Sierra Leone vehemently opposed the drain of 
labour from Sierra Leone, while Nathan as Governor of the 
Gold Coast found numerous reasons to favour it, indicates 
how far the outlook of officials was determined by their 
immediate situation. The problems created by the absence 
of a free labour market were sufficiently intractable for 
consistency to fall victim to expedience. 
The immediate issue was whether the four British 
colonies could be treated as a single unit for the purposes 
62 
of labour supply. If this was accepted, then some form 
of labour market did exist. The coastal towns drew Africans 
from the interior, particularly in Sierra Leone where 
oppressive slavery inland coexisted with the relative free- 
dom and independence of British West Africa's most 
Europeanised town. If the unemployed Africans who con- 
gregated in Freetown could be treated as a labour reserve 
for all four colonies, then it would be possible to deal 
with recruitment through a relatively free labour market. 
Even then it would not be 'free labour': Africans would be 
indentured for a minimum of one year's employment; employed 
as single men; and expected to work thousands of miles 
from the place of their engagement. But they would be 
voluntarily employed, not compulsorily recruited. 
The uneven development of the four colonies meant how- 
ever that open recruitment would sacrifice the development 
of one colony to that of another. The colony of the Gambia 
was so tiny that it need not be considered here. Sierra 
Leone and the Gold Coast, however, presented a sharp con- 
trast. From the early twentieth century, the Gold Coast 
became the centre of the most rapid West African development. 
The cocoa industry provided opportunities for large numbers 
of Africans, both as farmers and as porters. Gold mining 
established itself as a labour intensive industry requiring 
many thousands of labourers. The expansion of the colony's 
trade enabled the government to embark on more extensive 
programmes of road and railway construction, which further 
increased the demand for labour. Sierra Leone, with its 
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stagnant agriculture and urban unemployment seemed an 
obvious source for Gold Coast labour requirements. 
Successive governors of Sierra Leone were less taken with 
this project, and rejected the only possible defence: that 
it would solve the growing problem of unemployment. As 
Sierra Leone governors saw it, their task was to discourage 
migration to Freetown; persuade, and if necessary force, 
Africans to return to the Protectorate; and restore a 
possibility for cash crop production. Their fear was that 
if Freetown became an employment centre for the rest of 
West Africa, the movement to the coast, and depopulation 
of the interior, would only accelerate. 
In 1901, one of the Gold Coast mining companies pro- 
posed to the Colonial Office the formation of a private 
Labour Bureau to co-ordinate labour recruitment throughout 
British West Africa. This provided an occasion for all 
West African governors to give their opinions on the question 
of recruitment between colonies, and incidentally, on the 
place of private recruiting agencies. The response from 
Northern Nigeria was unenthusiastic: the North was short 
of workers, and already relied on recruits from Lagos and 
the South (41). The response from Southern Nigeria was 
more promising. The Acting High Commissioner considered 
that workers were potentially available, if only they could 
be persuaded out of their 'apathy' and taught 'the many 
benefits which can be obtained by the result of work' (42). 
He expressed none of the later fears of proletarianisation, 
but did question whether a private Labour Bureau could do 
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the job. In a foretaste of future practices, he supported 
the commissioning of chiefs as labour recruiters, as more 
appropriate for West African conditions. 
The Governors of Lagos and Sierra Leone were opposed 
to the scheme. MacGregor, Governor of Lagos, echoed Southern 
Nigerian doubts about private agencies: 
'Doubtless in a very few months such a company 
would be in conflict with the ruling chiefs, and 
disastrous war would be inevitable. The 
recruiting of labourers in every country in a 
condition similar to this must be in the hands 
of the Government, and can never be controlled 
as the bureau proposes, by the employer. The 
employer himself requires as much attention as 
the labourer; and the Government of each country 
is the only power that can attend to both 
efficiently. ' (43) 
Quite apart from this reservation, MacGregor claimed there 
was no surplus labour to be mobilised by a labour bureau, 
or any other body. Lagos already sent workers to the Gold 
Coast railways, and into military service in the Gold Coast, 
and Southern and Northern Nigeria; no margin remained for 
private concerns. The Governor of Sierra Leone repeated 
the by now traditional arguments against the use of Sierra 
Leone as a labour reserve: 
'I cannot too strongly insist on the indisputable 
fact that the population of Sierra Leone Colony 
and Protectorate is unequal to actual agricultural 
requirements, and that to induce the deportation 
of labour would be to inflict a very grievous 
injury on the community., (44) 
Since Lagos and Sierra Leone were the only anticipated 
recruiting grounds, their opposition was decisive. Their 
comments were passed on to the Governor of the Gold Coast, 
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who bowed to the inevitable, and in 1904 rejected the 
labour bureau scheme (45). The Colonial Office was not 
prepared to force Lagos and Sierra Leone to capitulate to 
the mining companies. Since each colony was to be finan- 
cially self-sufficient, the Colonial Office could not 
countenance a drain of labour from some colonies to others, 
lest it threaten 'autochthony'. 
The options were already closing in. Recruitment between 
the colonies was rejected as a means of easing the labour 
supply. Slavery was under stress, and could not be relied 
upon to produce 'reliable' workers. As the labour crisis 
deepened, another strategy was proposed: importing a labour 
force from India or China. The most consistent advocates 
of such schemes were significantly governors from the Gold 
Coast. They were the ones to face the most immediate 
shortages, and their interest in indentured labour was 
reinforced by their prior experience in colonies which 
relied on such labour. William Maxwell, Governor of the 
Gold Coast from 1895-97, came from the Malay States, and 
pursued this solution to particularly obssessive lengths. 
Despatches on such diverse topics as direct taxation and 
the conditions of life for Europeans were concluded with 
a plea for indentured labour from the East (46). He 
campaigned 
- 
unsuccessfully 
- 
for a subsidised monthly 
steamship service between West Africa and the East as the 
best guarantee of large scale immigration (47). The ideology 
underlying such proposals was explicitly racist: different 
races were characterised by different degrees of 
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industriousness; West Africans were lazy and indolent, 
while Indians and Chinese were honest and hard-working. 
'No real progress will be made in the development of the 
resources of this Colony', he argued, 'until a more energetic 
race than that which now inhabits it is at work here' (48). 
In similar tones, the Acting Governor of the Gambia com- 
plained, 'I am afraid we will never get the full value out 
of land in West Africa until a people more intelligent, 
industrious and ambitious, is imported, such as the Indian 
coolie or Chinese' (49). Since wage labour was assumed to 
be natural, the only explanation for African reluctance must 
be an intrinsic inferiority of the race. Another race 
should be substituted for the first inhabitants so as to 
ensure progress. 
In 1895, Maxwell asked the Colonial Office to approve 
an import of 800 indentured labourers from the Straits 
Settlement for work on the Gold Coast railway, and even 
went so far as to propose the encouragement of Chinese 
capitalists to take up gold-mining in the colony. The 
rationale for the latter scheme was explained by Antrobus 
of the Colonial Office: 
'It appears to be impracticable to import Chinese 
labourers on a large scale, and therefore Sir 
William Maxwell has put forward this scheme for 
getting some Chinese capitalists in the hope that 
it would lead to the immigration of Chinese 
labourers. If that should be the case, the 
country would probably be developed much more 
rapidly than it would be by English capitalists 
with native labour, and the English capitalists 
would probably be able to employ Chinamen or get 
more work out of the natives than they do at 
present. ' (50) 
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The proposal for large scale importing of indentured labour 
was backed by the Crown Agents, who were daunted by the 
difficulties of raising unskilled labour for forthcoming 
railway work. Labour supplies in the colony were pitiful, 
and as they saw it, the choice was between recruitment of 
workers in Liberia or indentured labour preferably from 
India (51). The Governor of the Straits Settlement was 
more pessimistic. In the absence of scheduled ships between 
his colony and the Gold Coast, transport costs would be 
high. Workers would have to be sent in specially chartered 
ships, and as it was unlikely they could be recruited in 
batches of more than 200, they would have to be sent over 
in half-empty ships, or else kept in Singapore until enough 
had accumulated for a full ship. Either way, the costs 
would be prohibitive (52). 
As it happened, only the second suggestion, for 
attracting Chinese capitalists, was put into practice, and 
in 1896, fifteen miners were brought over for an initial 
experiment. Two developed illness on the journey and had 
to be sent back; the rest suffered badly from malaria and 
returned to Kuala Lumpur with no intention of repeating 
the experience. The total cost to the government was 
£2,710 18s 3d (53). Proposals for indentured labour were 
resurrected in 1901, at the time of conflicts between Sierra 
Leone and the Gold Coast over labour recruitment. Both 
Governors turned to the possibility of coolie labour as 
the way out. The Governor of Sierra Lenone thought it would 
be 'a godsend to West Africa' (54), and the Governor of the 
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Gold Coast advocated the import of 800 Tamil labourers 
from Ceylon as an alternative to recruitment in Sierra 
Leone (55). The mining companies exerted similar pressure. 
In July 1901, a deputation from these companies met 
Chamberlain to discuss the chances of bringing in Chinese 
workers, but failed to convince the Colonial Office of the 
viability of their proposals (56). Even the Crown Agents 
were by now less optimistic (57), and by 1904 the Governor 
of the Gold Coast was adamant that he would not 'under any 
circumstances recommend the introduction of Chinese labourers 
into West Africa' (58). 
The problems with the scheme were overwhelming, and 
only an acute labour shortage could have provoked support 
for such unlikely solutions. There were four serious 
objections to the proposals: first, the cost of transport 
would be exceptionally high when there was no regular ser- 
vice; second, available evidence suggested that Chinese and 
Indian workers would be just as susceptible to the dangers 
of the West African climate as Europeans; third, the 
Government of India was no longer prepared to countenance 
mass emigration of indentured workers; and fourth, there 
was concern, based on experiences in other colonies, that 
racial tensions would develop between imported and indige- 
nous workers (59). Beyond Maxwell's ill-fated experiment, 
the only use made of workers from the East was in a few 
areas of skilled work. Nigeria occasionally employed 
Indians as printworkers, clerks and engine drivers, but 
found their demands over pay and conditions excessive, and 
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was glad to replace them with West Africans (60). Mass 
employment of indentured labour from India or China was 
never a serious possibility, and the number of occasions on 
which it was proposed is evidence of the urgency of labour 
supply problems rather than the viability of the proposal 
itself (61). In these early years, the colonisers were 
prepared to try anything, and bizarre visions of importing 
the Orient seemed as promising as any other. This option 
too was closed by the Colonial Office and colonial govern- 
ments were forced to seek solutions within their own 
colonies. 
What this meant was acceptance of direct compulsion, 
and reliance on the coercive powers of the chiefs. Along- 
side their more dramatic solutions, the colonial governments 
were always attracted to what came to be described as the 
'West African custom' (62). Thus failing the schemes for 
employing redeemed slaves on the Illogun-Ibadan railway, 
McCallum concluded an agreement with the Bale of Ibadan 
for provision of 1,000 workers to undertake the earthwork 
and provide the sleepers and ballast (63). McCallum was 
well aware that these 'workers' were in fact domestic 
slaves, but the details of recruitment could be safely left 
to the chiefs themselves. Local chiefs were employed as 
'assistant Engineers' at 5/- a day to supervise the work 
(64). The practice of paying chiefs for their services as 
recruiting agents was established in the 1890s, and in Lagos 
alone £4,000 was set aside in 1897 for payments of monthly 
stipends to co-operative chiefs (65). Sir Frederic Hodgson, 
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Governor of the Gold Coast from 1897-1900, summarised the 
broad terms of this form of labour recruitment. In his 
evidence to a 1909 Parliamentary Committee on the employment 
of Indian indentured labourers in the colonies, he said: 
'You see in Africa it is very different. You go 
to a chief and you say, "Chief. I want so many 
labourers"; he says, "All right, you shall have 
them; how many do you want? "; you tell him and 
they come to you and they are bound to work. The 
chief talks to them if they do not work. ' (66) 
With the chiefs accepting a double role as recruiters and 
enforcers of labour discipline, the advantages were obvious; 
and this procedure was widely used in the recruitment of 
unskilled labour. 
The requirements for skilled labour were relatively 
minor, and could normally be met. Creoles from Sierra Leone 
were available for clerical work; Kru workers from Liberia 
could be taken on for shipping and dock work. Beyond this, 
each colonial government built up a small nucleus of perma- 
nent workers for the railways and Public Works Department 
(P. W. D. ) Although these workers proved a problem in being 
the first to organise effective strikes (Hughes and Cohen, 
1978), there was never any difficulty over recruitment to 
such jobs. 
It was in the mobilisation of unskilled labour that 
the colonial states faced their real problems, and here 
they turned to the chiefs. The construction of roads was 
divided into two categories: the majority of roads were 
designated as 'Native' or 'political' roads, and these were 
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constructed and maintained by unpaid compulsory labour, 
through what amounted to a system of labour-taxation (67). 
All able-bodied males between 15 and 50 (in Southern Nigeria 
this applied also to women between 15 and 40) were liable 
to a maximum of 24 days each year (68). Failure to comply 
could lead to a fine of £l or one month's imprisonment 
- 
an equation which indicates the low value set on labour. 
Sierra Leone was unusual in having no legislation to this 
effect, and the Gambia in having no time limit on the number 
of days which could be demanded. But the system as practised 
was standard through British West Africa. Recruitment was 
organised by chiefs and headmen, who received payment for 
satisfactory completion of the work 
- 
the going rate in 
1907 being 10/- per mile (69). The system allowed chiefs 
enormous discretion, which occasionally generated comment. 
In 1927, for example, the Secretary for Native Affairs in 
the Easte rnProvinces of Nigeria noted: 
'It did not surprise me to see Ibibios cultivating 
a farm in front of a road overseer's house, and it 
is quite obvious that such a system gives an 
unscrupulous overseer endless opportunities for 
blackmail. Now wherever I have been along these 
roads all the labour I have seen has belonged to 
the farming or producing class. The semi-educated 
youth may do his share but if so he was singularly 
inconspicuous among the gangs I saw. ' (70) 
The system produced cheap roads. Roads constructed by the 
P. W. D. cost £812 per mile if made of gravel, £1,232 if coated 
in tarmac, and £87 per mile to maintain. A report on Ashanti 
in 1926 revealed that the political roads, which were un- 
tarmaced, cost £l00 per mile to construct, and nothing to 
the state for maintenance (71). As might be expected, the 
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majority of roads in West Africa were 'political' roads. 
The way the system worked was shrouded in as much 
mystery as the relations of slavery. It is clear that it 
depended on a tight control by chiefs over their people, 
but it was never suggested that this control was anything 
other than a respectable feature of pre-colonial society. 
Colonial officials did not seek to deny the 'element of 
compulsion', but felt the use of force was sufficiently 
explained in references to the inadequacy of voluntary 
mechanisms. If Africans did not choose to work, then of 
course they must be compelled to. Thus a memorandum pre- 
pared by the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories 
explained: 
'For essential public works and for carriers, labour 
is found on a compulsory system by instructions to 
chiefs to supply a quota 
... 
The need for money is 
not sufficient to make the people come forward 
purely (sic) voluntarily. ' 
The system was perfectly innocuous since: 
'on the whole Chiefs have fair control of their 
people and orders given to Chiefs for supplying 
carriers, labour, grass, timber etc. are promptly 
carried out without trouble 
... 
Civilisation has 
not yet reached the stage among the rural commu- 
nity to breed a desire for independence from tribal 
authority. A tendency in this direction is 
becoming noticeable in towns. ' (72) 
In this way, the system of labour recruitment was presented 
as a product of African 'desire' to remain under their 
chiefs, rather than as a subjection to powerful figures 
who controlled their access to land and privilege. 
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Despite constant denials, the main difference between 
this form of labour and that employed by the P. W. D., was 
that work for the latter was paid. Recruitment methods 
were similar 
- 
through chiefs and headmen 
- 
and the labour 
was largely compulsory. Labour for porters was almost always 
forced: chiefs were expected to find the requisite numbers 
to transport colonial officials through their territory, 
though the work itself was paid. Recruitment for road and 
railway work by the P. W. D. was 'voluntary, except for 
essential public works' (73). The workers were paid, but 
'the labourers are found by the Chiefs of a division being 
asked to supply a proportion of their able-bodied popula- 
tion' (74) 
. 
The methods of recruitments were virtually 
identical for the unpaid form of labour-taxation and for 
the supposedly voluntary paid work for the P. W. D. 
Uneven development in British West Africa meant that 
a labour market did exist in some areas, such that govern- 
ment departments could sometimes meet their needs without 
force. The clearest evidence of compulsory recruitment 
comes from the inland areas, where commodity production and 
the money economy had not established themselves to the 
same extent 
- 
most notably, Northern Nigeria, and the 
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. In some areas, 
labour requirements could be fulfilled by migrants from 
the less developed French colonies, seeking means to pay 
their taxes, or simply escaping the labour obligations 
imposed by their own governments. But what gave the colonial 
states the flexibility to carry out work in areas and at 
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periods when such labour was not forthcoming, were the 
numerous administrative mechanisms at their disposal. The 
inmates of prisons, for example, were called upon to increase 
the meagre labour supply for the P. W. D.; long term prisoners 
were employed not only on the tailoring work which is stan- 
dard throughout most prison systems, but on many extra-mural 
construction projects. To give just one example: in 1919, 
the prisoners in the Southern Provinces of Nigeria contri- 
buted 719,044 days labour for the P. W. D. (75). When the 
combination of free and prison labour was still inadequate, 
the chiefs were called on as labour recruiters. Here the 
differences with the recruitment methods for political roads 
were minimal. 
The Gold Coast Government responded to its shortage 
of labour for the Sekondi-Kumasi railway by introducing in 
1901 a system of payment to chiefs for the workers they 
'recruited'. The Government paid 4/- per head for each 
worker recruited for 6 months, and a further 4/- for anyone 
persuaded to continue beyond this period (76). Such 
recruitment methods encouraged chiefs to coerce their 
people into employment, and could not be universally 
practised because of potential scandal. In an incident 
documented by Mason (1978), the Nigerian Government was forced 
to set up an official enquiry into the use of forced labour 
on the Baro-Kano railway, after allegations of semi-slave 
conditions. The enquiry admitted the use of non-market 
compulsion, but was at pains to discount rumours that chiefs 
and headmen expropriated part of the wages of the workers 
they recruited. The report denied complaints of brutality, 
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but did not conceal the absence of a free labour market: 
'It is true that labour supplied through the 
Political Staff are not volunteers in the sense 
of their being recruited in an open labour market, 
for such a market exists only on a very limited 
scale. Nor can the labour supplied through the 
Political Staff be described as voluntary in the 
sense of native labour being recruited by 
recruiting agents moving about the country and 
offering inducements and persuasion to individuals 
to enter into contract to work. Such a system is 
not possible until the country has emerged from 
the patriarchal stage, nor is it possible while 
we continue to rule the country through native 
rulers, as such a system would have a tendency 
to undermine and damage the prestige of the native 
administration and organisation. ' (77) 
As late as 1928, Nigerian officials admitted the extensive 
reliance on forced labour: 
'We are endeavouring to secure free labour wherever 
possible or voluntary labour recruited by con- 
tractors; but in the present state of development 
of the country the only efficient contractors are 
the native administrations and the chiefs. ' (78) 
Where these methods were employed to secure workers for 
the state, they could be defended as the West African form 
of taxation. The colonial states were not developed enough 
to impose modern forms of taxation, and colonial officials 
turned this weakness into a defence. Transport was being 
developed in the interests of the community, and if the 
community declined to finance it through taxes, it must pay 
in labour services. The Gold Coast after all was to remain 
free of direct taxation after the disastrous attempt to 
impose a poll tax in the 1860s, and significantly, the 
Sierra Leone Government, which had managed to introduce a 
hut tax despite violent opposition, was the only colony not 
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to legislate for compulsory labour (79). Taxation and 
labour-services were continually counter-posed; when in 
1918, direct taxation was introduced in Abeokuta Province 
in Nigeria without any reduction in labour demands, it 
provoked what the Commission of Enquiry felt to be a justi- 
fied resentment, leading to mass rebellion (80). This 
defence of forced labour as the alternative to taxes could 
be sustained only for the political roads, but it served 
as a cover for 'political' labour on other government pro- 
jects. 
The colonial states thus constructed an alternative 
to free labour. As long as they could rely on chiefs to 
recruit labour and impose discipline, labour shortages could 
be met. The failure to create a working class could even 
be turned into an achievement, as later officials warned of 
the dangers of proletarianisation, and presented the alter- 
native labour system as a happy symbiosis of the old and 
the new. But the methods evolved for meeting the govern- 
ment's problem had also to serve for private capital. 
Private companies turned to the state for assistance in 
their search for workers, and put the state under pressures 
which it rarely faces in advanced capitalism. The colonial 
governments acceded to these pressures, but often with 
reluctance and a nervous apprehension of public scandal. 
Coercion of Africans for the building of roads could be 
defended as a form of taxation, but coercion on behalf of 
private capital was more contentious. The state was caught 
between two unpleasant alternatives: either it put its 
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resources at the disposal of these companies, and sinned 
against the prescriptions of liberal-democracy; or it left 
the companies to their own devices and threatened the 
fragile political order of the colonies. Neither alterna- 
tive was welcome, and the hardening of attitudes to private 
foreign capital must be understood in this light. 
Despite expectations, plantation developments were 
minimal, and though a few were set up near Accra and Lagos 
(Hopkins, 1973: 211), the main debate over plantations was 
to come later as Lever pursued his projects for the palm 
oil industry (Chapter Five). In the earlier years of the 
twentieth century, it was mainly the Gold Coast mining 
companies that demanded African labour, and it was in its 
relations with these companies that the government had to 
face the consequences of the limited labour market. In 
1897, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was formed, and in 
1901-2, the second 'gold boom' took place, with an estimated 
400 companies floated to develop the supposedly endless gold 
reserves (Silver, 1981: 49). European mining operations 
coincided however with the rise of the cocoa industry, 
which made extensive demands for labour for both farm work 
and porterage, and simultaneously encouraged government 
investment in railways. In this competitive labour market, 
the mining companies usually lost out, since even those 
Africans prepared to work for wages usually avoided the 
dangers of mine labour. For a number of reasons, the 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was usually able to meet its 
labour needs (81), but the other mining companies faced a 
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chronic labour shortage throughout the first thirty years 
of the century. As has been mentioned, they appealed in 
1901 for a private labour bureau to assist recruitment, and 
later supported proposals for importing Chinese labourers, 
but neither of these schemes came to anything. Subsequent 
negotiations pointed up one of the problem areas in official 
labour policy: the state had to choose between allowing the 
companies to solve their problems in their own way, which 
could interfere with the emerging pattern of co-operation 
between government and chiefs, or it had to assume responsi- 
bility for the labour needs of the companies. Faced with 
this choice, the state usually opted for the latter, but 
relations with the companies were increasingly fraught. 
As it became clear that they could rely neither on 
recruitment from Sierra Leone, nor on indentured labour, 
the mining companies turned to South Africa for inspiration. 
They proposed the introduction of pass laws to enforce 
labour discipline on recalcitrant Africans (Mason, 1978; 
Silver, 1981: ch. 3). They wanted a system of labour 
registration, in which workers would have to submit their 
certificates to the employers for the duration of their 
contract; any worker who absconded could then be readily 
identified. Governor Nathan was prepared to condone this 
scheme, and introduced a Concessions Labour Bill (1903) 
which embodied these proposals; but the succeeding Governor 
was antagonistic, and insisted that recruitment remain 
under the control of the state (82). He proposed that the 
Transport Department take on the job, using village headmen 
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to find the workers; as a concession to the companies, the 
Department would draw up a written contract recording a 
description of the worker, so as to aid apprehension of 
deserters (83). The issue was whether companies could be 
permitted to regulate their own labour, or forced to submit 
to government regulation. Capital objected to the new 
scheme, claiming the fees for workers were prohibitive; 
more importantly, as Silver suggests, they resisted the loss 
of their disciplinary powers consequent on government pay- 
ment of wages. The Transport Department scheme was thus 
short-lived, and constantly undermined by the companies' 
own private recruiters, who continued to compete with the 
official schemes, offering higher wages. 'Its atrophy', 
Silver argues, 'was therefore the consequence of the struggle 
between the mines' management and the colonial government, 
over the extent to which the companies were to be allowed 
a free hand with respect to the problems of labour control' 
(p. 59) 
. 
Labour shortages continued, and in 1906 the government 
began thepractice of recruitment of forced labour from the 
Northern Territories, which with occasional suspension, 
continued for the next twenty years (Thomas, 1973; Silver, 
1981). The companies pressed for greater autonomy in the 
field, and in 1909 proposed a Labour Bureau in which the 
state would have minority representation. The plan again 
was for pass laws to prevent desertions, and mining compounds 
to imprison workers at their place of employment. As with 
their first attempts, they met with some sympathy from 
colonial officials, but Governor Rodger returned to the 
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colony determined to resist, and was able to persuade the 
Colonial Office that the proposal was unacceptable (84). 
The conflict between government and companies reached its 
height when Mr Giles Hunt, representative in the Gold Coast 
of the Mine Managers' Association, declared that 'the 
Association is not prepared to admit that the recruiting 
of labour must be subject to Government regulations' (85). 
At this point, the company directors felt things had gone 
too far, and hastened to conciliate the Governor by 
dropping Hunt, and appointing a replacement (86). Govern- 
ment recruitment for the mines continued (87). 
Governor Rodger was echoing the doubts expressed earlier 
on the proposal for a private Labour Bureau to organise 
recruitment throughout West Africa. As in the earlier case, 
the fear was that a private body, lacking the experience 
of government officers, would find itself 'in conflict with 
the ruling chiefs', and undermine the existing arrangements 
for labour recruitment. In a world where labour depended 
on force, capital could not be trusted to act freely. 
Conflicts were developing over the growing independence of 
the mining companies, particularly in the mining villages 
which they set up in 1903. These never developed into the 
closed compounds of South Africa, but they did remain 
primarily under the control of the companies, and the 
government was unable to assert itself as the sovereign 
power. The compounds became like private empires, and a 
bye-word throughout West Africa. Thus in 1912, the Governor 
of Northern Nigeria acted on the experience of the Gold 
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Coast Government to make it clear that mining companies in 
Nigeria would have no authority over the camps. A Colonial 
Office official commented at the time, in the Gold Coast 
'there are "mining villages" in which the Government has 
practically no control, and where a Government doctor is 
only allowed to walk around on being invited to do so, and 
cannot insist on any sanitary requirements being complied 
with, or call for any statistics' (88). 
Conditions in these villages came to a head in 1923, 
when the death rates of workers reached proportions alarming 
even to the colonial state. Deaths among underground 
workers at the Taquah and Abosso Consolidated mines reached 
64.7 per thousand, without counting deaths from accidents, 
and as a Colonial Office official remarked, even in the 
Transvaal, death rates were only 11.2 per thousand (89). 
At this point government involvement in recruitment from 
the Northern Territories was halted, and the companies 
stumbled on, until the world depression of the 1930s finally 
solved the problems of labour supply. 
The crucial point in relations between capital and 
the state was not the use of force as such, but the extent 
to which the state could exercise sovereignty. The use of 
direct force was of course embarrassing. As its extent 
became clear, it became more difficult to defend, and 
Guggisberg explained that he had not realised that Political 
Officers specified the actual number of workers to the 
chiefs they employed as recruiters (90). But as a Colonial 
Office official cavalierly remarked in 1924: 
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'in dealing with the primitive races of tropical 
Africa it is difficult to say where persuasion 
ends and compulsion begins 
- 
especially when it is 
remembered that most, if not all, of them are 
living under a patriarchal system which places 
great power in the hands of the Chief. ' (91) 
Faced with a choice between government recruitment for 
private enterprise, and private control over recruitment, 
the colonial states always preferred the former to the latter. 
The official position was that companies could not be trusted; 
their relative ignorance of local customs could provoke 
serious confrontation. Better by far to entrust the problem 
to officers with good local contacts, and some understanding 
of local constraints. Yet government involvement in mass 
recruitment was also fraught with difficulties, as the 
scandal of mortality rates in the Gold Coast mines revealed. 
The government could hardly afford to be cast in the role 
of recruiting Northern Territories' workers 'to be sent 
down to their deaths' (92). Liberal democracy in Britain, 
and African opposition in the colonies, would not stand for 
it. 
There was no way out of this dilemma. Every alterna- 
tive to a free labour market carried its own difficulties: 
slavery could operate only in secret; ex-slaves were poor 
workers; recruitment from less developed colonies under- 
mined the principles of financial self-sufficiency; and 
indentured labour from the East was a hopeless dream. The 
incapacity of the state to establish a free labour market 
inevitably led it into deteriorating relations with capital 
operating in the colonies. In this situation, the govern- 
ment developed a more critical approach to the mining 
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companies. Increasingly, the Gold Coast Government 
expressed opposition to the disruptive activities of the 
companies, and the rise of the cocoa industry provided it 
with a rationale for disparagement of gold mining. 
'The period of ambiguity in the relationship of the 
colonial state with the mining companies had lasted 
until about 1909, during which time gold production 
was increasing dramatically, both in absolute terms, 
and as a proportion of total export revenue. How- 
ever, by 1909 the trend in cocoa production had 
made clear the export potential of the crop, and 
by 1910 cocoa had assumed its position as the 
Colony's primary source of export revenue. Not 
coincidentally it was in the 1909-10 period that 
the government came out strongly in opposition to 
the interests of the mining companies. ' 
(Silver, 1981: 66) 
This distancing from the mining companies became even more 
explicit in later years. Guggisberg in particular, took 
up a 'somewhat controversial' position in his report on 
the mines in 1926: 
'Much as I recognise the value of mines to this 
country, there is no question whatever but that, 
first and foremost, this is an agricultural 
country and its future development depends on the 
maintenance of our agricultural exports. There 
is no doubt that mining companies increase to 
an appreciable extent the spending power of the 
people, but on the other hand they bring in 
their train certain very undesirable factors. 
It is my considered opinion that, if the whole of 
the mining operations disappeared from the Gold 
Coast tomorrow, it would be for the good of the 
people and would not affect the revenue of the 
country. 
Unfortunately however, the Gold Coast is pecu- 
liarly rich in minerals and Government would be 
undertaking an impossible task to oppose their 
development. All that we can do is to give them 
such facilities in communications as are possible 
and to safeguard the people against the evil 
effects of the mining operations. ' (93) 
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High on Guggisberg's list of the 'evil effects' was the 
creation of a class of wage labourers, now seen as less 
civilised than their peasant brothers: 
'the inhabitants of the mining villages form a 
cosmopolitan crowd of hired labourers, whose 
moral development compares very unfavourably 
with that of the rest of the country. ' (94) 
This problem was extensively discussed in the inter-war 
years 
- 
how to deal with the destructive effects of the 
new class on the social and political fabric of the 
colonies? (especially in Orde-Browne, 1933; Davis (ed), 
1933). Workers from the Northern Territories could at 
least be shipped back to their homes on the completion of 
their 12 month contract (95). But the remainder of mine 
workers were recruited on a daily basis from the inhabitants 
of the villages and surrounding areas. These workers were 
irregularly employed, and they necessarily supplemented 
their wages by income from other quarters 
- 
petty trade, 
some subsistence farming, and as Silver (1981) has shown, 
theft of gold ore. Their irregular employment would hardly 
induce the values of thrift and hard work which formed the 
basis of Guggisberg's conception of 'moral development'. 
By the 1920s it was commonly suspected that the 
colonial states were antagonistic to private foreign capital. 
They had not allowed the mining companies all they wanted; 
they were seen as reluctant to condone further sales of 
land to European companies; they were criticised for their 
policy of state railways, and their insistence on a state 
monopoly in the coal fields in Nigeria. In 1923 the 
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Secretary of State appointed a committee to investigate 
these suspicions that private enterprise is not welcome 
to the administrators of the territories concerned' (96), 
and critics were able to give full rein to their dissatis- 
faction: 
'What is there to encourage British enterprise 
in West Africa? The Government have (sic) seized 
on anything that they consider profitable. They 
take the railways. They immediately take all the 
sites in a town. They also seize the harbours 
and you have instances of coal. What is there 
left? It is a policy of a kind of State owned 
country. There is nothing left for private 
enterprise. ' (97) 
Such complaints were extreme, but similar doubts were 
widely expressed, and were to some extent justified. When 
it came to questions of labour control, the colonial states 
clearly preferred public over private initiatives, and 
what resistance there was to private investment had its 
roots in this. As the Committee reported: 
'its political staff is in a far better position 
to handle indigenous labour than the contractor, 
who necessarily enters as a competitor against 
other employers, including the State itself. ' (98) 
It concluded that the existing emphasis on state construc- 
tion and management was the most appropriate to the 
circumstances. The argument was not new. As early as 
1901, Chamberlain defended his policy of state railway 
construction on the basis that government could better co- 
ordinate labour supplies. 'If the line to Coomassie is to 
be finished within a reasonable time', he argued, 'it is 
necessary, owing to the scarcity of labour, to decline to 
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take up, or allow anyone else to take up, any scheme 
involving the employment of many labourers until the line 
has been finished to Coomassie' (99) 
. 
The same argument was applied to the coal fields at 
Enugu in Nigeria, where state mines operated from 1915. 
The London, Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of Commerce 
joined forces with other representatives of private capital 
to question this state monopoly, and again the defence was 
that the state could best ensure labour supplies. In his 
address to the Nigerian Legislative Council in 1923, 
Clifford argued: 
'All the labour employed in the Government 
colliery is voluntary, but a good deal of con- 
sultation with the local chiefs and detailed 
arrangement and organisation on the part of the 
Political Officers has been needed before the 
stream of supply has been made to flow as evenly 
and as regularly as it flows today. For recruit- 
ment of its labour, a private company, of course, 
would have to rely upon its own resources with- 
out looking to Government for any extraneous aid; 
and its advent to the coal field could hardly 
fail to increase the cost of labour and there- 
with the cost of the coal at the pit's mouth. ' (100) 
Even with the formal reference to the labour as 'voluntary', 
there could hardly be a clearer statement of the continuing 
dependence on the co-operation of chiefs to guarantee 
labour. The government feared that the entry of private 
capital into these coal fields would either produce a free 
labour market, and force up wages, or place the government 
under pressure to recruit labour for capital. The Governor's 
address to the Legislative Council in the following year 
was devoted to the place of private capital in Nigeria. 
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He insisted that private firms could never recruit the 
workers necessary for railway work, and made it clear that 
the state would not help them out: 
'an undertaking by Government to provide and 
maintain a labour force for use by a private 
firm, appears to me to be open to the gravest 
objections; but it is none the less quite certain 
that, lacking such an agreement, no firm of 
contractors could obtain the labour it would 
require to carry out the work which is at present 
being done by the Department. ' (101) 
He went on to reaffirm his opposition to private investment 
in the coalfields. If private collieries set up in compe- 
tition to the government one, labour supplies would soon 
be inadequate: 
'Government would have no alternative but to exert 
its influence and authority to secure for the 
Government Colliery the labour necessary to prevent 
its operations, which are a matter of vital impor- 
tance to the whole of Nigeria, from being brought 
to a standstill. ' (102) 
This inevitable favouring of the Government Colliety, would, 
he predicted, produce an 'acute sense of grievance' among 
the directors of the private mines. 
Resistance to private recruitment of labour was fuelled 
by the fear that it would push up wage rates. The colonial 
governments had early discovered that manipulation of 
master-slave relations, and subsequent reliance on chiefs, 
ensured labour at low wages, and they suspected that private 
capital would disturb the labour market. Hopkins (1966) 
has shown how much the problem of wage levels pre-occupied 
Governor McCallum in Lagos. Wages in the city, at over 1/- 
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a day, were considered exhorbitant compared with those 
paid in the interior in the late nineteenth century. As 
Hopkins has demonstrated, McCallum's concern was to estab- 
lish a low wage economy in Lagos; his problem was not how 
to find workers, but how to reduce the costs. The alliance 
with chiefs provided a means to lower the price. But 
private companies, without access to these chiefs, might 
have to pay more, and force up overall wage levels. 
Government opposition to private capital centred on 
the question of labour, and arose from the absence of a 
completed labour market in the colonies. The fundamental 
fact was that no free labour market existed, and the state 
was incapable of establishing one. It feared the develop- 
ment of such a market, as a threat to the political order, 
which by the twentieth century centred around alliances 
with local chiefs. Economically, it was anxious that such 
a market would force wages up, and make its own wage bill 
too high in relation to its capacity to raise revenue. 
Even without these fears, it was unable to pursue the task 
of creating a working class, a task which took many cen- 
turies in Britain, and required a more centralised state 
power than that enjoyed by the colonial governments. The 
consequence however, was that the government had to exer- 
cise a direct, specific force to guarantee labour, and this 
presented it with a series of difficulties. Firstly, it 
was inconsistent with the practices of liberal democracy 
which provided the ultimate reference point, and was the 
grounds for scandal. Secondly, it led to impatience on the 
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side of private capital, which wished to recruit for itself, 
but in so doing would challenge the sovereignty of the state. 
The problems with forced labour, whether for public 
or private employment, were never considered sufficiently 
overwhelming to dictate state withdrawal from the use of 
coercion. In the absence of free labour, the colonial 
governments believed they had no alternative, and has been 
demonstrated, they were usually able to rationalise the use 
of force through reference to the backwardness of the 
African mentality. But as Orsmby-Gore stated in 1926: 
'the trouble with compulsion in any form is that 
it is only successful in the long run if it is 
carried out consistently and completely. It is 
no use imagining that you can continue a volun- 
tary system with a small amount of coercion. 
Any such scheme breaks down at the point where 
you are not prepared to go further with com- 
pulsion. ' (103) 
The colonial states were not sufficiently secure in their 
control to be able to countenance the degree of coercion 
required for full-scale 'development of the estates', and 
in this context, gradually withdrew from their earlier 
commitment to private foreign capital. 
Trapped between the impossibility of a working class 
on the one hand, and the many difficulties of forced labour 
on the other, the colonisers came up with the magical 
solution of a thriving peasantry. Needless to say, when 
faced with this thriving peasantry, they looked on it with 
horror, since it failed to conform to their misty ideal. 
But in principle at least, the 'policy' of peasant 
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agriculture provided a way through their difficulties. 
It combined the advantages of expanding commodity exports 
with submission to traditional authority, and seemed to 
relieve the colonial governments from their insoluble 
problems with private capital. 
The formulation of this West African Policy took place 
in discussions of land policy. Though the ultimate problem 
lay in the absence of free labour, the problem appeared to 
the colonial administrators in the guise of a land problem. 
In their discussion of colonial progress, the first 
administrators unconsciously adopted a vulgar Marxist 
paradigm: they believed the development of the productive 
forces was being held back by existing property relations, 
and they turned to land policy as the key to future expansion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'DEVELOPING THE ESTATES': LAND POLICIES IN THE FIRST TWENTY 
YEARS 
The pattern of labour policies was reproduced in delibera- 
tions over land. Just as the first solutions to the labour 
problem presupposed the formation of a free labour market, 
so the first considerations of land policy assumed a speedy 
transition to private property in land. As always, land and 
labour were two sides of the same coin. A free labour market 
could never come into existence while communal land tenure 
guaranteed access to the land: private property offered one 
mechanism for the dispossession of agricultural producers, 
and their transformation into landless labourers available 
for employment. In the first decades of colonial rule, the 
dissolution of communal tenure was widely favoured, and 
officials pursued policies whose principles were totally 
contrary to those adopted in later years. The sale of land 
to private capital was promoted; individual ownership by 
Africans was encouraged; African tradition was derided as an 
obstacle to progress. None of what became the pillars of 
the inter-war West African Policy was sacrosanct. 
In the course of the first twenty years, colonial 
administrators learnt their limitations, and retreated to 
the dream of a thriving peasantry. Communal ownership was 
the cornerstone on which this dream was constructed: it was 
believed to prevent reckless alienation of land, discourage 
absentee landlordism, and halt the formation of a landless 
rabble. It secured the chiefs in their traditional authority, 
and thereby strengthened their role as recruiting agents for 
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the colonial states. Hopefully, these chiefs could also 
serve as modernising agents, and press their people to employ 
the more efficient techniques of production favoured by 
colonial officials. The reversal of earlier visions for land 
reform was an acceptance of the limits of colonial power. 
The creation of a free labour market was abandoned as a task 
beyond the capacity of the colonial states. 
The story of this retreat is a complicated one. New 
governors arrived in West Africa full of reforming zeal. The 
field was open to experimentation, and numerous schemes for 
change were pursued. But few of these ideas achieved the 
status of legislation, since the constraints which dictated 
colonial practice soon made themselves felt. The dreamswhich 
underlay these early experiments have thus been blurred by 
the inaction of the colonial states. The extraordinary 
degree to which colonial policies changed, has been concealed 
by the relative continuity of the legislation. A study of 
colonial practice alone would confirm the myth so assiduously 
propagated in later years: that West Africa was dominated 
by peasants, and that colonial policy always sought to pre- 
serve this. It is only by considering the preambles to 
policy, the deliberations of what might have been possible, 
that the contrast with later years becomes apparent. In the 
dreams of projects that were never completed, we can mark 
the dramatic shift which the fragility of colonial control 
eventually imposed. 
The 'problem' of land first appeared as a problem of 
guaranteeing rights for private capital. With rumours of 
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gold, and prospects for rich rubber and timber developments, 
British firms soon began to push beyond the trading stations 
through which pre-colonial trade operated, and purchase land 
for mining and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. In the 
absence of private ownership, prospective investors found 
it hard to establish secure rights to the land. Individual 
Africans might be willing to sell the land they occupied, 
since the ready availability of agricultural land allowed 
them to move on. But when their rights were usufruct rights, 
they had no titles to transfer, and other members of the 
kinship group were likely to challenge the sale. Chiefs 
were frequently willing to dispose of the 'stool' land they 
held in trust for the community, and when so much of this 
was uncultivated, such transactions might seem straightforward. 
The land however was not 'their' land, and even if the commu- 
nity failed to raise objections, superior chiefs might claim 
jurisdiction over the territory and threaten intervention. 
The new 'owners' faced a potentially endless succession of 
claimants to their land, and anxious firms turned to the 
Colonial office for protection (1). 
One widely favoured solution in the early 1890s was 
for the state to appropriate the land, and set itself up as 
landlord to the new investors. The state could then guaran- 
tee security of tenure to European firms, while enjoying 
the additional advantage of a rent from their activities. 
The Governor of the Gold Coast suggested in 1889 that all 
land be declared Crown Land, with any existing rights recog- 
nised only for the lifetime of the holders (2); and a version 
of this was put forward in the Crown Lands Bill (1894) which 
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would have vested all so-called waste lands (a flexible 
concept, which could embrace vast territories) in the state. 
In the Ashanti Protectorate, where administrators were 
dreaming up plans for extracting a war indemnity from Ashanti 
chiefs 
- 
the anticipated secret treasures not having materia- 
lised 
- 
appropriation of gold-bearing land was similarly 
discussed (3). In the Gambia, the Governor proposed that 
the state take over all Colony land and all 'unoccupied' 
Protectorate land, and then rent it to Africans or interested 
Europeans (4) 
. 
None of these proposals was carried through, though all 
were given serious consideration. In each case, confidence 
failed at the last moment, and the legislation was dropped 
or reached the statute books in such modified form as to 
rob it of significance. The colonial states were not in a 
position to challenge the clientele of powerful chiefs on 
which they already relied, and the disadvantages of premature 
confrontation usually outweighed the benefits of land reform. 
In the Gold Coast, an alliance of chiefs and lawyers formed 
to resist such legislation (see Kimble, 1963), and even 
without such direct opposition, colonial administrators hesi- 
tated before the task confronting them. The arguments against 
wholesale expropriation were often expressed in legal terms: 
the opinion was that appropriation could be defended only 
in cases of conquest. But the real weakness in such schemes 
was that they assumed a state more powerful than the colonial 
one; the government could not afford to arouse the hostility 
of the chiefs (5). 
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The terms of the argument were nevertheless markedly 
different from those of twenty years later. This weakness 
of the colonial state was not yet romanticised into a 
strength, and the argument that the model colonies should 
promote African production, on the basis of African tenure, 
was not yet prominent. Most importantly, the communal 
system of land holding, later celebrated as the mainstay of 
the African policy, was in these years perceived as an 
obstacle to progress. In the interests of both African and 
European production, individual land tenure should be 
imposed. In the Gold Coast Colony for example, the Chief 
Justice suggested a tax on land as the best way to undermine 
the 'present wretched system of land tenure'(6): 
'Such a law would operate as a gigantic partition 
suit, gradually working itself out with compara- 
tively little friction. By this means land would 
soon be rested in definite persons. Families and 
tribes would agree to split up the land jointly 
or in common, and to pay for portions, and so land 
would soon become individually owned. Tracts of 
waste land would in many cases remain unpaid for, 
and would gradually fall into the hands of the 
Crown. ' (7) 
The impatience with communal land tenure was characteristic 
of the period, and was echoed in the comments of Governor 
Maxwell in 1896: 
'It will very likely be advisable to make native 
tenure more secure by declaring that any Native 
who obtains a Government certificate shall have 
personal proprietorship, and shall hold his land 
free from the operation of native laws or customs, 
which often make lands practically inalienable 
by the recognition of the right of every member 
of a family to an individual share in the property. ' (8) 
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The main objection to communal land tenure was that 
it hindered state and capital in the 'development of the 
colonial estates'; it set too many difficulties in the path 
of anyone who needed land. Maxwell's frustration was 
vigorously expressed in his famous despatch to Lord Ripon 
in 1895: 
'the Colonial Government is in the ridiculous 
position of being unable to erect a building, or 
log out a road on waste land, without having to 
go through a tedious legal process, concluding 
usually with payment to some individual or commu- 
nity, whom the prospect of gain has prompted to 
lay claim to the land. If it were decided, at 
some future time, to import Chinese or Indian 
coolies, for public works or as settlers (a 
scheme which has its advocates), I should, under 
the present condition of things, be unable to 
allot them land for buildings and cultivation 
without applying to some native authority for 
permission. ' (9) 
It was this potential in communal land tenure to produce an 
'owner' for any plot of land 
- 
even that which to colonial 
officials appeared obviously derelict 
- 
which most incensed 
administrators. The related concern to establish private 
property within African agriculture was subordinate: Maxwell 
certainly thought it desirable that African cultivators 
should hold their land 'free from the operation of native 
laws or customs', and hence free from the conservative 
pressures of other members of the family, but this objective 
he was prepared to shelve. The Public Lands Bill which he 
presented to the Colonial Office in 1897 contained a clause 
allowing the Supreme Court to impose partition of family 
property at the request of some members of a family, a 
clause which would have encouraged the more 'progressive' 
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African farmers; but he withdrew this at the committee 
stage, commenting that it was a matter which should be 
taken up at some later date: 
'that proper powers should be given to the 
Supreme Court, upon the application of a person 
or persons beneficially interested in what is 
here called 'family property', to order partition, 
I am quite convinced. But this is a matter 
requiring separate consideration, and it does not, 
perhaps, appropriately form part of a measure which 
has for its objects the settlement of the broad 
principles of private and public rights in land. ' (10) 
Maxwell undoubtedly favoured private property for the dual 
purpose of aiding sales to Europeans, and encouraging settled 
agriculture among Africans, and saw nothing to recommend 
communal tenure. But the immediate problem was to settle 
conditions for European appropriation of land. 
Direct appropriation by the state was an attractive 
solution to this problem, but was considered unnecessarily 
provocative. If the government could assert administrative 
authority over the land, and assume the power to regulate 
land sales and validate concessions, this would probably be 
adequate. This was the 'public lands' alternative, which 
was implemented without opposition in the Gambia with the 
Protectorate (Public Lands) Ordinance (1896) and the Public 
Lands Holding Ordinance (1897). Under this legislation, 
all land belonging to conquered or deposed rulers, and all 
land not yet owned by individuals, came under government 
control though not legal ownership. Occupants of the now 
'public land' had to obtain a land certificate, and pay 
annual rent to the government, a policy which was expected 
98 
to encourage European investors, and simultaneously promote 
individual holdings among Africans. The Colonial Office 
fully supported this second objective 
- 
'the introduction 
of individual landholders will tend to strengthen the 
administration of the Protectorate' (11) 
- 
but in the face 
of some opposition, the requirement for compulsory registra- 
tion was dropped. As with so many endeavours of these years, 
fears of African reaction moderated the original proposals, 
and the subsequent legislation was less ambitious. It was 
hoped, nevertheless, that the new Ordinances would be strong 
enough to attract capital, and the Governor announced his 
intention of 'bringing to the notice of capitalists and the 
Public in Europe, the chances there are now in the Gambia 
of acquiring landed property and safely investing capital 
in what [he believed would prove a lucrative investment' 
(12). These hopes were not to be fulfilled, and few inves- 
tors expressed an interest in the tiny Gambia. It was in 
the much more attractive Gold Coast that the real test of 
the public lands alternative took place. 
Here the problem was less how to attract capital, than 
how to regulate the rapidly developing market in land. 
There was a danger that the colony would become identified 
with purely speculative, even fraudulent capital, and that 
serious investors would be frightened away. Many companies 
were floated on the basis of an enticing prospectus detailing 
the land acquired in the colony. One case which caused alarm 
to the Governor in 1897, was that of the 'British India 
Rubber Exploration Company Ltd. ' which advertised itself as 
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owning 500 square miles at Appaboomah, rich in 450,000 rubber 
trees, with land titles duly registered at the Colonial 
Office. As Maxwell pointed out, there was no such district 
as Appaboomah, no land around Cape Coast was so well endowed 
with rubber trees, no one in the area had ever heard of the 
company, and no mechanism existed for registering land at 
the Colonial Office (13). The company was subsequently 
liquidated. Such occurences were by no means unusual; 
throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s the Colonial Office 
was overwhelmed with correspondence on fraudulent claims (14). 
The hope was that public lands legislation would provide 
the government with the means to control this land market, 
to weed out speculative concessions while strengthening pro- 
ductive ones. After an interim announcement that no con- 
cessions would be valid without the Governor's approval, 
the Public Lands Bill was drawn up in 1897 (15). As in the 
Gambian legislation, the basis on which land was declared 
'public' was extensive. The claims of African chiefs to 
the land were irrelevant, as was actual occupation by Africans. 
Only land which could be clearly shown to have an individual 
owner was excluded from the definition. A Concessions Court 
would validate sales to Europeans, and ensure that all 
relevant chiefs had agreed to the sale; that an adequate 
rent was paid; that the government received a 5% royalty on 
minerals, rubber and timber; and that no monopoly was de 
facto created by excessive concessions. Maxwell was confi- 
dent that this Bill would resolve the land problem: 
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'the Native Chief, who will receive through the 
Government a reasonable share of the land revenue, 
will not be unduly prejudiced, the native peasant 
who is offered legal proprietorship will be a 
gainer, and the holders of concessions who intend 
to turn them to account will have an opportunity 
of obtaining a safe and marketable title on fair 
conditions. 
These are the classes whom it must be the object 
of the Government to encourage. For those who, 
by the enforcement of a fixed system of land 
administration lose the chance of irregular profits 
enjoyed under the old state of things, the Legis- 
lative Council is not likely to have any sympathy. ' (16) 
As is well known (Kimble, 1963; Nworah, 1966; Omosini, 
1972) his prediction of easy success was not borne out, and 
the Bill was eventually dropped in the face of combined 
opposition from the concessionnaires it was supposed to 
benefit, the African chiefs, and the lawyers who enjoyed 
some of the 'irregular profits'. The means by which the 
state sought to aid private capital were not universally 
welcomed by capitalists, and the London, Liverpool and Man- 
chester Chambers of Commerce were less than enthusiastic 
over Maxwell's proposed reforms (Kimble, 1963). The colonial 
governments expected capital to pay a price for safer 
investments: secure land titles would cost more than the 
fragile deals made before regulation. Moreover, the state 
expected some share in the profits of private enterprise 
if it was to accept responsibility for promoting its 
development. This had been a clearly articulated part of 
Chamberlain's policy. The state would carry out necessary 
infrastructural work, but would expect to extract the finance 
for this from the capitalists it was serving. As he announced 
in a meeting with mining companies in 1889, 'I do not mean 
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to oppress or in any way hamper this industry, but I do 
not mean all the profits to go to the private individuals' 
(17) 
- 
The insistence on a financial contribution was generally 
unpalatable to those investing in West Africa. Many British 
firms involved in the colonies were experiencing severe 
pressures from the 1880s onwards, when the process of con- 
centration began which was to produce one giant firm in the 
shape of the United Africa Company (Hopkins, 1973: ch. 6). 
They were not prepared to pay extra even for changes which 
improved their long-term prospects. Thus while firms com- 
plained of the uncertainties of the West African land market 
when they found themselves paying several times over for the 
same piece of land, they were unwilling to accept higher 
rents as the price for stable ownership. Negotiations with 
local chiefs meant purchases of land at derisory prices; 
negotiations with the state as referee might ensure greater 
security of tenure, but could also prove more expensive. The 
West African traders and mining companies were not enjoying 
colonial super-profits, and they regarded access to cheap 
land or de facto monopolies as the necessary compensation 
for their risks. Not surprisingly then, they greeted the 
1897 Bill with some reservation, and attacked in particular 
the 5% royalty clause. But it would be wrong to cite this 
as evidence that the legislation was anti-capitalist, or to 
suggest that the policies in the 1890s were already framed 
within the vision of the thriving peasantry. Colonial policy 
in these years was firmly committed to the task of opening 
102 
the colonies to capital, and the recurrent disagreements 
with capital were over the price to be paid for this. On 
the royalty question, the Colonial Office accepted an 
immediate compromise: the claim for 5% was reduced to 21,2%, 
which was enough to quieten the complaints from this quarter. 
In any situation, the policies pursued by a state to 
protect the interests of capital as a whole, will bring it 
into conflict with individual firms. Nowhere was this more 
true than in the colonies, where firms frequently relied on 
under-regulated conditions for their profitability. The 
question of monopolies, for example, was always a thorny 
one. The state wanted as many firms as possible in the mar- 
ket; existing firms wanted as few as possible. A persistent 
objective of state intervention in the land market was the 
prevention of monopolies by firms who took up vast concessions, 
thereby excluded competitors, but delayed work on the land 
themselves. Fraudulent investors must be discouraged, 
excessive monopolies controlled. Individual firms rarely 
welcomed such measures, which restricted the flexibility of 
their own operations. As one timber speculator asserted 
when faced with the not ungenerous restriction to 40 square 
miles, 'if small concessions are going to be the rule, I for 
one shall be tempted to cut my loss now and be done with it 
as the import can never be controlled with an indiscriminate 
number of people importing' (18). 
Colonial states inevitably faced criticism from the 
firms they sought to regulate: that the regulation aimed at 
improved conditions of accumulation was rarely acknowledged 
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by such firms. Hence capital's failure to rally behind 
Maxwell's land reforms tells us little about the objectives 
of the Public Lands Bill. The opposition of potential 
concessionaires cannot be cited 
- 
as it is for instance in 
Kimble (1963: ch. 9) 
- 
as evidence that the policy was 
designed to curb capitalist investment in the colonies. On 
the contrary, all the evidence from the 1890s confirms the 
view that colonial policy was to open up West Africa to 
capital (19). Colonial administrators took it for granted 
that private capital would develop the mineral and timber 
wealth of the new estates, and their proposed reforms were 
designed to aid this process. In the 1890s there was little 
sense of the distinctiveness of British West Africa. The 
first Governors brought with them assumptions which contained 
no hint of a peculiarly West African dimension. Occasionally 
a note of caution was sounded which anticipated the ideas 
of the 1920s and 30s; the Acting Commissioner of the Niger 
Coast Protectorate, for example, declared himself in 1898 
as 'in favour of development by the Natives themselves' (20). 
But the consensus in the last years of the nineteenth cen- 
tury was for European capital as the agent of change. In 
land policy as in labour policy, capitalist relations were 
taken as the criterion of progress. The newly acquired 
territories were treated as a tabula rasa on which entirely 
novel property and production relations could be inscribed. 
The contrast between the first attempts at land reform 
and the dream of the inter-war years, was later minimised 
by colonial officials, who came to present British West 
104 
Africa as a continuous haven for the African peasant. Their 
rewriting of history was aided by the failures of early 
radicalism; since the legislation rarely reached the statute 
books, policy appeared more continuous than it was. And 
the contrast was further mystified by the formation of the 
'Third Party' of social reformers, who proposed land nationa- 
lisation for purposes quite different to those which activated 
the first land reforms (Nworah, 1966). The public lands 
alternative, which in the 1890s meant the imposition of 
private property in land, came under their influence to 
mean defence of communal land tenure. 
The Third Party alliance of trade and philanthropy 
brought together Mary Kingsley, John Holt (of Holt & Co. ) 
and E. D. Morel, who became famous for his denunciations of 
exploitation in the Belgian Congo. In the 1890s they 
appointed themselves as the voice of the West African mer- 
chants, though they were constantly frustrated by the 
passivity of their constituents. They were to the fore in 
critiques of government interventions, and particularly of 
the Chamberlain-inspired development policies, which they 
saw as merely a burden on the taxpayer. As Nworah puts it, 
'Holt disliked the "craze" for "development", especially 
the then current mania for railway construction', while 
Kingsley 'did not condemn railways generally, but there seems 
to have been no particular railway route she supported' 
(Nworah, 1966: 34-35). They saw themselves as critics of 
impractical missionaries and colonial brutalities alike 
- 
hence the name of 'Third Party'. 
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Their vision was essentially that of mercantile capital. 
No need for ambitious railway networks, the brutalities of 
concessionary companies, the meddling of colonial states 
with property. Trade could proceed perfectly well through 
the self-interest of European traders and African producers; 
the appeal of new manufactures alone would inspire Africans 
to produce more. The prominence of alcohol among these 
imports was unfortunate, but the civilising impact of the 
trade was greater than the degenerate effects of the commo- 
dity 
-a position which caused a breach between them and the 
other European philanthropists concerned with West Africa, 
the Aborigines' Protection Society (Nworah, 1966: ch. 3). 
It was this confidence in the role of commerce which unified 
the strands in their policies: the indictment of the Congo 
concessions; the attack on slavery and forced labour; the 
resistance to extravagant development projects. The state 
might assist in various ways, but trade was the key to 
expansion. 
'Official activity should in the main be limited 
to the construction with due regard to method 
and economy, of certain indispensable public 
works, collecting data, concerning the native peoples 
and respective regions in which they dwell, stren- 
gthening native authority so rudely disturbed by 
recent events; in protecting commerce, encouraging 
capital, preparing the ground for others; in short 
a work of gradual, sure, systematic consolidation. 
It should be our object to intermeddle as little 
as possible with native institutions, abide with 
scrupulous exactitude to both the spirit and the 
letter of our treaties with the Chiefs; develop 
the native peoples along the lines of their own 
civilisation both in the case of Mohammedans and 
Pagans; use conciliation in preference to dictation, 
gold rather than the sword. Administrative extra- 
vagance should be rigidly held in check for fear 
of burdening new Colonies with a load of debt; 
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the soldier and the policeman should be kept 
in the background, only to be used as a last 
extremity. Commerce, good roads and statesman- 
ship should be our preferable choice of weapons 
for mitigating evils 
... 
Patience, more patience, 
and again patience. That should be, ought to be, 
the corner-stone of British policy in West Africa. 
It was the tortoise that won the race; not the 
hare. ' (Morel, 1968: 15-16) 
This group had little in common with the visions of the 
first colonial administrators, and spoke more for a continua- 
tion of pre-colonial practice than a grand opening of 
colonies to capital. 
In the 1900s, under the guidance of Morel, the group 
moved away from the disappointingly apathetic Liverpool 
traders, and gravitated towards British radicalism. With 
his new ally, Josiah Wedgwood M. P. (21), Morel became an 
advocate of the ideas of Henry George, a Ricardian thinker 
who saw landlordism as the source of all human misery (22). 
The land, George argued, should be reclaimed as public 
property, a task which could be achieved through the impo- 
sition of a 100% land tax. Landlords could continue to 
administer their 'property', and retain any rent which was 
due payment for improvements, but all rent deriving from 
claims to ownership should be returned to the community. 
The application of this to West Africa produced a policy 
which seemed to fit with the interests of mercantile capital. 
Land should remain the communally held property of the people 
of West Africa, and colonial states should abandon attempts 
to introduce the retrogressive relations of private property. 
Agricultural production should develop through African 
initiative, without the direct investment of European capital 
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or the creation of large scale concessions (Nworah, 1966: 
ch. 5) 
. 
For Morel and Wedgwood, the evolution of private 
property in land was not only unnecessary to further expan- 
sion, but would indeed destroy those features of pre-colonial 
society which in their minds approximated to the ideal world 
of Henry George. Instead of intervening to promote indi- 
vidual property rights, the state should assume control over 
land sales and mortgages, and halt further erosion of the 
principle of public ownership. More concretely, their propo- 
sal was that all British colonies in West Africa should 
adopt the principle already embodied in the Land Proclamation 
(1902) of Northern Nigeria, which gave the Governor the 
right to proclaim areas as public land. 
Nworah has documented in detail the path of their cam- 
paign, which proceeded through Parliamentary agitation, 
articles in Morel's paper, The African Mail, and a constant 
stream of letters to the Colonial Office drawing attention 
to fraudulent concessions. It is clear from Colonial Office 
minutes that many saw the campaign as a resurrection of the 
proposals for state control associated with Maxwell's Public 
Lands Bill (23). Yet the strategy was almost a direct 
opposite: in the 1890s public lands were to be proclaimed 
as a means to speed transition to individual ownership and 
smooth the way for private capital; under the pressures of 
Morel and others, similar legislation was advocated as a 
means to prevent the emergence of private property in land, 
and secure agricultural development on the basis of African 
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commodity production. 
The superficial similarity between the Maxwell and 
Morel proposals has contributed to the false continuity 
between policy in the early years and the assumptions which 
came to dominate after the First World War. The arguments 
of Morel entered into the common-sense of post-1918 West 
African policy, although, as will become clear, his specific 
recommendations were not implemented. Thus a continuous 
line was traced from the land reform efforts of the 1890s 
onwards. On this basis, Maxwell's attempts, seemed, like 
Morel's, designed to curb capital. The continuity was 
assumed in reverse by African opponents of Morel, who argued 
that his proposals were simply a devious reassertion of the 
strategy for state appropriation they attributed to Maxwell 
(24). Yet there was no such continuity. In the first 
twenty years, 'developing the colonial estates' meant the 
creation of conditions favourable to private capital: the 
development of a transport network; the formation of a labour 
market; and the dissolution of communal land tenure to 
promote agricultural production by Africans and Europeans 
alike. There was little in common between this and the 
West African Policy as it was formulated in the twentieth 
century. 
The reversal was dramatic, and the ultimate cause was 
the colonial state's inability to create a free labour 
market. As long as free labour was the objective, communal 
land tenure could only be regressive. It provided a safety 
net for Africans who might otherwise fall into the labour 
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pool. It discouraged private capital by undermining labour 
supplies, and threatening the security of its claims to 
land. But once the project of creating free labour was 
abandoned as a hopeless task, and the chiefs installed as 
the only safe guarantors of labour, customary land tenure 
emerged as the central plank of the West African Policy. 
African resistance to government interference with land 
of course played its part. The formation of the Gold Coast 
Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS) caused some 
dismay to colonial administrators, and the organisation 
proved capable of raising substantial sums to finance its 
campaigns (Kimble, 1963). But the impact cf such groups 
should not be exaggerated. In 1897, Maxwell pressed the 
Colonial Office to ignore their complaints, seeing them as 
the voice of unscrupulous chiefs and lawyers who sought 
only to enrich themselves at the expense of the community 
(25). Later governors were more circumspect in their 
dealings with African opposition, but virtually all agreed 
that such groupings had dubious claims to represent 'African 
tradition'. And as events soon demonstrated, the Gold 
Coast ARPS was more concerned with the rights of African 
enterprise than with protection against the ravages of 
European capitalism (26). The ARPS certainly played a role 
in halting Maxwell's schemes for land reform, but they cannot 
be credited with responsibility for the subsequent favouring 
of Morel's ideas. 
The retreat on the land front coincided with the retreat 
on the labour front, and both converged on the new goal of 
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a commodity-producing peasantry. Two developments within 
West Africa speeded this change in colonial practice: first, 
the rapid confirmation of early fears that West Africa would 
attract speculative capital; and second, the emergence of 
a sector of British manufacturing capital which preferred 
to mimic merchant's capital, and 'leave production to the 
natives'. 
When the 1897 Bill was abandoned, the Gold Coast Govern- 
ment introduced a Concessions Ordinance (1900). This 
Ordinance set up a Concessions Court with the power to 
invalidate fraudulently obtained concessions, and to impose 
area restrictions of 5 square miles for mining and 20 square 
miles for agriculture. The Ordinance was, however, totally 
inadequate to the task of controlling speculation. It had 
no power to enforce the effective working of a concession; 
it instituted a two-tier system of validation which proved 
an easy target for devious companies; and it created a court 
which made little effort to ensure that the area limitations 
were respected. After 1900, sales of land were first 'proven' 
before the Stamp Commissioner 
- 
which meant no more than 
witnessing the execution of documents 
- 
and then validated 
before the Court, which in practice approved anything not 
challenged by a third party. In the gold boom of 1901-2, 
enterprising companies advertised leases which had been 
'proven' as fully validated concessions, and a market in 
'paper concessions' sprang up. Individuals rented land 
(often without consent of the paramount chief) at nominal 
sums, then sold the concessions in England for £1,000 or 
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more (27). The Governor complained that 'a concessions 
industry has grown up which is quite distinct from the 
mining industry, and threatens to ruin it and to permanently 
injure the future of the Colony' (28). At the height of 
the gold boom, when the Commissioner was proving more than 
35 mining concessions each week, only one company was expor- 
ting gold from the colony, and overall output had been 
declining for years (29). 
Companies could easily circumvent the area restrictions 
by taking out concessions under different names, and sub- 
sequently amalgamating. There was no legislation to control 
concentration of concessions already validated. Concessions 
were taken out over vast areas, on the wildest possibility 
of future gold wealth, and then remained locked up for 
generations. By 1913, the nominal area under concession in 
the Colony proper was 25,000 square miles 
- 
greater than 
its actual area 
- 
and though more than half of this had been 
struck out by the Court, or allowed to lapse, 12,000 square 
miles remained under notice of concession (30). Colonial 
officials were not at this stage concerned with the potential 
dispossession of Africans; they considered them sufficiently 
protected by the clauses which allowed them to practice 
traditional agriculture within the land granted to the 
concessionaire. But they did worry about this evidence 
that capital was turning to the Gold Coast for speculation, 
rather than production. Doubts as to the validity of 
earlier visions were inevitably raised. 
Coincident with this booming 'concessions industry' was 
112 
the growing interest of a sector of manufacturing capital 
which chose to operate in a merchant role rather than engage 
directly in production. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
relations between West Africa and Britain had been dominated 
by merchants, acting as middlemen between producers in the 
two continents. The development of the legitimate commerce 
in palm products had been premised on European exclusion 
from production; indeed as Dike (1956) has shown, African 
rulers and merchants jealously guarded the Niger Delta from 
European companies, sometimes to the point of forcing them 
to conduct operations from off-shore vessels. One task of 
colonialism was to break this African monopoly (Hopkins, 
1973: ch. 4) and guarantee greater access to the interior 
to such merchant companies. But the Chamberlain-inspired 
visions went further than this: it was hoped that the 
imposition of colonial rule would open up the colonies to 
new kinds of direct investment, as well as extending the 
older merchant activities. Mining was the obvious example 
of a capital which entered directly into production, but 
similar developments were projected for agricultural and 
forest products. As the discussion of early attempts at 
land reform indicate, the first administrators accepted a 
responsibility for encouraging direct investment by British 
capital. By the turn of the century, however, it became 
clear that British industrial capital might be content to 
continue the practices established in the first decades 
of legitimate commerce. Two new sectors - cocoa and cotton 
- 
emerged, both integrally related to British industrial 
capital, but neither dedicated to direct investment in the 
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colonies. 
The first step was the formation in 1902 of the British 
Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) on an initiative from the 
Lancashire Chambers of Commerce (Nworah, 1971). The cotton 
industry had recently suffered violent price fluctuations, 
arising partly from a world shortage of raw cotton, and 
partly from American speculation. The objective of the BCGA 
was to promote cotton growing in the colonies as a protected 
source of raw materials; and West Africa became one of its 
main targets. All four colonial states agreed to contribute 
to the costs of its activities, though by 1907 only the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria were sufficiently committed to continue 
(31). Though the Association did attempt plantation develop- 
ment (Nworah, 1971), it was soon convinced that the best 
future lay in encouraging production by Africans. The 
Association and Government would distribute free cotton seed; 
experiment to improve potential varieties; set up buying 
centres (with guaranteed prices); and build ginning factories. 
Peasant production was thought to be cheaper than plantations: 
as the Association Manager said in 1913, 'my experience of 
the African is that he will take on risks that people in 
civilised countries will not' (32). Africans working for 
themselves would work longer, and for less return, than day- 
labourers. In a paper to the Royal Colonial Institute in 
1907, one of the members of the BCGA explained that self- 
employed Africans were content with 2d. a day return for 
their labour, while wage workers expected between 6d. and 1/-. 
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'There are hundreds of thousands of the best 
type of native who would not go out and serve 
under a white overseer for a daily wage, but who, 
working in their own way, and in their own time, 
would accomplish far more than the average paid 
labourer, and would, in my opinion, be content 
with proceeds which give them even less than the 
equivalence of 6d. a day. ' (Birtwhistle, 1908: 22) 
Northern Nigeria was the Association's main hope, and 
expectations of future expansion contributed to Colonial 
Office support for a railway extension to Kano (33). As 
with earlier hopes of a gold-miners' paradise in the Gold 
Coast, the expectations were ill-founded, and the Association 
soon shifted its attention to Uganda (34). But in the years 
preceding the First World War, the BCGA put all the weight 
of a major manufacturing sector behind the peasant policy. 
British chocolate manufacturers pursued a similar line. 
Cadbury Bros. faced a peculiarly embarrassing scandal in 
1908, when it was publicly attacked for its reliance on 
plantations in Principe and Sao Thome as the main source of 
its raw cocoa (35). These plantations indentured labour 
from Portuguese Angola. Workers were taken on under 5 year 
contracts, but once on the islands were treated as slaves, 
and forced to re-indenture if they survived the rigours of 
plantation work. Any children born to them on the island 
were regarded as the property of the plantation owners. 
Cadbury Bros. had no role in the running of the plantations, 
since their general policy was to purchase raw cocoa on the 
market, rather than engage directly in production, but their 
philanthropic image nevertheless suffered a severe setback. 
With some relief, they turned to British West Africa, where 
a thriving cocoa industry was developing without any forced 
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labour. Like the BCGA, Cadbury Bros. experimented with 
small plantations, and like the Association came to the 
conclusion that they would rather leave production alone 
(36). 'We would very much rather not have the responsibility. 
Let the natives bring it to the open market. ' (37) 
Thus two major sectors of industrial capital arrived 
in West Africa, with interests quite different from those 
expected of concessionary companies in the 1890s. They did 
not want to invest directly in production; they did not 
require a mass of wage labour. They preferred to 'mimic' 
mercantile capital, and leave production in the hands of 
African peasants. 
The rapid expansion of cocoa production effectively 
destroyed the case for English land law as a pre-condition 
for permanent cultivation of cash crops. Customary land 
tenure, till then associated in the minds of colonial offi- 
cials with shifting cultivation, could apparently adapt 
itself with ease to settled agriculture. By 1912, the Governor 
of the Gambia, the colony which in 1895 had attempted forcible 
imposition of private property, could say, 'there is 
... 
no 
doubt in my mind that the tribal system of communal tenure 
of land is the most suitable for West Africa. The marked 
development of the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast during 
the last decade is a striking proof of what can be done by 
the West African under that excellent system. ' (38) 
Settled agriculture had created a new situation. As 
long as Africans were assumed to be engaged in shifting 
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cultivation, gathering palm products from wild palmeries, 
the establishment of European concessions could be presented 
as perfectly compatible with the older trade. Mining con- 
cessions, and even concessions to timber or rubber produce, 
could permit this traditional cultivation to continue. 
Africans could carry on with subsistence farming, or colle- 
ction of palm products, without interference from the new 
companies. Some might be displaced by the mining villages, 
but as long as it was assumed that Africans were engaged in 
shifting cultivation, such displacement could be dismissed 
as relatively painless. The development of the cocoa 
industry forced a re-evaluation. 
In 1910, an influential memorandum from a District 
Commissioner in the Gold Coast pointed to the potential 
conflicts between African production and private capital in 
the newly established cocoa industry (39). The clauses 
guaranteeing 'traditional' rights did not protect cocoa 
farmers. They were not engaged in shifting cultivation, and 
hence did not qualify. More than this, the establishment 
of a European company would inevitable mean demands on local 
labour, and cocoa farmers might well migrate to areas where 
they would be free from such constraints. Where a con- 
cessionary company was set up, it would press local chiefs 
to supply labour for its estates. And while the District 
Commissioner did not object to this on principle, he argued 
that a consequence could be depopulation, as Africans moved 
to areas where they could pursue their lives uninterrupted. 
'The native is very sensitive to anything par- 
taking of the nature of enforced labour. 
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Labour is always scarce, and it seems not immaterial 
that the Concession holder should expect chiefs to 
supply labour from among those subjects who may 
remain on the land over which the Concession rights 
have been acquired. ' (40) 
In this perceptive comment, the problems facing the colonial 
states were laid bare. In the absence of a free labour 
market, European companies would have to rely on semi- 
compulsory labour. Chiefs would be drafted as labour agents, 
and local producers subjected to labour conscription. The 
effects on the rapidly developing cocoa industry, which by 
now offered more hope for the future than the gold mines, 
could be disastrous. Peasants and plantations began to 
appear as alternatives, rather than as complementary paths. 
Certainly, the BCGA and Cadbury Bros. were beginning 
to draw this conclusion. Both had attempted their own 
experiments in plantations; both'-had given up and come to 
oppose plantations in general. Cadbury in particular, gave 
substantial financial support to Morel in his campaigns (41); 
while the manager of the BCGA argued in 1916 that colonial 
governments would have to choose between plantation or 
peasant production: 
, if utmost and sustained endeavours be made to 
teach natives to grow economic products for sale 
for their own account on their own land, the 
success of that policy will almost certainly 
imply that natives will not care to go to work 
for wages on European plantations. Thus if lands 
are granted to Europeans by the Government in 
the present stage of native policy, the Europeans 
will bring pressure to bear on the Government to 
relax Government efforts to native industries and 
to thereby cease inducements to natives to work 
on their own instead of for Europeans. If the 
Government refuses and still continues to teach 
natives to plant for themselves, the European 
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plantation owners will say that the Government 
has broken faith with Europeans, in that the 
Government has attracted Europeans into the 
country and to spend money on plantations, and 
then deprived the Europeans of cheap labour. 
So the Government should face this at the outset 
and declare their policy, if it be so, to make 
the native an independent farmer. Failure to do 
this i. e. confusion of policy in (a) granting 
lands to Europeans, while (b) pursuing the native 
economic policy, has already led to British East 
Africa becoming restless. ' (42) 
The BCGA did not want African production of raw cotton dis- 
rupted by plantation agriculture. 
The two roads to progress were beginning to diverge. 
The assumption of compatibility between European enterprise 
and African production now seemed naive. In the late nine- 
teenth century, it had been thought that the two could coexist 
in harmony. Indeed, the introduction of plantation agri- 
culture, hopefully using more sophisticated techniques, was 
expected to play an exemplary role, encouraging small farmers 
to adopt the more advanced methods of production. The 
emergence of the cotton and cocoa interests undermined this 
assumption. Even small model plantations set up by the 
state did not act as effective examples to small farmers; 
capitalist enterprises would threaten their survival. 
The arrival in the colonies of the cotton and cocoa 
interests thus created a climate less sympathetic to Euro- 
pean concessions, and more favourable to the Morel/Wedgwood 
advocacy of independent commodity production. The tide 
did not, however, turn overnight. The first success of 
the Morel/Wedgwood campaign was the passing of the Land and 
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Native Rights Proclamation, Northern Nigeria, in 1910, which 
declared all land public land. Even this, it can be argued, 
arose more from pragmatic revenue considerations, than a 
firm commitment to a new peasant policy. With land declared 
public, and under state disposition, its revenues could be 
claimed for public purposes, rather than disappearing into 
private pockets. Colonial administrators had long bemoaned 
the inequity of a situation where land values rose because 
of the colonial presence, but benefits accrued to private 
individuals (43). Sir P. Girouard, Governor of Northern 
Nigeria, was determined to change this. Proceeds from land 
sales should go to public use, and relieve the state of 
some of its financial burden. The ideas of Henry George 
struck a responsive note. 
In 1911, the Colonial Office decided to look again at 
land policy in the Gold Coast, and appointed H. C. Belfield, 
an administrator who, like Maxwell, had experience in the 
Malay States, to investigate the workings of the Concessions 
Ordinance. This was occasioned partly by the Government's 
difficulties in introducing a Forest Ordinance to create 
protected forest areas. All the influence of the Gold Coast 
ARPS was paraded to protest this legislation, which it 
treated as yet another attack on African ownership (Kimble, 
1963: ch. 10). The terms of reference given to Belfield 
did not, however, suggest that the Colonial Office was moving 
to unqualified opposition to European concessions (44), and 
his report in 1912 continued to affirm their merits. 
Belfield at least, still accepted that a capitalist sector 
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could play a positive and exemplary role; he gave no hint 
of a potential incompatibility between this and peasant 
production. 
'The permanent cultivation of land on scientific 
lines and under European supervision seems to have 
made little or no headway in the Colony, but 
should the time arrive when the planter acquires 
and develops the land, it seems clear that his 
example will prove at least equally valuable to 
the native, who will have the opportunity of 
studying the method of preparing the soil, of 
planting the trees and of treating the crop for 
the market. The average native of the Colony cannot 
be credited with energy, or any real desire to 
improve his position by personal exertion, but the 
success which is attending the introduction of the 
cocoa industry seems to indicate that he will 
follow an example which holds out the prospect of 
profit, and may be expected to take an interest 
in any agricultural project if assured it will 
pay. On the whole therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the presence of European industries in 
their midst is conducive to the material advantages 
of the people. ' (45) 
The fact that the cocoa industry had developed without 
European assistance, whether public or private, escaped 
Belfield's attention. According to him, Ashanti chiefs 
shared his commitment to European concessions, and were, 
if anything, disturbed by the relatively low rate of invest- 
ment in their part of the Gold Coast: 
'the chiefs have expressed to me their distress 
at the lack of European enterprise in their 
territories, and have emphasised that the white 
man shall come in and open up their territory, 
explaining that it is only by means of his 
presence and example that they and their people 
can become more prosperous. ' (46) 
The conviction that capitalist agriculture could play 
an exemplary role was apparently still shared by colonial 
officials who contributed evidence. Some pursued the argument 
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to its logical conclusion, and belittled mining investment 
as offering no useful lesson to the African small-holder (47). 
Sales of agricultural lands to Europeans were still seen as 
uncontroversial; if they were in conflict with African pro- 
duction, this was only in some far distant future when 
aspiring African capitalists might resent the granting of 
99 year leases to Europeans. The main recommendations of 
the Belfield Report were directed at the problem of specula- 
tion. It proposed that further area restrictions be intro- 
duced, not because concessions were innately undesirable, 
but rather so as to prevent monopolisation by speculators. 
Conditions should be introduced to force investors to work 
their land, or else forfeit their concessionary rights (48). 
The campaign for a new land policy continued. The 
mounting evidence of contraventions to the 1900 Ordinance 
had its effect (49), and the Colonial Office set aside the 
Belfield Report and established the West African Lands 
Committee (WALC) to consider the more fundamental issues. 
Morel and Wedgwood were invited to join this Committee (50), 
and under their influence, it tackled not only the question 
of land sales to Europeans, but also their especial concern, 
the relative advantages of communal versus individual land 
tenure. 
The evidence presented established for the first time 
the extent to which land had been commercialised, particularly 
in the Gold Coast Colony. Migration of Africans from one 
area to another was now a normal feature of life. Conventions 
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had evolved in response to this, though in most cases they 
took the form of demands for rent or tribute, rather than 
freehold sales of land. In some parts of Nigeria, selling 
land to a stranger was still considered sufficient ground 
for deposition of a chief (51). But a number of African 
representatives made their case for a clear recognition of 
private property in land. Some, like Mate Kole of Eastern 
Krobo, asserted that it was already well established, and 
now 'an appreciable factor in the social life of the Gold 
Coast' (52). Others, like Chief Adedeji of Ilesha, regretted 
its absence, and appealed to the Government 'to recognise 
individual ownership of land in the country' (53). Colonial 
officials were as ever divided in their evidence. One from 
the Gold Coast believed that 'there are many thousands of 
acres and thousands of pounds changing hands every year' 
(54), while the Governor maintained that individual ownership 
was still far-off (55). But all admitted that communal land 
tenure had been transformed by the development of permanent 
crops, and the creation of a land market between European 
companies and African occupants. In all the voluminous evi- 
dence submitted to the Committee, the only group which 
consistently denied cause for concern was the Gold Coast 
ARPS. Casely Hayford, their chief representative, expressed 
what Committee members viewed as a suspicious complacency. 
He suggested that chiefs could comfortably sell up to half 
their stool land without ill effect, and reminded the 
Committee that many Africans 
- 
particularly those descended 
from slaves 
- 
were already working for wages (56). He 
refused to acknowledge that there could be serious conflicts 
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between chiefs and commoners, since the people could always 
destool a chief who offended them (57). In contrast to the 
early years, it was now the ARPS who represented the 'pro- 
gressive' force in British West Africa, pushing for private 
property in land as the historically proven basis for develop- 
ment. All the arguments for tradition came from the colonisers. 
Morel and his supporters expressed their anxieties in 
a draft report (58), submitted in 1916; it was not destined 
to be adopted by the full Committee, but its contents were 
nevertheless highly instructive. Commercialisation of land 
was a danger because: (1) it tempted chiefs to use their 
traditional control over land to their own private advantage, 
and thereby undermined community confidence in them; (2) it 
led to land litigation, and expensive court proceedings 
between chiefs with competing claims; and (3) it promoted 
migration of workers for European companies, and farmers for 
more fertile land, and thus drew Africans away from the 
authorities to whom they were traditionally subject. Essen- 
tially, the fear was that commercialisation of land would 
destroy the authority of the chiefs through whom the colonies 
were controlled. The greed of the chiefs would bring them 
into disrepute, and weaken their powers. In the Gold Coast 
Colony, the land market had plunged many parts of the country 
into debt; more disastrously still, it had led the chiefs 
'to set aside "those rules and regulations of 
native tenure" which constitute the cement which 
holds native society together and to undermine 
the native system of government through the chiefs, 
which as we have seen, is the only way in which a 
country like the Gold Coast can be efficiently 
governed. ' (59) 
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The tendencies towards migration further weakened this 
cement. European concessions demanded a 'system of hired 
labour by natives not members of the community' (60). The 
immigrants would fall outside the network of native authority, 
and in the absence of a modern state, lawlessness would 
follow. Private property, in this argument, was incompatible 
with political order. 
The authors of the draft report were prepared to con- 
sider alternatives to peasant small holdings. They could 
wax enthusiastic over the development of large plantations 
by the chiefs, even when these employed some form of wage 
labour, but only because they considered such developments 
consistent with the chiefs' traditional powers. The estab- 
lishment of wage labour, the report implied, was acceptable 
as long as it was mediated through the pre-capitalist relations 
of dependency. Free wage labour was disruptive; what was 
effectively semi-compulsory labour was preferred as a rein- 
forcement of native authorities. Thus plantation developments 
by 'progressive chiefs' was paradoxically employed to defend 
the vitality of the 'native system of tenure', and to streng- 
then the case against the dissolution of communal tenure (61). 
In the deliberations of the WALC, the principles of the 
West African Policy took shape. It meant a sharp break with 
previous assumptions; a re-assessment of the place for 
European concessions; and a rejection of private property 
in land as the basis for progress. The shift remained, how- 
ever, largely at the level of intent, and barely influenced 
practice. It did involve significant changes in the terms 
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of reference used to evaluate the future of the colonies, 
but required no dramatic reversal of legislation, since the 
more radical dreams of earlier years had not been realised 
in law. The appearance of continuity was further sustained 
by capital's consistent indifference to plantation develop- 
ments. With the one notable exception of Lever's efforts 
to transform the palm oil industry (see Chapter Five), lack 
of profitability alone kept capital out (Hopkins, 1973: 212-4). 
There was no need for the state to make new laws to curb 
sales to concessionary companies, when these companies showed 
little interest in West Africa. Changing attitudes to 
communal land tenure were similarly muted, particularly as 
even those converted by Morel's advocacy to the 'native 
system of tenure', found his proposals for legislation 
politically impossible. 
The draft report of the WALC recommended sweeping state 
intervention to halt the transition to individual tenure. 
Except for certain urban areas where development was too 
advanced for reversal, it recommended state control of the 
land market. Governors should be able to enforce communal 
tenure, even against the wishes of the traditional rulers, 
by preventing sale and mortgaging of land between Africans. 
In addition, they should impose far more radical restrictions 
on the sale of land to Europeans, with maximum concessions 
of 1 square mile. 
But faced with the organised opposition of such groups 
as the Gold Coast ARPS, colonial governors could not imple- 
ment such proposals. Clifford, Governor of the Gold Coast 
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in 1914, considered such proposals political suicide: 
it 'would be regarded by the native population 
as a blow aimed at their inalienable rights in 
the lands, and as a direct breach of faith on 
the part of the Government. The loss of prestige 
which the Government would suffer were this 
action to be taken would be fatal to the efficiency 
of our administration, and would destroy the at 
present growing confidence of the chiefs and 
people in the bona fides of the Government. ' (62) 
However prescient the report might be in its predictions 
for the future of unrestrained commercialisation, it was 
impossibly naive in its prescriptions for saving the poli- 
tical order. Colonial governments could not use legislation 
to control the land market. They could not freeze commodity 
production at that ideal point where private property and 
traditional authority would remain in equilibrium. In the 
Gold Coast at least, attempts to intervene against private 
property would provoke a more immediate political crisis than 
that which they aimed to avoid. The draft report was not 
confirmed by the entire Committee, and its proposals sank 
virtually without trace with the outbreak of the First 
World War. Many of its ideas lingered on to be incorporated 
into subsequent visions of the West African path, but its 
specific recommendations were not implemented. In this way, 
the shift in policy assumptions never found explicit expre- 
ssion in a new strategy for British West Africa. 
It is not therefore surprising that few commentators 
have remarked on the contrast between policy in the first 
decades and policy as it developed in the inter-war years. 
British West Africa could be presented a model of enlightened 
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colonial policy, where pre-colonial institutions were 
cherished, where agricultural expansion was based in the 
activities of independent peasants, and where colonial 
administrators worked to protect these Africans from the 
destructive influences of capitalist companies and modern 
'individualism'. The past could be re-written to provide 
a perfect continuum. 
The continuity was little more than a cloak for inactivity. 
Old dreams of a radical rupture had died; new fears of poli- 
tical disorder had been voiced. But in neither phase could 
the colonial government act on its intuitions. The makeshift 
nature of the colonial settlement was already becoming 
apparent. The colonial states lacked the power to carry 
through their first visions of progress: they could not impose 
conditions which would create free labour without destroying 
communal land tenure, and they could not destroy communal 
tenure without weakening the chiefs on whom they relied in 
the interim for forced labour and political order. The 
fragility of their control made them dependent on pre-capitalist 
relations, and thwarted their early attempts to impose the 
bourgeois order. Fortunately, the reluctance of capital to 
engage in direct investment, and the discovery of the alter- 
native of peasant production, allowed them to retreat with 
honour from the task of transformation. They could even 
romanticise their failure into a success, and point to their 
policies as a model of colonial responsibility. 
But the new model worked better in theory than in prac- 
tice. Peasant production refused to conform to their 
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expectations. The 'peasants' kept threatening to turn 
themselves into capitalist farmers, asserting private rights 
over their land, getting into debt, and challenging the 
authority of the chiefs. And the problems of political 
order which had prevented the colonial states from pursuing 
their own more radical schemes, now prevented them from 
adopting the measures proposed to pre-empt this disintegration. 
Moreover, capital was not universally satisfied with the new 
model, and in the palm oil industry a major confrontation 
was brewing. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PEASANTS VERSUS PLANTATIONS: COCOA AND PALM OIL 
It has been argued (Hopkins, 1973: 212-14) that the peasant 
road was more viable than the plantation alternative, and 
that whatever the reasons behind its adoption, subsequent 
events confirmed the rationality of the choice. Peasants 
enjoyed superior knowledge of tropical conditions, and this, 
combined with their lower overheads and lower labour costs, 
gave them a clear advantage over expatriate plantations. 
Moreover, as the representative from the BCGA argued in 1907, 
peasants would be prepared to work for rewards which wage 
labourers would dismiss as inadequate, a point which was 
re-affirmed in the 1920s, when the colonial governments had 
to make their case against plantation developments. Sir 
Hugh Clifford, Governor of Nigeria from 1919-1925, produced 
in 1920 the following arguments for peasant production: 
'agricultural industries in tropical countries 
which are mainly, or exclusively, in the hands 
of the native peasantry: 
- (a) Have a firmer root than similar enterprises 
when owned and managed by Europeans, because 
they are natural growths, not artificial ýcreations, 
and are self-supporting as regards labour, while 
European plantations can only be maintained by 
some system of organised immigration or by some 
form of compulsory labour; 
(b) Are incomparably the cheapest instrument for 
the production of agricultural produce on a large 
scale that have yet been devised; and (c) Are capable of a rapidity of expansion and a 
progressive increase of output that beggar every 
record of the past, and are altogether unparalleled 
in all the long history of European agricultural 
enterprises in the Tropics. ' (1) 
Clifford's main argument was that no wage labour existed 
for plantation agriculture. He understood only too well 
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the inadequacy of the labour market, and correctly per- 
ceived that European investment would involve forced labour. 
He claimed, however, that an acceptance of the peasant 
alternative was defensible on its own terms, and that the 
social and political constraints which had dictated the 
choice of the peasant road were reinforced by strictly econo- 
mit considerations. There was in this view no conflict 
between economic and political concerns: peasant production 
was the safest alternative for political reasons, but also 
the cheapest and most productive. 
What such arguments ignored was the key question of 
control. With independent small-holders confirmed as the 
basis of agricultural development, neither state nor capital 
could dictate the conditions of production. In the palm 
oil industry, which faced from the end of the First World 
War increasing competition from plantations in the Dutch 
East Indies, the independence of peasants was to prevent 
measures widely favoured as means to increased agricultural 
productivity. And even in the apparently successful Gold 
Coast cocoa industry, peasant resistance to what were consi- 
dered improved techniques was a source of much anxiety. 
Though the weight of colonial opinion was placed behind the 
peasant option, the result was largely a makeshift. Neither 
palm oil nor cocoa production collapsed, but both presented 
problems which could not be resolved by colonial officials. 
This chapter examines these two key sectors, as exemplifi- 
cations of the obstacles which peasant production presented 
to the development of agricultural productivity. 
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1. Peasants refuse to comply: the case of cocoa 
As has been indicated in the previous chapter, the 
vitality of the Gold Coast cocoa industry was cited as the 
ultimate argument in favour of peasants. From nothing to 
the world's largest exporter in less than twenty years: if 
peasants could achieve this, why bother with the political 
and economic risks of plantation production? The argument 
however, carried less weight with those directly concerned 
with the cocoa industry, and from the first years of its 
success, colonial administrators attacked it for inefficiency 
and poor quality control. The Gold Coast producers were 
regarded as 'natives in a most elementary state of civili- 
sation' and not 'sufficiently intelligent to accept European 
methods'; their sole aim appeared to be 'the attainment of 
a maximum amount of money with a minimum expenditure of 
energy' (2). Under these circumstances, it was feared, the 
success of cocoa would be short-lived, and the industry 
would destroy itself in a combination of negligent cultiva- 
tion, unchecked disease, and inadequate drying methods. 
The dangers threatening the cocoa industry became a 
major topic under pressure from W. S. Tudhope, Director of 
Agriculture in the Gold Coast. 'I live in constant dread', 
he declared in 1915, 'of disaster overtaking the industry 
through the careless or negligent practices employed by the 
natives, and I have constantly advocated an increase in the 
European staff of my Department and legislation to control 
these anomalies. ' (3) The main concern was that African 
farmers took few precautions to counteract disease among 
their cocoa trees, and Tudhope's anxieties were shared by 
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the Director of the Botanic Gardens in Kew: 
'Under existing circumstances the spread of 
blights is so marked and so progressive that it 
becomes everyday more difficult to deal with 
their ravages, and if the Cacao (sic) industry 
in the Gold Coast is to escape a fate comparable 
with that which befell the Coffee industry in 
Ceylon, steps must be taken without delay 
... 
(4) 
The output from Gold Coast cocoa farms was constantly com- 
pared with that from the West Indies, or the African island 
of Sao Thome, and the differences were implicitly attributed 
to the peasant relations of production in the Gold Coast: 
'in making such a comparison it is necessary to 
take into consideration the facts that whereas 
the producers of the West Indian cocoa are either 
Europeans, of European extraction, or are suffi- 
ciently intelligent to accept European methods, 
the producers of cocoa in this Colony and Ashanti 
are natives in a most elementary state of civi- 
lisation, whose sole aim, as yet, appears to be the 
attainment of a maximum amount of money with a 
minimum expenditure of energy 
- 
however uneconomical 
the system, and whose lack of foresight for the 
future welfare of the industry 
- 
and consequently 
for themselves 
- 
has not yet been compensated by 
adequate legislative measures. ' (5) 
The Acting Director of Agriculture, who made this comparison, 
went on to indicate that coercion might be the only solution: 
'It might be a fairer comparison to take Sao Thome 
which produces a much higher standard cocoa than 
the Gold Coast with practically the same labour, 
but there decided methods of coercion obtain under 
European control. ' (6) 
Under existing relations of production, it was not 
possible to dictate the methods adopted by cocoa farmers, 
or to impose standardisation on the crop. As even Clifford, 
a strong advocate of peasant production, said in 1916: 
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'owing to the fact that the cocoa industry of this 
Colony and Ashanti is in the hands of small peasant 
proprietors, a Zarge quantity of cocoa of a uniform 
grade is precisely the article which the local 
farmer cannot produce. ' (7) 
Under peasant relations of production, government coercion 
seemed the only way to impose changes. Direct control of 
production was ruled out in peasant farming; market incen- 
tives were never a real possibility, when the buying firms 
refused to offer higher prices for better quality cocoa. 
The success of the industry seemed to depend on securing 
the assistance of local chiefs, who could then serve as 
agents of modernisation. As far back as 1883, the Gold Coast 
Government approved the introduction of bye-laws as a means 
of enforcing improvements (8). Chiefs thereby had the powers 
to fine 'inefficient' producers, who failed to keep their 
farms in order, or allowed disease to spread unchecked. 
Further bye-laws introduced in 1910 permitted fines of up 
to £5 for farmers who failed to report disease, or who aban- 
doned their farms without action. These bye-laws, officials 
complained, were 'universally adopted, but rarely enforced'. 
'their Chiefs, though readily acquiescing in the 
promulgation of the bye-laws necessary to obviate 
such spread [of disease], almost universally 
refrain from enforcing them. ' (9) 
At least one colonial official dealt with this by the 
'rather rough and ready remedy' (10) of simply 'instructing' 
chiefs to fine offenders, a practice which was condemned in 
1913 by the Commissioner of his Province. 'If it were possi- 
ble I should like to see Agricultural Officers have nothing 
to do with prosecutions and the enforcement of penalties, 
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otherwise the farmers will be disinclined to consult them 
or show them their farms. ' (11) Tudhope was more sympathetic 
to the use of coercion, and doubted the efficacy of 'friendly 
persuasion' (12). His persistence came close to reward in 
1916, when a Bill was drafted which would have given the 
Government power to impose fines, of up to £50, on recalci- 
trant farmers. The Government would have the power to 
declare Infected Areas, within which government inspectors 
would have free access and the right to dictate remedial 
measures. Failure to comply would mean massive fines, or 
6 months' imprisonment (13). The Bill was not in the end 
implemented, partly because so many Paramount Chiefs resented 
this threat to their authority, but more because it was no 
solution when virtually all farmers were potential offenders. 
Full implementation would have devastated cocoa production. 
In the following year, Tudhope was asked to set up an 
enquiry into the industry, and predictably used this oppor- 
tunity to press for stronger coercive measures. His reports 
are revealing, since they indicate that the problem was not 
so much the backwardness of peasants as the too-successful 
introduction of capitalist relations. It was, in his view, 
precisely the failure of farmers to remain simple peasants 
that was plunging the industry into potential crisis. Lust 
or greed were encouraging Africans to extend their farms 
beyond what the individual family could maintain; hence the 
tendency to abandon farms in the face of disease. 'It is 
generally found', he claimed, 'that each farmer has several 
distinctly separate plantations. This is invariably due to 
greed' (14). Cocoa farming was no longer a purely peasant 
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affair. Farmers had more than one farm, employed wage 
labour, bought and sold land as private property, and 
borrowed money at 50% interest. The size of farms was hard 
to estimate, but annual loads (a load was 60 lb) varied from 
10-2,000 
-a clear indication of the emergence of capitalist 
farming (15). Thus in the model sector for the West African 
Policy, 'peasants' were few and far between, and his main 
recommendation was a restriction of cocoa planting so as to 
re-impose the ideal of 
'moderately sized plantations which can be main- 
tained for the most part by the individual peasant 
proprietor with his own labour and that of his 
family' (16). 
A Committee set up in 1919 to consider his proposals 
found them 'eminently undesirable' in their advocacy of 
direct state intervention (17). As always, the colonial 
state was unable to introduce sufficiently stringent measures 
to prevent the anticipated dangers. The cocoa industry had 
produced unexpected deviations from the desired model, but 
it was impossible to act forcibly against it. The Committee's 
recommendations were more restrained: it suggested further 
use of fines; buying centres to assist standardisation; 
licensing of buyers to control purchases of inferior cocoa; 
and police inspection of weights and measures. Tudhope's 
more far-reaching proposals were never seriously considered. 
Concern about the cocoa industry re-emerged in the 
mid-1920s, when numerous shipments of Gold Coast cocoa were 
turned away by American customs officials as unacceptable. 
A further enquiry recommended grading certification, but 
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held back from making this compulsory, partly because it 
correctly assumed that buying firms would not pay a premium 
for higher quality cocoa. The only legislation which was 
introduced was the Cocoa Industry Regulation Ordinance (1934) 
which established minimum standards, and mechanisms for govern- 
ment inspection; but its impact was undermined by this 
refusal of firms to pay a differential which reflected the 
new government grades (18). In its campaign to control the 
cocoa industry, the state had few allies, since neither 
chiefs nor private firms were prepared to aid its efforts. 
Colonial dissatisfaction with the peasantry shifted 
uneasily between attacks on peasant backwardness and com- 
plaints of the all too civilised behaviour of profit-maximising 
cocoa farmers. The small size of plantations (in the 1930s 
still on average only 4 acres) discouraged improvements in 
cultivation and fermentation. But at the same time, the 
success of the industry had dissolved the 'peasants' into 
a complex of moneylenders, absentee landlords, independent 
smallholders and migrant labourers. The 1931 Census confirmed 
Tudhope's early report on conditions in the Gold Coast cocoa 
industry: the proportion of the crop produced by small- 
holders was decreasing annually; some plantation owners were 
reported as paying £400 a year in wages; and the vice of 
absentee landlordism had arrived on the scene. The Census 
Officer favoured the small peasant, and warned that: 
, the Gold Coast peasant-farmer, if he is to survive, 
must remember and be taught always to remember that 
the crops which produce small but certain profits 
are those on which his existence depends, since 
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they do not draw upon him the envious eye of the 
usurer or the greedy one of the capitalist. ' (Cardinall, 1931: 99) 
The only long-term solution which the colonial state 
could propose to this double problem of inefficient produc- 
tion and disintegrating social relations, was that of 
co-operatives. In the 1930s, co-operative fermentaries and 
co-operative marketing agencies were widely canvassed as the 
means to save peasant production. The co-operative movement 
was explicitly defended as an alternative to 'destructive 
individualism' and came to be regarded as the necessary 
corollary to peasant agriculture. In terms reminiscent of 
those employed in the draft report of the West African 
Lands Committee, co-operatives were presented as a bulwark 
against the dissolution of traditional restraints. Lord 
Lugard, in his introduction to C. F. Strickland's Co-operatives 
for Africa (1933) made the case thus: 
'there is 
... 
an increasingly large illiterate 
class which by prolonged contact with alien races 
has learnt a new individualism without its nece- 
ssary restraints, and a licence which strikes at 
the very root of communal sociology. Domestic 
ties are broken and replaced by less binding 
relations. The deracine has learnt that as an 
individual he can earn money and spend it as he 
likes. In some Dependencies it is a rapidly 
growing class, especially in the larger cities, 
to which the unattached native drifts and where 
he is often compelled to incur debts from which 
he seeks relief by theft. In the solution of this 
problem the 'thrift' and 'better living' co-opera- 
tive society may well afford invaluable help. ' (Strickland, 1933: ix) 
The same moralism was expressed in C. Y. Shephard's lengthy 
Report on the Economics of Peasant Agriculture in the Gold 
Coast (1936), where the co-operative was presented as the 
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last haven for the rapidly disappearing good peasant. 
'a co-operative system affords the industrious, 
intelligent, thrifty, and business-like peasant 
an opportunity of escaping from the economic 
bondage imposed upon him by his weaker neigh- 
bours. It should be regarded as an organisation 
open to individuals of good character, and not 
as a reformatory for the correction of those of 
ill-repute. Sound moral character is the founda- 
tion and not the superstructure. The success of 
the society will depend upon a strict observance 
of sound business principles. ' (19) 
The co-operatives were not a resounding success. In 
1936, after many years of encouragement, only 9,000 farmers, 
accounting for 2% of the crop, had been persuaded to join 
co-operative marketing societies; and all too often, the 
maintenance of these societies depended on extensive aid 
from agricultural officers in keeping the books, collecting 
the crop, carrying out sales to the merchant firms, and 
distributing the proceeds (20). Co-operative fermentaries 
were set up from the late 1920s, with the aim of improving 
the quality of the beans to that achieved under plantation 
production, and though the quality of beans was undoubtedly 
improved, these fermentaries again accounted for only a 
tiny proportion of the crop. The stumbling block was the 
resistance of the buying firms to the demand for a premium 
for improved quality; despite enthusiastic encouragement, 
the co-operatives only controlled 2.8% of the cocoa crop 
in 1937-8 (Hancock, 1942: 227). 
The Gold Coast cocoa industry survived, and the more 
nightmare prophecies of total collapse were not fulfilled. 
But even in this supposed model of the peasant option, prob- 
lems had arisen and remained unresolved. The thrifty, 
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conscientious, yet unambitious, peasant was more a colonial 
dream than a reality. Attempts by officials to transform 
conditions of cultivation and processing were usually blocked 
by unco-operative farmers, and the direct coercion which 
peasant production was-supposed to avoid seemed the only way 
to impose desired standards. In this case, however, the 
relative ignorance of colonial experts, and the absence of 
a coherent alternative in the form of plantation production, 
muted the conflicts. The recommendations of the Agricultural 
Department were often ill-advised, and the supposed inade- 
quacies of African production were never sufficiently proven 
to produce radical proposals for change. Moreover, the 
cocoa buying firms continued to distance themselves from the 
process of production, and did not campaign for government 
interference in cocoa production. It was only in the palm 
oil industry, that the West African Policy faced an explicit 
confrontation with an alternative model of development. 
2. Plantations versus peasants: the case of palm oil 
At the time of colonisation, palm products made up half 
the total value of exports from British West Africa. Palm 
oil had long been a staple of domestic consumption and inter- 
nal trade, and processing methods were established before 
colonial rule. The men collected palm fruits from wild 
palm trees, and the women boiled and pounded the pericarp 
of the fruit to produce palm oil. Any attempt to transform 
production and processing techniques necessitated a challenge 
to this division of labour, and as subsequent events demon- 
strated, it proved remarkably resistant to change. The 
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development of the palm kernel industry was less problematic. 
Palm kernels had little value within West Africa, and it was 
only with the invention of margarine, and the development 
of processing methods which made palm kernel oil an appro- 
priate substance for this new commodity, that the kernels 
became a major export. The processing of kernel oil developed 
from the outset under the control of capitalist manufacturers, 
primarily in factories in Germany and Holland, and proved 
less of a problem. The processing of the pericarp to pro- 
duce palm oil had, by contrast, to be done locally, since 
the oil turned rancid on the long journey to Europe; and any 
policy for new processing techniques involved direct con- 
frontation with established African production. As in the 
case of cocoa, colonial officials were deeply distrustful 
of African methods, and in this sector a concrete alternative 
to ineffective official propaganda offered itself. 
The initiative came from William Lever, founder of the 
vast soap and margarine empire of Unilever and only signifi- 
cant representative of the process Lenin considered charac- 
teristic of twentieth century imperialism: the transition 
from export of commodities to export of capital. From the 
beginning of the century, Lever replaced his selling agencies 
with overseas factories, initially in Switzerland, and sub- 
sequently in Germany, Australia, Canada and U. S. A. In 1904 
he set up a factory in Belgium; in 1910 he expanded to 
France; in 1911 to South Africa; and by 1913 he had pene- 
trated Japan (Wilson, 1954). Within these more developed 
countries, the internationalisation of production allowed a 
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new strategy of market expansion. By creating factories 
within what had previously been export markets, it was 
possible to evade high protectionist tariffs, and simultan- 
eously appeal to patriotic consumers who could now buy goods 
produced in their own country (21). Lever was not a British 
manufacturer seeking markets for British goods; he was the 
forerunner of the modern multinational corporation which 
recognises no national boundaries (22). 
In British West Africa, he had little patience with the 
strategy pursued by the chocolate manufacturers, of leaving 
production under the control of African small-holders. He 
wanted plantation production for more efficient cultivation 
of palm fruits, and mechanised processing under capitalist 
relations of production. In pursuit of this vision he came 
into direct conflict with other firms involved in West 
Africa, not yet prepared or able to compete on this grandiose 
scale; and he provoked major tensions within the West African 
Policy. 
Lever Bros. first turned their attention to Sierra 
Leone, and submitted in 1907 a scheme embodying this vision 
for the future of the palm oil industry. A visit to the 
colony, where the company faced a noticeably lukewarm Gove- 
nor, persuaded it to revise the proposal into a less radical 
suggestion for power mills to process the palm fruits, with 
collection of the fruits left in the. hands of independent 
Africans. This began a series of negotiations with the 
Colonial office, as Lever Bros. pushed for this and similar 
proposals for Nigeria and the Gold Coast (23). The company 
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argued for extensive monopoly rights as a condition for 
the capital investment: it wanted exclusive rights for 99 
years to the erection of processing equipment within a 20 
mile radius of each mill; exclusive rights to the construc- 
tion of railways to transport the produce; preferential 
rates on government railways; rent-free sites for the mills; 
and remission of import duties on materials for the con- 
struction of the mills (24). 
In this light, it is hardly surprising that negotiations. 
were protracted and indeed occasionally suspended. The 
Colonial Office faced the antagonism of Lever's competitors, 
if such preferential treatment were agreed. As Hopkins 
argues, 'Other expatriate traders who lacked either the 
capital or the inclination to enter production feared that 
their more adventurous rivals would be in a position to 
undercut them by a considerable margin and to establish a 
monopoly over the supply of export crops. ' (Hopkins, 1973: 
213). The Sierra Leone negotiations provoked a spate of 
anxious enquiries from firms operating in West Africa, and 
from Chambers of Commerce in England: the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce declared itself opposed to any form of monopoly 
rights within the colonies (25). The African Oil Mills Co. 
and Liverpool Chamber of Commerce were deeply hostile to 
encouragement of a kernel processing industry inside West 
Africa, when factories already existed in Britain and Europe. 
The antagonism was further overlaid by Tory Party criticisms 
of Lever as an active member of the Liberal Party, and 
suggestions that Lever was being offered favourable consi- 
deration because of his support for the Liberals (Nworah, 
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1972). These complaints centred on the issue of monopoly 
rights, and though the Colonial office was prepared to reduce 
the scale of the concessions to Lever, legislation was 
nevertheless introduced. The Palm Oil Ordinance (1912) per- 
mitted monopoly rights within a radius of 10 miles, and for 
a period of 21 years; kernel crushing mills were, as a result 
of complaints from other firms, excluded from the terms of 
the Ordinance (26) 
. 
The first serious experiment under the Ordinance of 
1912 was the erection of a processing factory at Yonnibanna 
in Sierra Leone, which was made ready for production by 
1914 (27). The fruit was to be supplied by independent 
African collectors, and after protracted negotiations with 
local chiefs over the appropriate price to be paid, operations 
began (28). Lever himself considered this dependence on 
African suppliers a shaky basis for factory production, and 
expressed his reservations in 1912 in comments on the parallel 
enterprise established in the Belgian Congo: 
'All this river fruit buying is in its infancy, 
but I do not think we can rely on it as a perma- 
nent supply of fruit. We can only depend on our 
own gathering and cultivation. The fact is the 
native has few wants: a little salt and a little 
cloth are his indispensables; after this, beads, 
brass rods and other luxuries. Chief Womba of 
Leverville can be taken as an example. Twelve 
months ago he and his people were poor and few 
in number, and were keen to bring fruit. After 
twelve months or less of selling fruit he is rich 
and lazy, has ten wives, and his village is about 
four times the size it was; but he gathers little 
or no fruit. The palm-tree is in these parts the 
banking account of the native, and he no more 
thinks of going to his bank for money when his 
wants and ambitions are supplied than a civilised 
man would. His bank is always open when he wants 
to draw on it. ' (Lever, 1927: 173) 
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In Yonnibanna such fears were fully justified, though 
for more complex reasons than those given by Lever. As the 
company saw it, the problem in Sierra Leone was the 
irrationality of the Africans; all they seemed to understand 
was that processed oil sold at £4 a ton, while unprocessed 
fruit could earn only 30/-; and they seemed incapable of 
calculating that they could earn more money if they concen- 
trated all their energies on collection alone. The company 
failed to perceive that existing methods of oil production 
were deeply embedded in a specific sexual division of labour. 
The men collected the fruit; the women processed it. If 
the palm oil producers of Yonnibanna accepted the new division 
of labour proposed by the factory, it could only mean that 
the women joined the men in the work of gathering, or that 
the men did twice as much work as before. The patriarchal 
relations within West African households made either alter- 
native unlikely. As a Provincial Commissioner commented 
in 1925, 
'If all palm fruit were carried to a mill the 
women would escape their share of the work and 
I cannot imagine the Sierra Leone native taking 
kindly to a system whereby he did all the work 
and his wife none. The women whose other duties 
consist of looking after their children, cooking 
food and weeding the farm, would not be able to 
assist in the transport. ' (29) 
For Yonnibanna to survive on the proposed basis, a fundamen- 
tal rupture in existing social relations were required. Yet 
to effect this radical transformation, West African Oils Ltd 
had at its disposal only market forces: the somewhat uncon- 
vincing lure of 30/- a ton for fruit against the previous 
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£4 a ton for oil. Depending as it did on peasants for the 
supply of material to the factory, the Company could not 
dictate a restructuring of the division of labour. It did 
not have direct control of the labour process. 
In this case, a happy symbiosis of capitalist and pre- 
capitalist relations was impossible. Within cocoa production, 
the defence of an African peasantry involved tensions, but 
at Yonnibanna the entire enterprise would fail if it could 
not effect the necessary transformation. Without a regular 
supply of fruit, the capital invested in the mill could not 
earn an adequate profit; the factory operated below capacity, 
and eventually in December 1915 was forced to close down (30). 
The conclusion which many drew from this first experiment 
was that fruit production must be directly controlled. 
Factory processing (which all concerned favoured) would be 
feasible only if the supply of raw materials was guaranteed, 
and this meant either plantation estates worked by wage 
labour, or the employment of extra-economic coercion to 
impose on the independent producers the requirements of the 
factory. 
In 1915 a Parliamentary Committee was set up to investi- 
gate the future of the West African oil trade, though its 
particular emphasis was on ways of promoting a kernel crushing 
industry within Britain (31). The report of the Committee 
dodged the difficult questions raised by the failure of 
Yonnibanna, saying that the issue of supplies to factories 
inside West Africa would depend on land policies, still under 
discussion in the West African Lands Committee (32). It did 
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however inspire the Gold Coast Government to set up a research 
Project on the oil palm industry, which under Colonial Office 
pressure became a joint project between the Gold Coast, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone (33). In 1921, a central laboratory 
was established in Nigeria to co-ordinate work on improving 
seeds, methods of cultivation, and of processing. After 
several years, two hand presses were developed which could 
be used by African producers themselves to improve their 
output (34), and the promotion of these presses became a major 
feature of the Nigerian response to the crisis of the palm 
industry. 
The sense of impending crisis was meanwhile intensified 
by the emergence of the 'Sumatran menace'. Before the war 
the foundations of a palm oil industry had been laid in the 
Dutch East Indies, particularly in Sumatra, which could draw 
on the heavily populated island of Java for indentured 
labour, and develop production on the basis of plantations 
and factory processing. After the war, this expanded rapidly 
- 
6,500 acres were under plantation in 1915,28,000 by 1922, 
and 60,350 by 1925 (35) 
- 
and it seemed that the combination 
of systematic cultivation with mechanical processing per- 
mitted an output of oil which far exceeded that obtained in 
the wild palmeries of West Africa. Estimates of the advan- 
tages varied, depending largely on whether the evidence was 
being used to urge a new policy for West Africa or to depre- 
cate the seriousness of the threat. But the Gold Coast 
Deputy Director of Agriculture claimed that in Sumatra the 
factories could extract 30-31% of the weight of the fruits 
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in oil, while Nigerian palm fruits only contained 16-25% 
oil, with only half of this extracted under existing tech- 
niques (36). The early collapse of the West Africa rubber 
industry in the face of more scientific cultivation was 
employed as a grim warning for West African oil, if new 
policies were not adopted (37). 
In the face of the new threat, the commercial world 
closed ranks, and the Joint West African Committee of the 
London, Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of Commerce pre- 
ssured the Colonial Office to set up a committee to investigate 
the dangers. In 1923 their request was granted, and a commi- 
ttee established, with five representatives nominated by the 
Joint West African Committee. Its report, published in 1925, 
concluded in favour of factory processing, and outlined five 
conditions for success: 
(1) freehold, or at least 99 year leasehold, land 
for the mill; 
(2) protection for 21 years against competitors; 
(3) plantations of up to 5,000 acres; 
(4) facilities for legally-binding contracts with 
Africans over supplies; 
(5) exclusive rights to the use of mechanical trans- 
port for fruit within a7 mile radius of the 
mill. (38) 
The crucial proposals were (3) and (4). The Committee was 
convinced, with good reason, that processing factories could 
not survive on the basis of supplies from independent African 
collectors. Private firms should have the right to set up 
plantations beside their mills, or failing this, to engage 
the authority of local chiefs to guarantee supplies. They 
should be allowed to conclude agreements with chiefs, binding 
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them to supply a specified amount of fruit within an agreed 
period. If the chiefs failed to fulfil their part of the 
bargain, the factories should be entitled to employ wage 
labour to collect the agreed quantity from African owned 
palmeries. Market forces alone would not persuade local 
producers to sell fruit to the mill; the future of the industry 
demanded either plantations, or coercion by chiefs to enforce 
adequate supplies. 
The arguments apparently settled by the time of the First 
World War in favour of peasants had to be re-opened, and this 
time with private capital pushing for a genuine alternative. 
The economic argument for peasants was that they were cheap, 
and likely to continue production despite falling world 
prices. As Ormsby-Gore reported after his 1926 visit to 
West Africa, even a very rapid development of plantation pro- 
duction in other colonies would not destroy the West African 
trade: 
'serious as is the necessity for the more 
scientific development and equipment of the 
industry we can at any rate be sure that any 
industry on a peasant proprietorship basis is 
far more resistant than would often appear. 
Even if the rapid development of the plantation 
industry in other countries succeeds in de- 
pressing the price and curtailing the market 
for the West African products, the native will 
continue to produce. In fact, while high prices 
are a great stimulus to increased production, 
however paradoxical it may sound, low prices 
may equally be a stimulus to native production. 
A native peasant having acquired certain wants 
and a certain standard of living will work harder 
to satisfy those customary wants if he has to 
produce more to obtain the same money. It will 
be very difficult for the competition of the 
plantation oil to eliminate him. ' (39) 
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Aligned with this were the political arguments against 
plantation estates. Large grants of land to European com- 
panies were considered ill-advised, and as the Governor of 
the Gold Coast said in 1929, 'the factors governing the 
ownership of land form serious obstacles to the introduction 
of the plantation system' (40). Anxieties about potential 
land disputes were reinforced by concerns about labour supplies 
to plantations. As Clifford had stated in his 1920 Address 
to the Nigerian Legislative Council, 'European plantations 
can only be maintained by some system of organised immigra- 
tion or by some form of compulsory labour' (41), an argument 
which was to be confirmed by those firms which did set up 
factories or small plantations in West Africa. 'Shortage 
of fruit cutting labour is our chief difficulty', complained 
the Lever subsidiary, West African Oils Ltd. of its Gold 
Coast mill in 1926, 'and the principal reason that we do 
not make profits' (42). If this was true of the Gold Coast, 
where wage labour was more fully developed than in Nigeria 
or Sierra Leone, the problem of labour supply was clearly 
a major one. 
But against these arguments for peasant production was 
the generally agreed necessity for factory processing, which 
included even Clifford among its advocates. The experience 
of Yonnibanna had already shown that erecting a factory was 
useless, without some strategy for ensuring adequate supplies. 
The Superintendent of Agriculture in Nigeria pointed out in 
1926 that 'no cases have been placed on record of highly 
capitalised factories being regularly and stably supported 
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from independent small holdings in the tropics, with the 
exception of cotton' (43), and there was little reason to 
expect West African palm oil to become the second exception. 
Nevertheless, the 1925 Report was not well-received, 
and a Colonial Office memorandum cast doubt on the Commi- 
ttee's neutrality: composed of it was of long-standing 
supporters of the factory system the Committee could 'hardly 
be described as an impartial body' (44). The Nigerian 
Government re-affirmed its opposition to plantations, and 
suggested that the Sumatran menace was much exaggerated (45). 
The Governor of Sierra Leone was prepared to consider 
plantations; here the lessons of Yonnibanna had been taken 
most to heart, and legislation was passed in 1922 to permit 
European plantations of up to 5,000 acres (46). The Commi- 
ttee's proposal for legally-binding contracts with chiefs 
was however rejected as too obviously coercive, and only 
contracts with individuals would be condoned. The Governor 
recommended in addition a model plantation set up by the 
state (of 5,000 acres) to provide an incentive to Europeans 
and Africans alike (47). In the Gold Coast, where the 
development of cocoa had largely undermined palm oil pro- 
duction, the Governor also proposed model plantations, but 
on a smaller scale (250 acres) and with the objective of 
encouraging African cultivation. The Colonial Office was 
not inclined to enforce the more radical proposals of the 
Committee, and left each colony to pursue its own strategy. 
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i. The Nigerian response 
In Nigeria, the state maintained its opposition to 
plantations and exclusive monopoly rights until the late 
1920s. Lever's early negotiations for monopoly rights to 
mills in Southern Nigeria had foundered (48), and Nigeria 
made no application under the Palm Oil Ordinance (1912) for 
powers to grant exclusive rights to erect mills. Two mills 
were nevertheless established in Calabar Province, though 
neither with much success. The tension between Lever and 
the Nigerian state stemmed from these early negotiations, 
but was dramatically intensified during Clifford's period 
as Governor, when it developed into a bitter personal feud 
between the two men (49). At the height of this antagonism, 
when Lever had attacked the 'extravagant and inefficient 
management of expenditure and finances in West Africa' (50), 
Clifford responded with an idealisation of the non-market 
nature of Nigerian society, and its virtual independence of 
world capitalism: 
'Lord Leverhulme, in common with a good many 
other gentlemen interested in West African 
produce, would appear not yet to have digested 
the possibly unpalatable fact that, though 
European business in this country, together 
with the public Revenue for administrative and 
development purposes, are both almost entirely 
dependent upon the conditions of Nigeria's 
external trade with the outside world, the 
vast bulk of the eighteen odd millions of native 
Nigerians are in the singularly fortunate posi- 
tion of being able to regard that trade as 
nothing more than a useful and very acceptable 
adjunct to a livelihood which, without taking 
it into account, is already amply assured 
... 
In Nigeria 
... 
the bulk of the people can and 
do grow their own cotton, or at least spin their 
own thread, weave their own garments, provide 
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all their own food-stuffs, and even, when the 
occasion arises, forge their own tools and make 
their own pottery. ' (51) 
In these sentiments, Clifford was taking the West African 
Policy too far: it was after all supposed to embody a vision 
of co-operation between capitalist and peasant production, 
and not idealise one at the expense of the other. The 
vehemence of his attacks on Lever were largely personal, and 
not fully representative of colonial thinking, but even when 
he was replaced in 1926 by a Governor more alive to the 
Sumatran menace, the contradictions facing the colonial 
state prevented any dramatic change of direction. 
There was some shift in emphasis in 1926, with the 
appointment of Sir Graeme Thompson as Governor, and planta- 
tions were accepted as a possibility for the more under- 
populated areas of Nigeria. The Report of the Agricultural 
Department played down the change in policy: 
, the desirability of some plantations of this 
kind [. e. large scale] as an object lesson to 
everyone in the country is obvious, and this has 
been a subject of much discussion during the 
year. There seems to have been a good deal of 
misconception on this subject, for it seems to 
have been thought by many merchants that Govern- 
ment is opposed to the starting of such planta- 
tions. This is not the case. The position is 
merely that it would, it is generally believed, 
be impossible for any one to arrange to lease 
large areas of land from the native communities 
in the densely populated parts of the palm oil 
belt, simply because the people cannot possibly 
spare the land. And it would be neither possible 
nor just for Government to exercise any influence 
to encourage these communities to give such 
leases. But it is believed by many, who should 
be able to judge, that there are large areas of 
land which is suitable for oil palms, in some 
cases actually bearing palms, which are still 
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very thinly populated and which the native 
communities who own them would not be averse 
to leasing out. ' (52) 
The announcement did not produce a rush of European firms 
for plantation leases, perhaps because it was felt that 
labour problems would be even more acute in under-populated 
areas. The United Africa Company did begin prospecting for 
possible areas in 1928, and in 1930 set up the Sapele planta- 
tion. But when it attempted in 1936 to extend the operations 
into the Provinces of Calabar and Warri, the state inter- 
vened, fearing a proletarianisation of the peasantry in 
these areas (Hancock, 1942: 191n). 
European plantations remained marginal to the Nigerian 
strategy on palm oil. From the late 1920$, the government 
operated on three main fronts: (1) encouraging small African 
plantations and African owned hand presses; (2) introducing 
a subsidy scheme for unprofitable processing factories; (3) 
introducing export duties to favour higher quality oil. The 
two hand presses developed in the Nigerian research labora- 
tory became available in 1927, but the more efficient one 
cost over £17, and even the cheaper Duchscher press which 
was subsequently developed cost £11 (53). Clearly this was 
not compatible with the original vision of an African pea- 
santry, so confidently used in arguments against plantation 
production. Only substantial farmers could afford to buy 
such presses, and these would almost certainly be employers 
of wage labour. The small numbers sold confirm this: in 
1930 only 100 had been purchased, and by 1940 the total in 
use was estimated at 816 (Hancock, 1942: 242). In many cases 
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these presses became the basis of a thriving entrepreneurial 
activity, run by teachers or artisans, who employed wage 
labour on the presses and sold their services to local farmers 
(Hancock, 1942: 242n. ). The supposed 'peasant' alternative 
to European plantations and factories, turned out to have 
little to do with peasants. As with the Gold Coast cocoa 
industry, reality did not conform to the dream. 
But if processing methods were to be improved, and a 
plantation alternative discarded, the Nigerian state had to 
swallow this contradiction. Indeed the Agricultural Depart- 
ment formed an alliance with the Lands Department in the 
1930s, and pressed for a more 'realistic policy on individual 
land tenure' which would accept this deviation from the 
original norm (see Chapter Six). Much the same conclusion 
followed from the other side of the 'peasant' policy 
- 
the 
attempt to promote more scientific cultivation of palm trees. 
If Africans were to be encouraged to plant trees, rather than 
rely on wild palmeries, it would be the richer farmers, 
pressing for secure individual titles to land, who would 
be most co-operative. The Agricultural Department attempted 
initially to persuade village communities in the central 
palm belt to thin out and replant their palmeries (54), but 
found communal and family land tenure an obstacle. All 
members of a family had to be persuaded into agreement with 
the proposals, and faced with the difficulties of convincing 
all involved, the Department became converted to a policy 
of encouraging individual farmers. It embarked on a pro- 
gramme of encouraging a few farmers to set up experimental 
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plantations, cultivated according to Departmental recommen- 
dations, and discovered that only those Africans who had 
succumbed to modern individualism were prepared to respond. 
By 1928, twelve such experiments had begun, but the Depart- 
ment warned: 
'Lest it be thought that all difficulties are 
now overcome, it should be explained that all 
these plots belong to rather exceptional men, 
who are substantially "individual owners" of 
land, or to families in which there is a man 
of such exceptional personal character or energy 
as to be able to carry the other members with 
him. The difficulties to general progress 
arising from communal ownership still remain, 
and frequently negotiations for one of these 
experiments have broken down because all the 
members of the family would not agree to them, 
in spite of the head of the family or the 
majority being quite ready to go on. ' (55) 
The number of African plantations did increase, but by 1938 
there were still only 5,530 planters, occupying only 9,213 
acres (Hancock, 1942: 242). The Department felt itself 
battling against the odds, under 'the overwhelming handicap 
of the present unsatisfactory position of land tenure' (56). 
The second aspect of the Nigerian strategy 
- 
the sub- 
sidies to processing factories 
- 
began in 1928, when a 
scheme to encourage European investment was drawn up (57). 
The Government was prepared to cover up to 30% of any short- 
fall from estimated output, with subsidies of up to £4,000. 
It was a full admission of defeat. Factory processing could 
not be profitable without regular supplies, and since the 
Government was not prepared to take steps to ensure supplies, 
it would simply foot the bill for resulting losses. The 
only firm to apply for a subsidy was United Africa Company, 
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and even this application was for their existing, unprofi- 
table, mill at Ibagwa. In the absence of further enquiries, 
the Nigerian state became more circumspect, and began to 
doubt the viability of any mill even after the maximum 5 
years of government subsidy. The Director of Agriculture 
recommended rejection of the only request, and pointed to 
the Department's work in encouraging African plantations as 
the more promising venture. After protracted discussion, 
The United Africa Company announced the closure in 1931 of 
the Ibagwa mill (58). 
The prospects for factory processing thus receded, and 
the Nigerian response to the potential crisis came to rest 
on the development of African cultivation and processing. 
In 1935 the activities of the Agricultural Department were 
reinforced by an Ordinance to favour palm oil from cultivated 
plantations: such oil would be eligible for remission of 
export duty. A combination of market forces and administra- 
tive advice would have to do, since the alternative of 
mechanised processing was doomed without radical changes in 
the production of palm fruit. It was not after all possible 
to superimpose a modern factory on peasant production, and 
future agricultural productivity would have to depend on 
changes in African production alone. But as was clear to 
the Agricultural Department at least, this was no victory 
for the 'peasant'. It involved, rather, the individualisa- 
tion of land tenure, class differentiation, and state 
support for larger farmers. The plantation project was 
squashed in Nigeria, but so too was the vision of the African 
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peasantry as dreamt up by the West African Lands Committee. 
ii. The Gold Coast response 
In the Gold Coast the more extensive development of 
commodity production and wage labour produced different 
policies. West African Oils Ltd. (a Lever subsidiary) was 
allowed a concession in 1912 at Seysie (near Sekondi), where 
it employed a combination of fruit purchases from independent 
collectors, and wage labour to cut fruit within the area 
of the concession (59). The decline of the palm oil industry 
meant that prices for locally produced oil were lower than 
in Nigeria, and the contrast between the price of fruit and 
the price of oil was less dramatic than at Yonnibanna. More- 
over, the development of seasonal wage labour was relatively 
advanced, and the mill could see some prospect of solving 
its labour problems. The mill lasted longer than that at 
Yonnibanna, but even so was never able to produce at capacity, 
and put continuous pressure on the state for assistance in 
its labour difficulties. Colonial officials did their best, 
as the Commissioner of the Western Province explained in 
1926: 
'As regards labour, political officers have done 
all they can to help the Company, and will continue 
to do so. Efforts by the Company to obtain labour 
from Sefwi last year were unsuccessful, though the 
project was fully explained to the chiefs by the 
District Commissioner. Similarly, efforts to obtain 
labour from Ashanti have met with no better success. 
... 
there has been a shortage of labour ever since 
the Company (or their predecessors) started about 
1912. ' (60) 
Labour remained, as the Director of Agriculture said in 
1920, the fly in the ointment' (61). 
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As at Yonnibanna, the company had little understanding 
of the social relations which produced the labour problems. 
It was 'lack of comprehension' which led Africans to prefer 
processing their own fruit; the problems were intensified 
by the 'spineless and inept' Omanhene, who failed to come 
up with the necessary labour, and by the 'apathy' of the 
Africans who spent an 'excessive amount of time' on funerals 
(62). The mill, which had the capacity for 6-12,000 tons 
of fruit a year, failed to sustain its 1923 peak of 3,600; 
it could employ 1,000 workers, but in 1926 had only 400 (63). 
Even within the Gold Coast, European power mills had little 
chance of success. 
In response to the labour difficulties, the state 
devised in 1920 a plan for greater involvement of progressive 
chiefs in the finances of processing factories. Two 
alternatives were considered: the chiefs could set up a 
co-operative society and finance their own small factory; 
or they could enter into profit-sharing agreements with 
European firms and agree under bond to guarantee supplies 
of fruit (64). The objective in both cases was to involve 
chiefs in the financial success of the mills, in the expec- 
tation that this would encourage them to exert all their 
authority over their people to ensure supplies. But even 
the favourite progressive chief, Mate Kole of Eastern Krobo 
(65) was reluctant to consider an investment of the order 
of £20,000, and threw the problem back at the Government 
with the suggestion that it undertake financial responsibi- 
lity (66). This the state was reluctant to do. When Mate 
Kole raised this possibility again in 1925, the Director of 
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Agriculture responded that 'the provision of a factory is 
entirely a commercial matter and if private enterprise is 
not sufficiently attracted, it would be unwise for Govern- 
ment to go into the business. ' (67) 
In the Gold Coast as in Nigeria, the state had to ack- 
nowledge that processing factories could not survive on the 
existing basis. The Seysie mill made no profits until 1928, 
and even then had made little headway in persuading local 
producers to sell to the mill. It was only the possibility 
of employing wage labourers to collect fruit from the con- 
cession land which made the mill at all viable (68). In 
1928, the Government drew up a subsidy scheme similar to 
that introduced in Nigeria. It was prepared to subsidise 
mills which ran at less than 5/6 estimated capacity, but 
only where the failure could be directly attributed to prob- 
lem in supplies of fruit (69). On the basis of this scheme, 
an agreement was reached with United Africa Company for the 
erection of two more mills in the Krobo area. The Government 
was confident it would escape with less than £1,800 subsidies 
in the first year, since it had taken the precaution of con- 
cluding a prior agreement with local chiefs. Mate Kole was 
to receive a bonus of 3/- a ton on all fruit delivered to 
the factory, and the other six principal chiefs would get a 
bonus of 1/- a ton. The chiefs had no doubts of their 
abilities to persuade their people: 'Mate Kole, who intended 
calling a mass meeting of his people during the present week, 
said that he thought we need have no fears about the price 
not being accepted'. When one sub-chief complained that 
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the boxes they were to fill seemed rather large for the 
proposed price, Mate Kole responded that he 'considered the 
box fair and would see that his people accepted it. ' (70) 
This scheme, approved in its entirety by the Secretary 
of State in 1929, contained all the essentials of the labour 
contract proposed by the 1925 Committee, leaving out only 
the punitive clauses. Whatever the reservations about state 
involvement in processing factories, the Gold Coast Govern- 
ment was prepared to go into the business in a big way: it 
would cover financial losses, and use its political influence 
with chiefs to coerce local suppliers into co-operation. In 
its solution to the problem of guaranteeing supplies to 
European mills, the Gold Coast Government relied on these 
alliances with chiefs 
- 
accepted the formal independence of 
the producers, but employed administrative influence to aid 
the mills. Even more clearly than in the Nigerian case, the 
crisis of the oil palm industry produced policies which took 
the state far from the supposed defence of an independent 
peasantry. 
In addition to its policies on European mills, the Gold 
Coast Government established in 1926 three small model 
plantations, designed to engender more scientific cultiva- 
tion among African farmers (71). As with the strategy 
pursued in Nigeria, the object of these lessons was not the 
small peasant, secure in communal ownership of land. Rather 
it was the progressive chiefs, such as Mate Kole, who could 
be encouraged to turn their stool land - and the labour of 
'their people' 
- 
to productive use. The encouragement, 
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again, of hand presses for use by African farmers was 
necessarily directed at a stratum of larger farmers, employing 
wage labour. Though the terms of the debate had been set 
up in the 1920s as 'peasants or plantations', the Gold Coast 
ended up poised between the two. The palm industry was not 
transformed along the lines first laid down by Lever: Euro- 
pean plantations were not encouraged, and the few processing 
factories set up continued to suffer labour shortages, and 
operated below capacity. But the failure of Lever's project 
to produce palm oil under capitalist relations of production 
did not entail a successful peasant alternative. Africans 
were drawn in as wage labourers on the Seysie concession; 
their efforts were supplemented by supplies from local 
collectors under the control of their chiefs; and the future 
development of the industry was seen to depend on the 
activities of the more 'progressive' large farmers. 
iii. The Sierra Leone response 
Sierra Leone was remarkable as the one colony converted 
by the early 1920s to the development of plantations. The 
1922 legislation providing for European estates of up to 
5,000 acres was not however acted on, and in 1925 the Govern- 
ment set aside £16,000 for the creation of a state-owned 
and run plantation (72). The experience at Yonnibanna had 
induced a severely practical assessment of the conditions 
for factory processing, and a report by the Agricultural 
Chemist in 1925 summed up the alternatives: 
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'This fruit could be supplied by any one of the 
following methods: 
- (a) By a plantation of suitable size under European 
control 
(b) By an African owned plantation of suitable size 
(c) By fruit being brought in by natives from the 
surrounding bush provided the bush were suffi- 
ciently rich in palms 
In my opinion (b) may not be looked for for many 
years, and (c) did not prove successful in Sierra 
Leone. The reason for the non-success of (c) is, 
I think that by carrying the fruit to the factory 
the men are depriving their own women of a job and 
their own supplies of palm oil disappears since it 
is doubtful if the factory would undertake local 
retail; (a) is then left as the only means by which 
a factory can be supplied with fruit., (73) 
Even (a) was recognised as involving a 'revolution' in social 
life, since it would involve some slight migration of the 
population' to clear land for a plantation, and further 
migration of workers to the plantation (74). In the face 
of this, it was felt that private firms might be too dis- 
ruptive, and that the initial experiment should be undertaken 
by Political Officers (75). 
The Masanki plantation established by the state turned 
out extremely costly. Only 2,000 acres were brought under 
cultivation, and by 1927 a further £26,000 had to be set aside 
to cover the escalating costs (76). The Empire Marketing 
Board and United Africa Company provided small subsidies, 
but when, in 1931, the Government tried to persuade UAC to 
take the burden from them, UAC were unimpressed by the con- 
cern, and offered only to take over without compensation (77). 
By 1934 the experiment was admitted a failure. Work on the 
plantation had effectively stopped, and only a small gang 
of prison labourers remained to collect fruit from 200 acres, 
the rest having reverted to bush (78). Even the 2,000 acres 
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brought under cultivation at so much cost would not have been 
adequate to supply a substantial mill, and if its output had 
to be supplemented by supplies from local collectors, the 
old problems would have arisen again. By the mid-1930s, the 
only suggestion for the Masanki plantation was that land 
could be divided into small plots for a land settlement 
scheme, with Political Officers providing advice on scienti- 
fic cultivation, and tenants processing the fruits with 
small hand presses (79). By comparison, the mill at Seysie 
was considered a great success, and this was attributed to 
its employment of wage labour to collect from wild palmeries. 
3. Conclusion 
As can be seen from both cocoa and palm oil production, 
colonial administrators doubted the efficiency of existing 
techniques, and favoured changes in methods of cultivation 
and processing so as to raise productivity. In both cases, 
the autonomy of the farmers blocked their efforts. In the 
palm oil industry, all three colonial states accepted the 
arguments for mechanical processing, and all three took the 
Sumatran menace sufficiently seriously to devise ways of 
encouraging the erection of power mills. Yet such mills 
were not established on any significant scale, and ironically 
the greatest success was the mill at Seysie on the Gold 
Coast, the colony which was, of the three, the least depen- 
dent on palm oil exports. The independence of peasant 
farmers proved a major obstacle to the desired changes. 
Processing mills could be profitable only with regular supplies 
of fruit, and this meant a revolution in existing relations 
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of production. Supplies had to be subordinated to the 
requirements of the mill, through the use of wage labour 
to collect the palm fruits, or through a radical restruc- 
turing of the sexual division of labour among palm oil 
producers. With the partial exception of the Gold Coast, 
the first alternative was impossible, since it entailed 
both appropriation of palm-bearing land, and the formation 
of an agricultural proletariat. The second alternative 
proved equally difficult, since in all three colonies existing 
fruit collectors were reluctant to sell fruit to the mills. 
The sexual division of labour provided sound material argu- 
ments against co-operation with the mills, and even insistent 
political pressure from colonial officials and allied chiefs 
failed to shift this. As long as producers could sell 
locally processed oil at prices which compared favourably 
to those offered for unprocessed fruit, the dominant gender 
relations would sustain for any foreseeable future this 
reluctance to comply with the new conditions. In this case, 
peasant production was a definite obstacle to proposed 
improvements in agricultural productivity. The erection 
of the power mills, even with considerable financial and 
political support from the colonial states, was not enough 
to effect the necessary transformations. 
Within the parameters of the West African Policy, the 
only solution was to encourage African producers to adopt 
more efficient techniques. Hand presses were developed for 
sale to local farmers, and model plantations set up to 
encourage the cultivation of palm trees. Success in this 
field was premised, however, on a destruction of the peasantry 
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as originally conceived by the West African Lands Committee. 
Colonial officials turned their attention to the wealthier 
farmers, who had little in common with the supposed peasantry. 
Improved methods of cultivation and processing demanded a 
progressive elimination of the family and communal encum- 
brances on economic activity, a demand which potentially 
undermined the authority of the chiefs. 
The same constraints appeared in the cocoa industry, 
though on a less dramatic scale. Here too the autonomy of 
the farmers blocked the efforts of agricultural experts. 
Africans could not be made to tend their farms along the 
lines preferred by colonial officials; the success of the 
industry was a testament to African initiative, but as a 
result, it remained under African control. It could not be 
revolutionised to accord with colonial preferences. 
It has been argued (Green and Hymer, 1966) that the 
inefficiency of the cocoa industry was largely a delusion 
of colonial officials, and that the proposed changes were 
neither necessary nor desirable. Agricultural experts con- 
stantly confused the Gold Coast cocoa with the finer quality 
bean grown in the West Indies, and mistook what was a 
difference in kind for a difference in techniques of produc- 
tion. In this view, many of the efforts to improve the 
quality of cocoa in the Gold Coast were fundamentally mis- 
conceived, as were some of their proposals for countering 
disease. When faced in the 1930s, for example, with serious 
outbreaks of swollen shoot disease, colonial experts had no 
other solution to recommend than the cutting out of diseased 
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trees. The 'unintelligent' Africans resisted destruction 
of their trees, preferring to abandon the affected farms to 
the cures of time. As subsequently emerged, their solution 
was less disastrous than that demanded by Agricultural 
Officers, whose favoured policy of cutting out was later 
described as 'inefficacious and actually harmful' (80). The 
cutting out of diseased trees reduced the forest canopy, 
which provided much needed shade and high humidity; a report 
in 1937 concluded that swollen shoot developed in precisely 
the less humid conditions created by a programme of cutting 
out (81). 
These arguments have some validity, and there can be 
no doubt that agricultural 'experts' were extremely ill- 
informed of the conditions appropriate to West African 
agriculture. What is important to this thesis, however, is 
the fact that the experts did view the relations of production 
as a constraint on agricultural productivity. Whether their 
worst fears were realised in the subsequent history of cocoa 
farming is a subject for another study. What matters here 
is that the colonial administrators came to regard their 
'thriving peasantry' as an unsatisfactory compromise; that 
they believed agricultural productivity was suffering, yet 
found themselves powerless to effect change. 
Moreover, the arguments of Green and Hymer, are aimed, 
like those of Hill (1963), against the recurrent complaints 
of African irrationality. Their argument is a defence of 
African ingenuity against colonial incompetence, an argument 
which can all too easily become one-sided. Extracted from 
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the terms of this debate, the issue is less clear. However 
ill-informed colonial officials were in their prescriptions 
for agricultural development, they were right to view the 
independence of the peasants as a constraint. 
In the case of palm oil, the fears of colonial officials 
were more definitely grounded in an alternative which was 
technically superior. The plantation developments in other 
colonies produced more oil per acre than was possible in 
the wild palmeries of West Africa. Hopkins' defence of 
peasant production is inadequate here. Though he rightly 
points to the high failure rate of plantations in British 
West Africa, this serves as evidence for the dilemmas facing 
colonial officials, rather than as proof of the vitality of 
the peasant alternative. In the absence of an agricultural 
proletariat, plantations were not a real option 
-a point 
which appears in Hopkins' analysis only in the technical 
guise of relatively high wage rates due to labour shortages. 
Since the colonial states were unable to resolve the labour 
shortage through proletarianisation, they chose to remain 
within the boundaries of peasant production; but by doing 
this, they eliminated the prospects for factory processing. 
The strategy pursued in the palm oil industry has been 
explained by Hancock as a sacrifice of economic progress to 
political security. Lever's strategy was proved right, he 
argues, by the subsequent contrast between British West 
Africa and the Belgian Congo: the export of oil and kernels 
from Nigeria doubled between 1909 and 1936, while in the 
Congo it increased ten-fold between 1909-1914 and 1924-28 
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(Hancock, 1942: 195). The refusal to contemplate develop- 
ments like those in the Congo stemmed, he argues, from the 
colonial states' concern for political stability. However, 
as the examples of both cocoa and palm oil indicate, the 
West African Policy could guarantee neither economic progress 
nor political security. The result, it can be argued, was 
a failure on both counts. In the palm oil industry, atten- 
tion was increasingly directed at the wealthier farmers, freed 
from those constraints of communal tenure which supposedly 
ensured political order. In the cocoa industry, farmers 
refused to fit the mould of peasant production, and all the 
'vices' which communal tenure was meant to pre-empt 
- 
wage 
labour, landlordism, and money-lending 
- 
came to characterise 
the industry. For a long time, colonial officials were too 
mesmerised by their ideology of peasant farming to admit 
the capitalist nature of the cocoa industry, but this arche- 
type of peasant production eventually produced a class of 
capitalist farmers sufficiently organised to challenge the 
power of the cocoa-buying firms in a series of cocoa hold- 
ups (Howard, 1978: ch. 6). In these two key sectors, the 
West African Policy was less successful than contemporaries 
suggested. The dictates of agricultural productivity con- 
flicted with the peasant basis of production, and produced 
a middle way which was neither economically efficient nor 
politically stable. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LAND POLICIES IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS 
By the time of the First World War, colonial land policy 
had apparently crystallised into a set of guidelines which 
reflected the peasant road. Extensive alienation of land 
to private capital was not encouraged, a policy which 
remained relatively consistent even under Lever's energetic 
campaign. African rights to the land were acknowledged, 
but claims to private ownership by individuals were not. 
Government was entitled to appropriate small areas for rail- 
way work or other public purposes, compensating the occupants 
only for their crops or buildings, and not for the value of 
the land. If any of this land was subsequently leased to 
private firms, the rents from it were the due reward of the 
government, whose endeavours in developing the colonies 
were responsible for the increase in land values. 
These principles were not consistently reflected in 
legislation. Land legislation presented the bewildering 
complexity of local variation which was typical of British 
administration in Africa. As a legacy from the earliest 
days, the Crown claimed full ownership over some of the 
coastal land, though the legitimacy of even these claims 
was effectively challenged in the case of Lagos, where 
African opposition mobilised from 1912 onwards (Crowder, 
1968: 423-4). Aside from this, the state had accumulated, 
through 'compensation' to previous owners, some small tracts 
of Crown Land in most of the major cities. Successive 
ordinances gave the governments the right to appropriate 
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land for railway development 
- 
again with the obligation 
to compensate only cultivated land, and not to pay the 
value of the land itself. The resultant Crown Lands were 
tiny in proportion to the colonies, and beyond these, the 
only serious claims to control over land were in Northern 
Nigeria. Here the 1910 Proclamation remained in force, 
establishing the Government as sole trustee, with extensive 
powers over the public land. Colonial control was most 
limited in the Gold Coast, where the Concessions Ordinance 
(1900) acknowledged African ownership 
- 
though still not as 
individual property rights 
- 
and restricted government 
action to the judicial approval of the terms on which Africans 
leased land to Europeans. Aside from these two cases, no 
signficant land legislation had been passed, and government 
practice was ruled by decree rather than by law. The con- 
tinuing attempts by the colonial states to assert admini- 
strative control over forest land remained a source of 
tension, the full tale of which has been told elsewhere 
(Kimble, 1963) 
. 
The ambiguities and inadequacies of the peasant road 
meant that debates over land policy continued into the inter- 
war years. The arguments for communal tenure had never been 
accepted by all colonial administrators. Lord Lugard, for 
example, was a firm believer in private property as the source 
of thrift and hard work, and with all his ceaseless propa- 
ganda for indirect rule, could not resign himself to communal 
tenure as the corollary (Lugard, 1922). In the 1920s and 
30s, developments in the palm oil industry forced a re- 
assessment of the supposed advantages of communal tenure, 
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and the continuing expansion of commodity production raised 
the further question of African rights to mortgage land. 
The model colonial policy as articulated in the proceedings 
of the West African Lands Committee seemed increasingly 
inadequate to conditions in West Africa, and in the inter- 
war years was frequently challenged as anachronistic. In 
this period, officials in London became the main advocates 
of the ideals of Morel and Wedgwood, while those faced with 
the burden of implementation were more inclined to view 
these ideals as anachronistic. On the two important issues 
of this period 
- 
how to regulate even those limited sales 
to private capital which were condoned? and how to impose 
relations of communal tenure on Africans who persisted in 
claiming individual rights? 
-a gap opened up between the 
relatively isolated officials in London and the increasingly 
doubtful administrators in the colonies. 
1. Land values and private capital 
One recurrent theme in colonial debates was the asser- 
tion that land had no value before the colonial conquest. 
It might have owners 
- 
though not individual ones 
-with 
rights of cultivation, and these were entitled to compensa- 
tion if their land was taken over for public or private use. 
But since no land market existed, African 'owners' could 
not claim the monetary value of the land. In the Gold Coast 
Colony it had proved impossible to insist on this, and legis- 
lation recognised the rights of African owners to the proceeds 
from land sales. In Nigeria, however, Lugard had tried 
to apply this principle, and suggested in 1914 that any 
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leases to private capital in Southern Nigeria be mediated 
through the state (1). The Government should acquire free- 
hold title to such land, paying only compensation to the 
occupants, and then sub-let it to European merchants. In 
this way, the benefits of rent would accrue to the state. 
The proposal was premised on the assumption that existing 
African land tenure was not individual freehold. On this 
assumption, land both belonged to the Africans and did not. 
Government could appropriate it with only minimal compensa- 
tion, claiming that it was acting as the new 'paramount chief' 
of West Africa, with overall responsibility for land affairs. 
On this occasion, the Colonial Office retreated in 
horror, and sent Lugard a stiff letter of reprimand (2). 
But in 1917, when bauxite was discovered in the Gold Coast 
Colony, officials in London proposed precisely the same 
scheme for this most touchy of African colonies (3). The 
Secretary of State advised legislation to vest all mineral- 
bearing land in the state. Africans could, he suggested, 
claim compensation for the agricultural value of the land 
they occupied, but all rents from the new mines should go 
to the treasury. Within the assumptions of customary land 
tenure, as interpreted by colonial officials, the proposal 
seemed perfectly straightforward. Africans lost only access 
to farming land, and could be duly recompensed for this. 
The mineral value of the land arose from the colonial pre- 
sence, and why should the state not enjoy some benefits 
from this? Local administrators, who recognised the extent 
to which 'customary tenure' had dissolved, were totally 
opposed. 
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Governor Clifford's lengthy (63 printed pages) rebuttal 
included a re-assessment and critique of all previous attempts 
to establish state ownership of the land (4). He insisted 
that in the Gold Coast Colony, the rights of Africans to 
their land had been finally acknowledged in the dismissal 
of Maxwell's Public Lands Bill, and could not now be challenged 
without serious political repercussions. The 'suspicion of 
profiteering on the part of Government will inevitably arise 
and the relations between the Government and the people will 
be very considerably affected', said the Chief Assistant 
Colonial Secretary (5); the proposal would cause a 'recrude- 
scence of distrust and resentment that will far outweigh 
the comparatively trifling pecuniary advantage', claimed the 
Colonial Secretary (6); all the influential officials agreed 
with Clifford on the impossibility of such a scheme. In the 
Colony at least, private property in land was too far advanced 
for such legislation. Colonial Office minutes on this 
despatch indicate a sharp divergence of opinion between 
administrators in London and those on the spot, and though 
the suggestion was dropped in the face of such powerful 
opposition, the Colonial Office refused permission for the 
printing of the despatch (7). Local doubts were considered 
excessive, and opinion in London continued to favour such 
proposals. 
When the colonial government was taking over land for 
public purposes, as for example, in the construction of 
railways, there was little disagreement: the general principle 
that Africans could get compensation, but not the value of 
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the land, was broadly practiced. Successive ordinances 
to legitimate government claims to land embraced this 
principle that Africans could claim payment only where land 
was actually cultivated, or where public works destroyed 
their improvements to nearby land. In these cases, the 
philosophy of Henry George was willingly applied: no-one 
owned the land itself, but only the crops or buildings. 
The disagreements arose when the state assumed more 
extensive powers. In 1927, legislation similar to that 
applied in Northern Nigeria was at last extended to another 
part of British West Africa, with the introduction of the 
Land and Native Rights Ordinance for the Northern Territories 
(8). As with the Nigerian legislation, land was declared 
public, and the Governor given supreme powers to validate 
land titles. He could decide the rentals appropriate for 
leases to Europeans; within the larger towns, he could decide 
the terms for leases between Africans; and he could deter- 
mine whether or not mortgaging would be permitted. All rents 
outside the towns would go directly to the treasury, while 
town rents would be divided equally between the chief of the 
town and the treasury. The new Governor, Slater, who arrived 
in the colony when the legislation was already agreed, was 
firmly opposed. In an argument similar to that of Clifford's 
despatch, he communicated in 1930 his amazement at the 'radi- 
cal change' from Chamberlain's statement in 1899 that the 
state would not claim ownership of African lands (9). He 
was not averse to some action to regulate leases to private 
capital, but considered the proposed legislation unnecessarily 
provocative. The Secretary of State defended the Ordinance 
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as an extension of the 'very successful' Northern Nigeria 
Proclamation, and summed up general Colonial Office opinion 
on such legislation: 
'The primary object of that legislation was to 
protect the native occupiers in the use and 
occupation of their land. Secondary objects 
were to prevent the evils of expensive litigation 
over land rights and to secure that the community 
instead of private individuals should benefit 
from increases in land values due to communal 
effort. ' (10) 
The language here was heavily reminiscent of that used by 
Morel and Wedgwood. 
The attitudes of Governors varied considerably, and 
often shifted in the course of their administration. But 
the Colonial Office commitment to the assumptions of the 
draft report of the WALC remained surprisingly consistent up 
till the early 1930s, and was only occasionally moderated by 
a reminder that the report was never accepted by the entire 
Committee, and not approved as the official policy for 
British West Africa (11). On the related issue of the rates 
charged to private capital for the land they leased in the 
colonies, there was often a similar contrast between opinion 
in London and local views. Under the Northern Nigeria Land 
and Native Rights Proclamation (1910), rising land values 
were regarded as a product of government work in improving 
communications and developing towns. Leases to private 
capital should be arranged in such a way as to maximise 
government rewards for this work. Thus land was publicly 
auctioned, and rents revised at frequent intervals (prefe- 
rably 7 years), a procedure which promised high rents. Lugard 
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complained about this system in 1913, and proposed an amend- 
ment to allow revision of rents at 20 year intervals, since 
'revision at more frequent intervals than this would act as 
a bar to the development of the country and prevent capital 
from entering. ' (12). An unconvinced official in London 
commented, 'We are never told that it has acted as a bar: 
on the contrary, we know that there has been a brisk demand 
for sites along the railway, and especially at Kano' (13). 
The Colonial Office was prepared at this point to compromise 
by permitting 20 year revisions for building sites, but did 
not accept the proposed amendments to the Proclamation, which 
Lugard subsequently dropped. 
The dispute was re-opened in 1917, when Lugard suggested 
he might have discretion to offer land to mining companies 
at reduced rents, fixed for the term of their occupancy. 
On this occasion the response was firmly negative (14). The 
matter was not simply a pre-occupation of one Governor: in 
1919, Clifford was the next to take up the cudgels on behalf 
of the merchants, and supported their repeated requests for 
freehold tenure and lower rents (15). The reply from London 
explicitly referred Clifford to the draft report of the 
WALC as the embodiment of the principles he should consider 
in deciding land policy (16), and though he was allowed 
to abandon public auctions of land, his suggestion for more 
lengthy periods of rent revision was resisted (17). Clifford 
was at this stage unimpressed by the land policy adopted 
in Northern Nigeria; as he commented in a later despatch: 
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'There can be no doubt, I think, that the Land 
Laws in force in the Southern Provinces are 
more favourable to the native population than 
are those which are embodied in the Land and 
Native Rights ordinance of 1916 [of Northern 
Nigeria. ' (18) 
An official in London noted hopefully that his experience 
in Nigeria was already modifying his views, and that he 
was now 'rapidly becoming a very fair Northern Nigerian' 
(19). The fact that Clifford became a clear advocate of 
the peasant road, and one of the most vigorous opponents of 
plantation development, only confirms the complexity of 
the issues raised by land affairs in West Africa. Caught 
between African claims to land, and European complaints of 
unfavourable treatment, even the most committed supporters 
of the West African Policy found the land proposals emanating 
from London unsatisfactory. 
The conflict between the Nigerian Government and the 
Colonial Office reached its high point in 1928, when the 
Deputy Governor sent a lengthy despatch 
- 
approved by 
Governor Thompson 
- 
which once again suggested an extension 
of revision periods for private rents (to 20 years in the 
Northern Provinces, and 30 years in the Southern). The 
despatch recommended 99 year leaseholds; a restriction of 
public auctions to special cases; and a guarantee that new 
rents would never involve more than a 30% increase on the 
previous one (20). As ammunition, the Deputy Governor enclosed 
a report from the Lt. Governor of the Northern Provinces, 
which directly attacked the principles of the 1910 Procla- 
mation, and indeed the Wedgwood inspired Northern Nigeria 
Land Committee: 
178 
'it was only a small minority of the Political 
Staff who agreed with the section of the committee, 
including one or two of our own officers, which 
wished not only to legalise the de facto African 
conception of land tenure, but to use it as a 
mechanism for imposing in perpetuo a somewhat 
utopian form of land tenure in the country. So 
far as Nigeria was concerned, Mr C. L. Temple, then 
Chief Secretary of Northern Nigeria and afterwards 
Acting Governor for a considerable period, was the 
protagonist of the Utopian influence which was domi- 
nant from 1908-1913. Mr Temple was a firm believer 
in the Marxian doctrine that labour applied to 
land constitutes wealth. [Flood of the C. 0. here 
interjected in the margin, 'I don't believe it: '] 
He was a disciple of Henry George and wished to 
administer Northern Nigeria on a single tax basis, 
i. e. by putting into the revenue of the state the 
whole of what was termed the 'true rent' or 'incre- 
mental value' of land. Mr Temple instilled the 
theories of Marx and Henry George into his sub- 
ordinates and acted on them whenever possible. ' (21) 
Fortunately, the report continued, Residents and District 
Officers did not act on the Proclamation. And when Lugard 
returned to the colony in 1913, 'he was far from being in 
agreement with the utopian ideals which animated in part its 
provisions, and was still less in agreement with the admini- 
strative action by which Mr Temple had sought to carry out 
the theories of Karl Marx and Henry George among the Native 
Administration' (22). Officials in London found these 
allegations of revolutionary infiltration unconvincing, but 
since three successive Governors 
- 
Lugard, Clifford, and 
now Thompson 
- 
had agitated for change, they finally conceded 
to the arguments. 
Temple was certainly one of the most convinced exponents 
of the ideas of Henry George, and in his period in Nigeria 
(Resident in Northern Nigeria 1901-1910; Chief Secretary 
1910-1914; Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria 1914-1917) 
179 
developed a version of colonial administration which rested 
on a profound distrust of modern 'civilisation'. Indirect 
rule, for Temple, meant protection against the vices of 
this civilisation, and he warned against the dangers of 
throwing the African 'like a crab without a shell amongst 
a horde of ravening sharks' (Temple, 1968: 54). The 'question 
of land tenure', he argued in Native Races and Their Rulers 
(1918) 'is connected in the closest possible manner with the 
burning question of labour' (1968: 147), and the alternatives 
as he saw them were private property in land, the creation 
of a landlord class, and the emergence of a 'large thriftless 
population', or the African peasantry based on communal 
ownership of land. Private property could only mean expro- 
priation of the poorer Africans, and would start the downward 
slide towards proletarianisation. The Northern Nigeria land 
legislation was, in his view, explicitly and correctly anti- 
capitalist, and in this, he pursued the implications of the 
West African Policy beyond many of his contemporaries. But 
whatever views can be attributed to Charles Temple, it can 
hardly be argued that the Colonial Office was staffed in the 
early twentieth century by advocates of Marx and Henry 
George. 
The recurrent conflicts between London and Nigeria have 
a more mundane explanation. The problem was that the model 
colonial policy, with its happy integration of expanding 
commodity production and traditional methods of social con- 
trol, was from its beginnings inadequate to the complex 
conditions within West Africa. And not surprisingly, it 
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was the administrators in London who were able, in their 
relative isolation, to sustain for longer the anachronistic 
visions of Morel and Wedgwood. The theories of Henry George 
had articulated a number of pressing colonial concerns. 
The doctrine of 'fair rents' reduced the costs of administra- 
tion without seriously hampering merchant activities; the 
restraining influence on individual land rights seemed to 
promise continued political order through local chiefs in 
the face of rapidly expanding commodity production. The 
(almost) universal preference of European firms for leaving 
production in the hands of Africans seemed to combine with 
this, to project a good public image of the colonial states 
as protectors of their African subjects from the worst 
excesses of capitalist exploitation. This model colonial 
policy rested fundamentally on the assumption that 'native 
customary tenure' was a direct opposite to individual free- 
hold. On this assumption the colonial states could 
legitimately appropriate land for public works, and even 
for rental to private capital, without any significant 
interference with African rights. They could claim that 
they were acting as the new 'paramount chiefs' of British 
West Africa, and employing the accepted powers of chiefs 
to allocate land in the interests of the community. This 
was the argument that underlay the 1910 Proclamation for 
Northern Nigeria; this was the assumption that justified 
the 1927 extension of similar powers to the Northern Terri- 
tories of the Gold Coast. No-one could accuse the colonial 
states of seizing land from its rightful owners if the land 
had no private owners. The state was merely pursuing the 
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traditional responsibilities of chiefs to 'protect the 
native occupiers in the use and occupation of their lands'. 
As long as this version of traditional land tenure could 
be sustained, proposals such as the one for appropriation of 
all mineral-bearing land could be presented as a perfectly 
legitimate extension of African tradition. The same argument 
could be applied to the vexed question of forestry reserves; 
if it was assumed that no individuals owned the forests, and 
that land was traditionally administered by public autho- 
rities, then surely the colonial state could establish 
forest reserves without any interference in existing African 
rights? In this argument, only the unrepresentative 'new' 
Africans, who made their living from land litigation and 
adopted Western conceptions of land tenure, would offer any 
resistance. The true voice of West Africa would understand 
that the colonial state was simply fulfilling its social 
responsibilities to the community. 
Thus the reforming vision of Morel and Wedgwood had 
provided an underpinning which could justify denial of 
African land rights, and it is not surprising that their 
ideas lingered on despite the failure to ratify the draft 
report of the WALC. Many administrators within the colonies 
shared this vision, but it is noticeable that successive 
Governors challenged its validity. Faced as they were with 
the practical task of implementing the proposals which arose 
from this conception of 'native customary tenure', many came 
to the conclusion that the conception was either incorrect, 
or at least out of date, when ideas of land tenure had 
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changed so rapidly. Hence Clifford's refusal in 1914 to 
even consider implementation of the dreams of certain members 
of the WALC that the colonial state could halt further land 
sales (23); hence the rejection of the 1917 suggestion that 
mineral bearing land be nationalised; hence the recurrent 
criticisms of attempts at forestry legislation (24). Con- 
trary to the official version, the notion that Africans did 
indeed 'own' their land was widespread, and the potential 
opposition to such legislation would not be restricted to a 
few unrepresentative African lawyers. Similarly, the 
objections within West Africa to the policy of extracting 
maximum rents from private capital expressed the greater 
sensitivity of the local governments to the political oppo- 
sition of merchant companies; their dealings with private 
capital were more continual and direct than those of the 
Colonial Office, which faced at the most the occasional 
recriminatory letter (25), or carefully stage-managed consul- 
tative meeting. 
2. Peasants and private property 
Land transactions with private capital challenged 
assumptions of African custom, and undermined official 
versions of communal tenure. But the real problem was the 
peasants themselves. 'Native customary tenure' reduced 
even pre-colonial land relations to a false simplicity, 
ignoring the extent to which land was already bought and 
sold. In the inter-war years, the gap between official 
version and rapidly-changing reality became more striking, 
and the principles of the WALC proved an inadequate guide. 
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Property relations in West Africa did not fit the proposed 
model, and as commodity production was further developed, 
a number of complex issues emerged. As in their dealings 
with private firms, it was administrators on the spot who 
first admitted the out-moded nature of existing land policy; 
the Colonial Office clung longer to the dream of happy 
peasants, protected and encouraged by relations of communal 
ownership. 
Three main problems arose. First, how should communal 
tenure adapt to the introduction of permanent cash crops 
like cocoa, where trees took 7-20 years to reach fruition? 
In particular, how should it deal with migration? Before 
colonisation, migratory strangers were widely accepted into 
a community if they were of 'good character' and acknowledged 
the authority of the local chief by payment of tribute. But 
chiefs in some areas were reluctant to approve the planting 
of permanent crops, like cocoa, when it seemed to imply 
outright control of the land by the new occupants. The 
colonial states were here caught between a commitment to the 
new cash crops, and a concern to sustain 'customary tenure'. 
Obviously, they wanted to support the right of strangers to 
cultivate the crops on which colonial economies relied. 
Lugard, for example, tried in 1918 to persuade Judicial 
Councils and Native Courts in Southern Nigeria to adopt a 
rule which allowed strangers to erect permanent buildings, 
plant permanent crops, and pass on land to their sons (26). 
But the corollary of this was that a previous system of 
tribute would develop into demands for land rent, and 
customary tenure be correspondingly transformed. In this 
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case, Lugard attempted to moderate the changes by insisting 
that any such rent be paid to public bodies, and used for 
public purposes. It was impossible to enforce this require- 
ment. In the Gold Coast, land rent had already developed: 
strangers were welcome to plant crops on stool land and 
paid a rent of id. per bearing cocoa tree to the chief, who 
usually accepted it as a private income. As the Acting 
Chief Commissioner for Ashanti commented, the rent 'goes 
in theory to the community, but in practice to the Chief and 
elders only' (27) 
. 
This was the second problem associated with the develop- 
ment of commodity prdduction. How could colonial governments 
prevent chiefs from asserting themselves as private land- 
lords? And how were they to deal with the increasing con- 
flicts between lesser and higher chiefs, as each competed 
for the right to land rent? Paramount chiefs were frequently 
grieved by the refusal of subordinates to share out the pro- 
ceeds (28), and as the Secretary for Native Affairs in the 
Gold Coast noted in 1926, 'the forces of disintegration and 
degradation are hard at work', with lesser chiefs constantly 
flouting the demands of the superiors (29). The state could 
not afford the consequences, when the practice of indirect 
rule made political order so dependent on the authority of 
chiefs. Recurrent litigation between chiefs interfered with 
colonial administration, and the transformation of chiefs 
into landlords hastened the 'decay of tribal authority'. 
In the Gold Coast Colony, where commoners traditionally had 
the right to dismiss chiefs who acted against their interests, 
the number of depositions rose sharply, in rhythm with the 
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commercialisation of land. 
No. of stool depositions 
in Gold Coast Colony (30) 
1904-8 
1909-13 
1914-18 
1918-23 
1924-25 
10 
22 
39 
32 
16 
The Secretary for Native Affairs who reported these figures 
did not attribute them to 'de-tribalisation' of the commoners; 
the problem rather was the de-tribalisation of the chiefs, 
who pursued private gain at the expense of community progress. 
Third, how should the colonial governments respond to 
the mortgaging of land? African producers continued to press 
for full control over the land they occupied, and particularly 
for the right to sub-let and mortgage. In the inter-war 
years, some officials came to approve this development as 
the necessary price for agricultural improvement. In Nigeria 
the Head of the Agricultural Department formed an alliance 
with Rowe, the Commissioner of Lands, and campaigned for 
greater 'security of tenure' for individuals, in other words, 
for more rights to sub-let, mortgage and sell. The custom 
of referring decisions over land usage to the entire kinship 
group was regarded by such officials as a constraint on 
'progressive farmers'; and the denial of mortgages as a 
restriction on the credit which might otherwise be used for 
purchase of improved equipment. Such arguments inevitably 
shattered the assumption of 'native customary tenure', and 
officials in London were constantly shocked by the divergence 
between local proposals, and the principles on which they 
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had assumed land policy was formulated. 
In the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the main proponent of 
change was Lt. Col. Rowe, Surveyor-General in the Gold Coast 
from 1920-27, and subsequently Commissioner of Lands in 
Nigeria till his death in 1933. Rowe interpreted the above 
mentioned problems as heralding the end of the dreams of the 
WALC. Only a decisive move in the direction of individual 
property rights could ensure satisfactory conditions for 
development in British West Africa. Private property would 
guarantee security for migrants; undermine the devious 
transformation of chiefs into landlords by challenging the 
communal property which gave chiefs their powers; and provide 
access to credit for the progressive farmers who should be 
the backbone of any agricultural policy. His first success 
was the formation of a Committee on Land Registration in the 
Gold Coast in 1923, comprising himself, the Attorney General, 
and one other political officer, to investigate a system of 
land registration to establish individual titles (31). The 
report recommended procedures for the registration of titles 
for Europeans and Africans alike, and an insurance fund to 
compensate any dispossessed who might subsequently challenge 
the titles. In this way registered titles would be secure 
from litigation, and on the basis of these titles, mortgages 
could be arranged. The Committee did not yet press for 
compulsory registration, but expressed the hope that regi- 
stration on a voluntary basis in more developed areas like 
Accra would encourage Africans throughout the Colony to 
adopt the practice (32). The Attorney General demurred from 
this report, pointing out that under customary tenure, 
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individual property reverted to the community when the 
occupant died without heirs: how was the system of registra- 
tion to deal with that? The honest answer was that the 
point of the system was precisely to destroy this custom; 
Rowe's objective at least, was not simply to register existing 
individual rights but to dissolve communal tenure and intro- 
duce private property. The Acting Governor supported the 
Attorney-General, and the matter was laid aside 
- 
like 
many others 
- 
till the visit of Ormsby-Gore in 1926. 
At this point, the Acting Governor drew up a detailed 
report, but focussed on the less vital issue of guaranteeing 
land titles to European firms. He favoured 99 year leases, 
rather than freehold titles, since: 
, in the present stage of development of the Gold 
Coast indiscriminate grants of freeholds to non- 
natives are not advisable. It would lead, as it 
has done elsewhere, to the creation of a class 
of absentee landlords, and as is well, known, the 
existence of such a class has always caused 
trouble. ' (33) 
On the more radical proposals for promoting individual rights 
among Africans, he was equally discouraging, suggesting only 
that where individual freehold titles already existed, they 
should be more effectively registered. His arguments were 
much more firmly in line with the supposed principles of 
West African land policy than those of the Surveyor General. 
Rowe meanwhile had hardened his position, and called 
for compulsory registration of titles in the urban centres 
of Accra, Sekondi, Kumasi, Koforidua and Cape Coast. His 
ultimate objectives were made clear in the following 
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extract from a 1926 memorandum: 
'Sometimes administrators who are justly proud 
of a native administration based on native 
customs (which they are doing their utmost to pre- 
serve in their purity), view with alarm the idea 
of the encroachment upon the native customary 
methods of modern legal and technical processes, 
and it is often asserted that modern methods 
cannot be properly applied to land held under 
native custom. It must however, be recognised, 
that the gradual attainment of individual owner- 
ship and civilised forms of owning and leasing 
land is an advance brought about by economic 
necessity and must inevitably be introduced with 
the full development of any country. Land becomes 
scarcer and dearer with the increase of the 
population, with the building of railways and 
the inauguration of large enterprises. Semi- 
permanent crops such as cocoa are introduced, 
necessitating a semi-permanent and secure form 
of ownership of land, and commercial undertakings 
of any magnitude require long and good leasehold 
before capital will commit itself. This change 
to definite individual ownership of land may be 
delayed, but its ultimate establishment everywhere 
is inevitable, unless development of the country's 
resources and its commerce is to be hampered and 
retarded. ' (34) 
This declaration of intent set the scene for a sharp 
confrontation between the cultural imperialism of Rowe and 
the cultural dualism of those like Rattray, who clung, like 
Temple before him, to the image of a separate path of develop- 
ment for Africa: 
'I postulate [declared Rattray in 1937] as the ideal 
for these people, a race, the bulk of whose popu- 
lation is settled on the land; the maintenance of 
the revenues necessary for the advancement of their 
country and countrymen secured by agricultural pur- 
suits, not as paid labourers, but by each man 
working his own holding; and finally the possession 
of all land safeguarded by trusts as constituted by 
the Tribal Stools. ' (35) 
The debates were published in two weighty collections by 
the Gold Coast Government: in 1927 the Proposed Reforms in 
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respect of Land Legislation of the Gold Coast primarily in 
order to promote security of title, and in 1930 the Land 
Legislation of the Gold Coast, Vol. II, which brought 
together memoranda by various Gold Coast officers consulted 
on the subject (36). Rattray, whose ideas were treated 
with considerable respect at the Colonial Office, considered 
the effects of Rowe's various recommendations would be as 
follows : 
'(a) Break up of the Akan Constitution 
(b) Finally destroy the already dwindling power of 
the Chiefs 
(c) Lead to a scramble by everyone who had acquired 
land by native customary methods, to rush to 
register an absolute title to what, under the 
law which alone had put him in possession of 
a valuable asset, could never have become his 
freehold property 
(d) Lead to the rapid alienation of land, and 
facilitate it falling into the hands of 
capitalists (European and African) 
(e) Bring about the eventual impoverishment of the 
tribal and family units and the creation of a 
landless class, who would in time become African 
paupers 
-a section of civilised communities 
familiar to us, but hitherto unknown in West 
Africa. ' (37) 
Rattray knew very well that Rowe's proposals would gain the 
support of Africans, and argued that it was the responsibility 
of colonial states to prevent their escape from the control 
of tribal authorities. 
Opinion at this time was varied, and as Passfield 
commented, the 'marked divergence of opinion' suggested 
necessity for the utmost caution' (38). The problem was 
not so much how to guarantee titles for European companies; 
on this issue all agreed that existing legislation was 
unsatisfactory, and provoked excessive litigation. Debates 
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here were only over the kind of legislative or executive 
action required to remedy agreed defects. 
It was the question of private property for peasants 
that aroused passions. Rowe's proposals sometimes appeared 
as no more than a worthy attempt to control land disputes. 
But what was at stake was the reversal of existing land 
policy. The commitment to communal tenure which had evolved out 
of the first decades of colonial rule, and found expression 
in the draft report of the WALC, was fundamentally challenged 
by Rowe's campaign. He rejected the image of the undiff e- 
rentiated peasantry, tilling the soil under the guidance of 
their chiefs, and secured in access to the land by customary 
tenure. For him, the future lay with progressive farmers, 
freed from kinship constraints, able to raise mortgages for 
agricultural improvement, and presumably 
- 
though he did 
not insist on this 
- 
employing wage-labour. The chiefs he 
saw as an obstruction, and in his arguments against them, 
he cleverly deployed the threat of landlordism: 
'The Commissioner of Lands discovered that the 
system whereby under nebulous and uncodified so- 
called "Native Law and Custom" the rights of 
individuals were suppressed and attempts made 
to regard all land as vested in the Chiefs 
(so-called communal land), not only was great 
injustice inevitable but that in some places the 
Chiefs were, as a direct result of the policy, 
beginning to charge economic rents and that 
the people themselves would undoubtedly be, in 
the course of time, reduced to landless wage 
slaves on their own land. The same mistake 
(as has been made in other countries) of vesting 
the land in the Chiefs was being gradually 
introduced into Nigeria, but subtly disguised 
as "Native Law and Custom". ' (39) 
In arguing this, Rowe revealed a glaring inconsistency in 
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the West African Policy: the advocacy of peasant small- 
holders, secured in the communal ownership of the land, 
could all too easily turn into its opposite, and encourage 
incipient landlordism among the chiefs. Rowe's ideas 
questioned much of what had become commonplace in British 
West Africa, but without a frontal attack on the principle 
of peasant farming. Rather, he emphasised inconsistencies 
between this supposed objective, and current practices in 
land affairs. His ideas shattered much of the dominant 
consensus, but this consensus was already in some disarray, 
and Rowe found himself a surprisingly ready audience. 
Guggisberg, in his period as Governor of the Gold Coast, 
gave Rowe considerable support, and set in motion from 1925 
the separation of a Lands Department from the Survey Depart- 
ment, with responsibility for overseeing the changes Rowe 
proposed. Slater, who succeeded him in 1927, was opposed 
to Rowe's suggestions. Like Rattray, he believed their 
effect would be to increase the number of land suits in the 
colony, as Africans fought with one another for rights over 
the land. 'The remedy', he suggested, 'seems worse than the 
disease' (40), a comment which -sufficiently indicates that 
for Slater, the only point of further land legislation was 
to settle existing land disputes. As already mentioned, 
legislation similar to that of Northern Nigeria was intro- 
duced for the less developed Northern Territories, but no 
final solution was agreed for the more controversial Colony 
and Ashanti. By 1930, the Colonial Office was prepared to 
consider some modification of the previous basis of land 
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policy, and Flood of the Colonial Office wrote an influen- 
tial minute which began a process of distancing from the 
draft report of the WALC: 
'I might perhaps add a word of caution in regard 
to the W. A. L. C., to which so much reference is 
made. That Committee was established at a time 
when the desire of people in this country was to 
prevent the poor native being robbed of all his 
lands for the benefit of the unscrupulous European 
and the exciting cause of its appointment was the 
scramble between Brunner Mond & Co. and Levers, 
for agricultural concessions in the Gold Coast. 
The circumstances are now changed and there is 
not now so much demand for permission to alienate 
native lands, and the problem before the Govern- 
ment is rather to regularise, so far as can be 
done, the existing situation, which is not satis- 
factory. ' (41) 
The proposed resolution was nonetheless influenced by the 
draft report; Passfieid suggested in May 1930 that the 
Government proclaim all lands as tribal or stool lands, and 
put the onus on claimants of individual property rights to 
establish the legitimacy of their claims before a quasi- 
judicial commission. Slater, who had already demonstrated 
his reluctance to modify existing land rights, rejected this 
suggestion, and proposed that the discussion of registration 
of titles be discontinued (42). 
The debate thus lasted from 1922 to 1931, with no 
ultimate results. The process of transition to private 
property in land was to be neither retarded nor speeded up, 
but left to develop at its own momentum. It is significant 
however, that with the exception of Rattray, and a relatively 
small number of Political Officers who echoed his views, 
the explicit criticisms öf Rowe's proposals were mainly 
that they would promote endless land litigation. This had 
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been the corner-stone of Slater's objections. And signi- 
ficantly, he dealt with the argument that private ownership 
in land was needed to allow Africans access to credit, not 
by challenging the development of credit itself, but by 
pointing out that European companies seemed quite willing 
to lend money without mortgages, merely on 'personal guaran- 
tees by persons of substance. ' (43) 
Rowe meanwhile had transferred to Nigeria, where he 
was to participate in very similar debates during his period 
as Commissioner of Lands. The issue of private property 
rights had become a source of concern in Nigeria in the 
early 1920s (44), and indeed it was because of the emergence 
of these problems that Rowe was appointed to his new post. 
In the area around Abeokuta in Southern Nigeria private 
property in land had developed on a significant scale 
- 
partly because the Egba United Government which ruled this 
area at the time of the colonial conquest was less rooted 
in traditional African chieftaincies than in other parts of 
Nigeria, and pursued more Western conceptions of land 
tenure; partly because the proximity of the town to the port 
of Lagos meant a greater integration into commodity pro- 
duction; and partly because the area had been one of the 
centres for the cotton production sponsored by the BCGA. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century land sales were 
sufficiently common to provoke the Governor to impose a 
restriction on land transactions to those between people 
of Egba descent; and by 1922 there was agitation among Egbas 
for the removal of these restrictions. A petition was 
drawn up by the 'people of Egbaland' and presented to the 
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Alake of Abeokuta and his Council. This contrasted the rapid 
development of Lagos 
- 
where sales, leases and mortgaging 
of land were unrestricted 
- 
with the stagnation of Abeokuta, 
where Egbas were prevented from selling land to either 
Europeans or non-Egba Africans (45). In forwarding this 
petition to London, Clifford drew a similar contrast between 
the two towns, but in his case to the detriment of Lagos, 
where he understood that 
'the descendants of the original landowners have 
been reduced to the position of labourers on large 
estates which have been acquired by wealthy 
Lagosfans. ' (46) 
Clifford expressed the conventional antagonism to private 
property: 
'the present tendency, then, in Abeokuta is toward 
individual ownership of land, with the inevitable 
result that natives who acquired wealth by trade 
will form large estates to the exclusion of the 
uneducated peasant farmer. In my opinion this 
tendency should be checked, as it is not in the 
interests of the Egbas as a whole to allow a state 
of affairs to continue which can only benefit a 
few thousand literate natives. ' (47) 
He was prepared to allow some concessions in the town of 
Abeokuta, and would accept leasing and mortgaging of any 
property which could be demonstrated as fully individual 
property; but only to other Africans, and with the consent 
of the Alake and his Council. The control of the Alake 
should be further re-established, with all existing land 
transactions made dependent on his approval. The Alake was 
understandably in favour of this compromise. 
In the course of the next two years 
- 
during which no 
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decision was reached 
- 
Clifford's position modified to a 
clear advocacy of the rights to sell, lease and mortgage 
land within the boundaries of the town. Local opinion was 
unanimous in support of this; private property was firmly 
established, as was perhaps inevitable in the process of 
development; and the institution of mortgaging already existed 
in the practice of mortgaging of crops (48). Officials in 
London expressed the usual reservations. Mortgaging was 
considered by one official a very dangerous development for 
an 'improvident people' (49), while the discovery that crop 
mortgaging existed aroused fears that the owners of the land 
would soon be 'reduced to the position of serfs bound to 
till their own land for the benefit of the mortgagees' (50). 
Approval for the mortgaging of town property was conceded, 
but faced with such reluctance from London, Clifford decided 
to delay action. 
This uncertainty over the policy appropriate to Abeokuta 
lead in 1926 to a request for a post of Commissioner of Lands, 
and the establishment of a Lands Department to deal with 
land problems for both Northern and Southern Provinces of 
Nigeria. The decision over Abeokuta was laid aside pending 
the appointment of Rowe to this position, and it was hoped 
that the formation of a Lands Department would facilitate 
resolution of this issue, while also settling the confusions 
about land titles and boundaries in the Colony of Lagos. 
Rowe's reception in the homeland of 'indirect rule' was, 
as might be expected, somewhat mixed; what is remarkable is 
not that he faced opposition from Nigerian administrators, 
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but that a man of his reputation was chosen by the Nigerian 
Government, against the advice of the Colonial Office (51). 
His first disappointment on arrival in Nigeria was exclusion 
from the Northern Provinces. The Lt. 
-Governor of the North 
was not prepared to co-operate with him, and the activities 
of the Lands Department were restricted to the South (52). 
Even in the Southern Provinces, he came up against strong 
opposition. In 1929, for example, the Lt. 
-Governor of the 
South declared that: 
'any extension of the individual proprietary right 
would completely destroy native administration 
... Government cannot, I think, hope to be successful 
with its policy of rule by indirect methods if it 
gives much support to an extension outside Lagos 
of freehold tenure. ' (53) 
Rowe however, found a valuable ally in the Director of 
Agriculture, whose attempts to deal with the palm oil indus- 
try by promoting the introduction of experimental plantations 
by African farmers had come up against the obstacle of 
family tenure. In 1931 Rowe could proclaim: 
'The Director of Agriculture and the Commissioner 
of Lands are of the opinion that full progress in 
agriculture in Nigeria cannot be obtained under a 
system of land tenure which does not provide for 
security of the individual proprietary right. ' (54) 
He pursued his campaign for a 'realistic' land policy 
through accumulation of evidence of already existing indi- 
vidual rights. In a lengthy memorandum on Land, Planning 
and Development (55), produced in 1931, he listed the example 
of Abeokuta, where public auctions of land averaged 100 each 
year; Calabar, where the local Deeds Registry witnessed 
numerous transactions by individuals claiming virtually 
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freehold rights; Kano, where the usufruct of farms was widely 
bought and sold; and Ijebu Province, where the greater part 
of the land is privately owned and is constantly let or 
sold outright' (56). He challenged the claim of the defenders 
of 'native customary tenure' that they were protecting African 
rights, by pointing to evidence that chiefs were abusing 
their position to become landlords. He managed to get the 
annual Conference of Residents in 1929 and 1930 to discuss 
his proposal for registration of titles 
- 
though with little 
success at this stage, since the overwhelming opinion seemed 
to be in favour of preserving the 'supposed communal system' 
(57) 
. 
The Lands Department 
- 
like many others 
- 
suffered 
severe retrenchment in the early 1930s, when five of the 
European officers were dismissed in the financial stringency 
of the depression. But against all odds, an Ordinance for 
the registration of land titles was finally approved in 1933 
(Rowe died just before its final approval), which established 
the principle of compulsory land registration, and accepted 
the practice of mortgaging and foreclosure. The Ordinance 
applied only to Lagos and the Southern Provinces, but within 
this area registration districts could be declared, within 
which titles must be registered for any lease of over 40 
years, and any land transaction involving money. Registration 
of titles would also be permitted for shorter leases, but 
with the qualification that applications would be rejected 
if the land was shown to be family land (58). The acceptance 
of private property in land was thus hesitant, and fell far 
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short of a challenge to family property, but the principle 
of individual ownership was approved. 
It was against this background of rapidly changing 
opinion that the decisions over Abeokuta were made. In 
1928, Governor Thompson declared: 
'I hold the view that the idea that the raising of 
a mortgage is in itself a doubtful proceeding in 
which the natives should not be allowed to indulge 
owing to their unsophisticated nature, which has 
to a. large extent permeated our policy in regard to 
this subject in Nigeria, is now out of date. ' (59) 
It was inconsistent to promote commodity production, but 
deny the right to mortgage. In particular, he suggested, 
continued refusal of mortgages might undermine the position 
bf the African middleman, who mediated between European 
merchant companies and African producers. Mortgaging could 
be safely permitted, as long as it was only of leasehold 
land. Amery, in his response, correctly pointed out that 
this was no protection against possible expropriation from 
the land, but by now agreed that 'absolute protection against 
such a state of affairs apparently puts a check on the legi- 
timate development of Nigeria' (60). Approval was reluctantly 
given to the principle of mortgaging. 
The framework of debate had thus shifted considerably. 
At the time of the WALC, free land sales had been associated 
with the policy of development through European plantations, 
and the alternative of African commodity production had 
been identified with the maintenance of 'native customary 
tenure'. By the late 1920s, it was increasingly admitted 
that even this 'legitimate development' through African 
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small holders demanded some relaxation in previous land 
policy. Policy remained varied, with the extension of the 
principles of Northern Nigerian land policy to the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast, at the same time as a 
relaxation of restrictions on mortgaging in Southern Nigeria. 
But there was no longer a simple model for British West 
Africa. 
The shift in opinion was strengthened by new evidence 
of the conditions of 'native customary tenure'. Thus for 
example a comprehensive survey of land tenure in the four 
Yoruba Provinces of Southern Nigeria, commissioned in the 
early 1930s, revealed that land was not after all vested in 
the chiefs as trustees of the people (61). The land belonged 
rather to the family groups who had settled it; the family 
heads who administered this land might often be chiefs, but 
their authority over the land derived from their membership 
of the family, and not from their office as chiefs. The 
survey thus established 
- 
at least to Governor Cameron's 
satisfaction (62) 
- 
first, that the chiefs did not own the 
land; second, that the only clear restrictions on land 
transactions within customary tenure were the obligations 
on members of a family to obtain the permission of chiefs 
before accepting strangers into the community; and third, 
that customary tenure seemed to permit both individuals and 
families to sell their land. In Yorubaland, strangers who 
were permitted access to virgin land would be expected to 
make gifts to the head-chief of the family group, and also 
to the owners of the land - who might themselves be chiefs, 
or merely family heads, or even individual members of a 
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family. In neither case was the gift a rent proper, but 
whereas the gift to the head-chief was a recognition that 
'he was the administrator of the group, the advisor on points 
of custom, and the chief judge in cases of dispute' (Ward- 
Price, 1933: 28), the gifts to the actual grantors of the land 
were an acknowledgement of their rights of ownership over 
the land. Thus chiefs who claimed rights of ownership were 
acting outside the original custom, and Ward-Price, the 
author of the report, criticised attempts made by chiefs 
in previous decades to present themselves as owners of the 
land (63). 
The report described the process whereby pre-colonial 
forms of tribute had been replaced by a simple monetary 
exchange. In the case of Ibadan: 
'in former days, town sites were granted rapidly 
because a grateful adherent was thereby added to 
the family, and the family's prestige and power 
increased. Sites were granted in perpetuity so 
long as they were occupied, which really means, 
except in rare cases, an outright grant. 
In modern times, the head of a family realises 
that such a grant really amounts to an outright 
grant, and that, under the new administrative 
and judicial systems, there is not much advantage 
in possessing grateful adherents of the family. 
He therefore, comes to the conclusion that it 
is wise to make the occasion an opportunity of 
adding to the family's financial resources, as 
he stands to gain nothing by not doing so. ' (Ward-Price, 1933: 44) 
The establishment of colonial states meant a separation of 
politics and economics. The political advantages of 'grate- 
full tenants were increasingly minimal, and if the economic 
advantages of rent were denied to the owners, they would be 
reluctant to agree to an influx of new farmers. In this 
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context, colonial restrictions on land sales or rents would 
actually reduce the opportunities for strangers to take up 
land outside their country of origin; the effect would be 
a greater inflexibility than that of pre-colonial society. 
A similar process was taking place in grants of virgin land 
in the country around Ibadan. Forest land which had pre- 
viously been freely granted to any new occupant who took on 
the task of forest clearance, was now regarded as valuable 
cocoa-growing land. The owners demanded a small annual pay- 
ment from the new tenants, and a labour obligation to work 
on the grantor's farm at various periods during the year 
(Ward-Price, 1933: 45). Again, if this form of tenancy were 
prevented by colonial legislation, migration to previously 
uncultivated land would be halted, to the detriment of 
agricultural expansion. Furthermore, as Cameron argued in 
forwarding the report, the custom of permitting strangers 
access to family land provided a mechanism whereby descen- 
dants of slaves 
- 
who owned no land 
- 
could establish them- 
selves(; as farmers; constraints on the practice would eliminate 
this possibility. In other words, Yoruba societies prior 
to the colonial conquest had evolved customs which encouraged 
mobility and migration to agriculturally productive land. 
Under the conditions of colonisation, the previous forms 
of tribute inevitably came to take the form of clear land 
sales and rentals. And if the traditional horror of such 
developments were to lead the colonial governments into 
preventative action, obstacles would be created to the expan- 
sion of agriculture. 
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The potential of expropriation from the land was not 
denied, but in a significant shift from the earlier terms 
of debate it was now hinted that the landless could be 
accommodated through working as wage-labourers for more 
successful farmers. Ward-Price commented on the extent of 
mortgaging of crops which had developed in Abeokuta Province, 
where 'there are numerous young men who are unable to redeem 
the trees their fathers pawned'. This, he suggested, 'may 
be one reason why there is always a large number of young 
men without work to do or farms to work on'. However, 
rather than simply deploring this development, he went on 
to point out that 'there are also farmers who are in need 
of labour to cultivate their holdings. The young men do not 
always trust that the farmers will pay them their wages 
regularly' (Ward, Price, 1933: 79). The implication here was 
that the solution to the problem might lie in a more firmly 
institutionalised wage labour relationship, rather than in 
a doomed attempt to guarantee all farmers equal access to 
ownership of land. 
As a result of this report, Cameron was prepared to give 
final approval to land sales and rentals in Abeokuta, and 
clung merely to the two safeguards that only the leasehold 
of town land could be mortgaged to non-Africans, and that 
only the crops on farming land could be mortgaged. By this 
point officials in London were prepared to allow the West 
African Governors a free hand in decisions about land tenure, 
which was now considered 'such a tedious subject' (64). 
The last vestige of Colonial Office anxiety was to occur in 
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1934, when Cameron proposed a new bill to regulate the 
'kola' (peppercorn) tenancies which had developed among 
the Ibo people in the Southern Provinces (65). The problem 
again arose from the development of land values: in the 
Onitsha Province 'kola tenants' who paid a nominal tribute 
to the owners of the land 
- 
for example occasional presents 
of kola nuts 
- 
could now sub-let the land for as much as 
£200 per annum; the proposed bill would give the original 
grantors the right to reclaim the land on payment of compen- 
sation to their tenants, or alternatively give the tenants 
the right to purchase the land outright. Colonial Office 
officials were predictably horrified by this evidence of 
ground landlordism, and the precedent of India was once more 
brought out as the cautionary tale. But as with the Abeokuta 
decision, it was accepted that the Governor should now decide 
on the appropriate action, and the bill was approved. The 
Kola Tenancies Ordinance was accordingly enacted in 1935. 
Thus in the case of Nigeria the principle of private 
property in land was conceded, and institutionalised in 
legislation which permitted the registration of individual 
proprietary rights; acknowledged the right to sell land with- 
out the constraints of native law and to charge an economic 
rent; and accepted - with some restrictions - the right to 
raise mortgages on private property. This principle was 
not of course practised throughout the colony of Nigeria. 
The Registration of Titles Ordinance was only applied to 
the major urban centres, and the concessions of the late 
1920s and early 1930s involved more the recognition of existing 
private ownership rights, than the grandiose vision of Rowe 
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which pushed for an enforced introduction of private owner- 
ship throughout Nigeria. The change in policy stopped short 
of any deliberate campaign to promote private property rights. 
And the continued ambivalence was demonstrated in the failure 
of Rowe's propaganda for registration of titles in the Gold 
Coast. The principle of African proprietary rights in land 
had been conceded in the Concessions Ordinance, and any more 
explicit move in the direction of individual freehold was 
deprecated by the Governor in the late 1920s. The growing 
divergence between the supposed philosophy of West African 
land policy and the actual practice of colonial governments 
testifies more to the inappropriateness of the original 
philosophy than to a dramatic conversion to its opposite. 
The starting point of land policy at the time of the 
First World War was the concern to dampen the effects of 
change. It had been assumed that production could continue 
within largely pre-capitalist relations, and that the efforts 
of merchant capital would ensure only a change in the nature 
of the products themselves. Africans would be encouraged 
to bring more land under cultivation merely by the lure of 
money rewards from the merchant companies; they would not 
have to change the relations under which they produced. The 
success of the West African Policy was that the transformation 
to commodity production did indeed occur mainly through the 
market. The colonial states in West Africa were not 
generally forced into the use of taxation or direct admini- 
strative coercion to 'persuade' their subjects to produce 
for the world market. But the second assumption - that in 
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the process pre-capitalist relations could be preserved in 
relative purity 
- 
was not to be fulfilled. Administrators 
in London were slow to admit this, and administrators in 
the colonies varied in their perception of it. But by the 
time of the Second World War 'native customary tenure' no 
longer seemed so straightforward. 
The clearest transformations occurred where land was 
required by the merchants (as in the urban trading centres), 
and where migration of strangers from another lineage group 
had preceded colonialism, or developed in response to the 
new conditions of commodity production (as with the migrant 
cocoa-farmers studied in Hill, 1963). In the former case 
land came to have a clear exchange value, and in the compe- 
tition for the proceeds individual proprietary rights were 
almost universally established. In the latter, the culti- 
vation of what the colonial administrators termed 'economic 
crops' led the owners of the land to demand an economic 
rent. Ironically the imposition of the colonial state 
fostered this process by undercutting the politics of 
patronage; the land-owners demanded a money rent instead of 
the increasingly worthless 'gratitude' of their tenants. 
Underlying these processes was the dependence on credit 
implicit in the transition to commodity production. The 
farmers who came to live by production of a commodity which 
could be realised only once or twice in the course of the 
year, usually relied for their subsistence on advances from 
African middlemen who organised the purchase of the crops 
for the merchant companies. A complex system of indebtedness 
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rapidly developed, the extent of which only became fully 
understood in the proceedings of the Commission on the 
Marketing of West African cocoa in 1938 (66). The mortgaging 
of crops, the discovery of which had caused such consterna- 
tion in Abeokuta, was widespread throughout the cocoa-producing 
districts of the Gold Coast, and inevitably placed the mort- 
gagee at risk of expropriation if the crop failed, or the 
output fell below expectations. The potential for class 
differentiation within this process worked itself out, such 
that the 1931 census in the Gold Coast had to classify those 
involved in agriculture into the following five groups: 
(a) peasant proprietors cultivating crops solely for them- 
selves and their families; (b) peasant proprietors cultivating 
crops for sale and export; (c) hired labourers; (d) 
employers of labour and non-working land-holders; (e) 
distribution agents, buyers, middlemen, transport owners, 
transport employees, porters (Cardinall, 1931: 201). This 
was not the vision articulated by the writers of the draft 
report of the WALC, though it arose from the fundamental 
principle advocated by those writers 
- 
that agricultural 
production should remain in the hands of the Africans, and 
not be developed through large European estates. What had 
emerged was that this principle was not enough. The 
exclusion of European capital did not of itself guarantee 
that pre-capitalist relations of production would be pre- 
served against the forces of dissolution. 
By the 1930s, the claim that British West Africa repre- 
sented an alternative to capitalist agriculture was seriously 
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discredited, and the colonial governments were engaged in 
little more than a holding operation. The commitment to 
peasant production had some effects, but from the emerging 
'development' perspective, these were largely negative. It 
had enough force to hamper Lever's attempts to transform 
palm-oil production, but not enough to ensure alternative 
ways of promoting productivity. It could force land trans- 
actions underground, and disguise the number of land sales, 
but could not eliminate them. It delayed regulation of the 
land market, and thereby limited access to bank loans, but 
could not prevent African farmers from turning instead to 
money-lenders, who charged exhorbitant interest. It con- 
strained investigation into the use of wage labour on 
African farms, and so hindered the regulation of this labour 
market, but could not stop the formation of capitalist agri- 
culture. The policies which at the time of the First World 
War seemed a coherent package of philanthropy, economic pro- 
gress and political order, did not work; and by the outbreak 
of the Second World War, the colonial states were merely 
adjusting themselves to conditions over which they had 
marginal control. 
In this sense, the war was a watershed for colonial 
policies, and in subsequent years, colonial administrators 
began to occupy themselves with a new set of problems. As 
one analyst of colonialism prophetically remarked in 1942: 
'Different generations choose different aspira- 
tions and concepts to guide them in their 
political endeavour: "indirect rule" was the 
watchword of the decade which followed the last 
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war; "development and welfare" will probably be 
the cry of the generation which follows the 
present one. ' (Hancock, 1942: 267) 
The war served merely to mark this shift, and cannot be 
held responsible for it (67). The crisis in colonial 
practice was rooted in the impossibility of the task the 
colonisers had set themselves, and the war only accelerated 
forces of dissolution already at work. Significantly, the 
inter-war attempts to regulate property relations, and settle 
once and for all the vexed question of communal land tenure, 
came to nothing. The 'uncertain financial outlook' delayed 
investigation into land registration in the Yoruba Provinces 
(68), and by 1940, only three registration areas had been 
declared in Nigeria (69). Land questions receded into the 
background, and by the end of the war the problem of labour 
came once again to the fore. Tinkering with property rights 
was no solution to the inadequacies of the peasant option, 
and a more immediate crisis was looming, with mass migration 
to the towns. Moreover, decolonisation was at last on the 
agenda, and the colonial states had to cope with new con- 
stitutional issues which absorbed much of the energy previously 
devoted to manoeuvring around the peasantry. The post-war 
years witnessed a further radical shift in the terms of 
colonial debate, a shift which can be traced through exami- 
nation of labour policies from the late 1930s onwards. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE EMERGENCE OF AN AFRICAN WORKING CLASS 
It was the unintended arrival of an African working class 
that finally torpedoed the West African Policy. The peasantry 
refused colonial expectations, and under the pressure of 
circumstance, land policy never achieved a consistent pattern. 
The resultant ambiguities revealed the inadequacies of 
original policy, but as long as African workers were absent 
from the scene, the peasant road retained some credibility. 
For as long as was possible, colonial officials treated wage 
labour as a peripheral activity; and it was not until the 
late 1930s, when the existence of African workers had to 
be acknowledged, that the Policy finally collapsed. 
The resistance to plantation estates kept down the 
numbers of wage labourers (1), and the main private employers 
were the mining companies. Even here, the use of migrant, 
and sometimes non-waged, labour sustained the illusion that 
wage labour was marginal to the colonial economy. In Nigeria, 
tin and gold mining were still alluvial, and though a 1935 
report on the Nigerian goldfield suggested that this stage 
must soon end, most of the work remained in the hands of 
tributers, who collected mineral ore from the river beds and 
sold their findings to the companies (2). In the gold, and 
less significant diamond mines of the Gold Coast, the labour 
force was still substantially migrant, and as late as 1950, 
50% of the workers for the southern mines came from the 
Northern Territories or the neighbouring French colonies (3). 
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Again, the future of this labour system was under question 
from the 1920s as the mining companies discussed the possi- 
bilities of a more stabilised work force (4), but the work 
remained sufficiently casual to justify denials of a working 
class. A few small factories were set up in the 1920s and 
30s, but here too the work was of a casual nature. Rose's 
lime juice factory in the Gold Coast, for example, employed 
only 70 daily-paid labourers, and these were discharged at 
the end of each season (Greenstreet, 1972a: 42). The Nigerian 
Government retained control of the coal mines at Enugu, and 
operated under similar conditions to the private companies. 
The mine kept far more workers on its books than it could 
employ at one time 
- 
3,400 on the books against 2,700 normally 
employed 
- 
and clearly considered its workers as temporary 
refugees from peasant production, rather than permanent wage 
labourers (5). Thus where wage labourers were employed, it 
was on the basis described by Lord Hailey in The African 
Survey: 
'In Africa the organisation of wage labour has 
proceeded on the assumption that, except where 
farms are worked by squatter labour, the homes 
of the labourers will continue to be in the 
native areas, and that responsibility for them 
will be discharged if they are remunerated at 
rates suitable to the single man and are ade- 
quately fed and housed in their temporary places 
of employment. ' (Hailey, 1956: 710) 
Recruitment to these jobs remained on an ad hoc basis. 
Pressures for a private recruiting agency had been rebuffed 
(6), and no alternative existed in the form of a labour 
exchange. When labour supplies were inadequate, for public 
or private employment, the government resorted to the chiefs, 
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and did not enquire too closely into the methods used to 
produce the desired work-force. Conditions for the workers 
were subject to little regulation, and for most of West 
Africa the main labour legislation was a version of the 
Masters and Servants Ordinance, which regulated the terms 
on which migrant workers were employed. There was no factory 
legislation and no provision for trade unions. In these 
unregulated working conditions, companies were able to evade 
such minimal conditions as regular payment of wages. In 1930, 
for example, the Gold Coast Prestea Mine was unable to pay 
wages for two months, and in the resulting confrontation, 
8 miners were shot and wounded by the mine staff (7). Wage 
employment on African farms was almost totally ignored by 
colonial officers, and again the lack of regulation produced 
casualised working conditions. As Ward Price's report on 
Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces (1933) indicated, landless- 
ness was on the increase among so-called peasants, but the 
victims of this were reluctant to work for local farmers, 
when so many of the farmers failed to pay the promised wages. 
As long as the extent of wage labour in agriculture was 
denied, and the illusion of peasant production maintained, 
such questions could not be faced. According to the principles 
of the West African Policy, wage labour was a minor phenomenon 
which could be left to regulate itself. 
The world recession of the 1920s and 30s served ini- 
tially to re-inforce commitment to the West African Policy. 
Its first impact was to strengthen the case against wage 
dependency, and add weight to the peasant alternative. The 
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crisis in world employment indicated the fragility of jobs, 
and the argument was that Africans who became dependent on 
wages for their subsistence would present a challenge to the 
political order when their jobs inevitably disappeared. One 
consequence of this was the disparagement of schemes for colo- 
nial development, as creating more problems than they were 
worth. In the 1920s, such schemes were canvassed as a solu- 
tion to Britain's growing unemployment problem: the colonies 
would get assistance in their development efforts, while 
Britain would benefit from the increased orders for equipment 
and machinery. These schemes, which found expression in the 
Colonial Development Act (1929), were not always welcomed by 
the colonial beneficiaries. Governor Clifford of Nigeria, 
for example, argued in 1925 that any 'sudden, brief spasm of 
intensive development' could be disastrous for the colonies 
themselves: 
'Any attempt to force development by violent arti- 
ficial means is bound to produce results which 
will be found to be quite tragically disconcerting. ' (8) 
The problem was that solving unemployment in Britain might 
generate unemployment in Nigeria: 
'Even if unemployment had been sensibly relieved 
in Great Britain, which might or might not be 
the case, would it be very satisfactory if each 
of the more backward Tropical Dependencies of the 
Crown was required to face an unemployment question 
of its own, as the price of the relief thus 
afforded? ' 
He feared a 'premature' (recurrent colonial phrase) dissolu- 
tion of peasant society, particularly when the new wage 
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labourers might subsequently have to retreat to agricultural 
production: 
'The Colonial Governments concerned would only be 
able to hope that the men whom they had seduced 
from agricultural work in order to furnish the 
means of promoting this sudden spasm of intensive 
development would sink back into the class of 
cultivators from which they had been prematurely 
drawn; but all experience in the Tropics proves 
that such reversions are in the last degree diffi- 
cult to effect, and that angry discontent invariably 
kindles in the man, who having been lifted out of 
his "natural" sphere, is incontinently dropped 
back into it by a Government which cannot find a 
use for the training or the skill which he has 
acquired through its agency. ' (9) 
When the Colonial Development Act (1929) put these 
notions into practice, and made available £l million per year 
for development projects, the funds were underutilised, and 
few colonial governments took full advantage of the new 
opportunities for cheap loans. In Nigeria, the most populated 
of the African colonies, a bare £% million was requested in 
the decade preceding the Second World War. Colonial resis- 
tance to the scheme arose partly from the fear that extensive 
development programmes would impose too great a burden on 
the finances of the local state, which would have to foot 
the bill for recurrent expenditure, and could expect assistance 
only for initial investment (10). But in addition to this 
was the reservation expressed by Clifford, that such projects 
would accelerate proletarianisation beyond what the colonial 
economy and state could sustain. 
The implications of world unemployment for African 
conditions was stated most forcibly in Orde-Browne's The 
African Labourer (1933) (11) 
. 
Like the Governor of Nigeria, 
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Orde-Browne saw future unemployment as the central danger. 
His study was written at a time of mass unemployment in 
Britain, when the state was facing considerable difficulties 
in devising social security schemes adequate to the large 
numbers out of work. With this in mind, Orde Browne argued 
for the 'retention of the connection between the worker and 
the land', as the only way to avoid the vast machinery of 
welfare benefits which was in crisis in Britain. Wage labour 
should remain an adjunct to peasant society, and in this way, 
the obligations of the state would be kept within acceptable 
limits: 
'As long as the displaced worker can if necessary 
be re-absorbed into tribal life, provision for 
unemployment, old age pensions, and similar obli- 
gations of modern industrialised society will be 
largely superfluous; if, however, a considerable 
class of landless manual workers be created, and 
European conditions reproduced the government 
concerned will sooner or later be compelled to 
recognise the inevitability of appropriate measures 
to meet the attendant problems. ' (Orde-Browne, 1933: 116) 
If the colonial governments permitted wage dependency, yet 
resisted the claims to welfare provision, the results could 
be disastrous: 
'the detribalised worker must face destitution if 
he loses the employment from which he draws his 
wages, and will become a homeless wanderer picking 
up a precarious living for himself and his family 
as best he can. The danger of creating such a 
class is very real, for they must form a miserable 
and discontented body almost inevitably inclined 
to crime, while their misfortunes will render 
them peculiarly responsive to any agitator or 
mischief-maker. ' (p. 113) 
Beyond the more pragmatic revenue considerations, any 
generalisation of wage labour could threaten the political 
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order of the colonies. In his foreword to this work Lord 
Lugard 
- 
never a principled opponent of wage labour 
- 
warned: 
'the problem of today is to ensure that service 
with Europeans shall not result in the premature 
disintegration of native society. For the illi- 
terate worker who has lost faith in the approval 
or the anger of the spirits of his forebears, who 
has renounced his tribal loyalties and his claim 
to a share in the family or clan land and the 
ready help of his fellows in time of need, has 
now no motive for self-control and becomes a 
danger to the State. ' (p. V. ) 
Orde-Browne echoed this vision of the working class threat: 
'For practical purposes 
... 
such workers are 
without any real standard of behaviour, and obey 
only such police or company regulations as may 
be effectively enforced. The ease with which 
such people may drift into the criminal classes, 
or the fertile ground which they will provide 
for inflammatory political propaganda, must be 
obvious. ' (p. 104) 
In such an atmosphere it was only to be expected that West 
African administrators would continue to discourage or deny 
the formation of a proletariat. The peasant road was leading 
in a different direction than envisaged, and the journey was 
fraught with unanticipated dangers; but it retained enough 
credibility for the disparagement of wage employment as peri- 
pheral to the colonial economy. 
The world crisis thus strengthened the case for the 
peasant road, but simultaneously, it spelt the end of its 
possibility. The processes which the colonial states had 
set in motion, could not be frozen at the desired point, and 
the recession intensified the process of proletarianisation. 
As Berg (1965) has pointed out, the problem of labour shortage, 
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which characterised virtually all African colonies up till 
the 1920s, was transformed into a new problem of labour sur- 
plus. World prices for primary commodities collapsed in the 
1930s, and Africans who had become dependent on money earnings 
now found themselves unable to survive on the proceeds from 
their farms. Migration to the towns and mining compounds 
increased, but at a time when both government and private 
firms were cutting back on employment. The numbers of unskilled 
Africans seeking wage employment soon exceeded the available 
jobs, and in the Gold Coast, colonial administrators began 
to dissuade migrants from the Northern Territories from 
seeking work in the mines (Silver, 1981: 103). Initially, 
these new conditions simply re-inforced the commitment to 
casual labour, since the assumption that Africans did not 
rely on wage earnings justified mass lay-offs of workers. 
The crisis was taken as a demonstration of the correctness 
of colonial practice: if a working class had existed, the 
redundancies would have created serious problems for the 
colonial states, but as it was, it could"be assumed that the 
dismissed workers were simply re-absorbed into peasant society. 
The accumulation of Africans in the towns was treated as a 
problem of vagrancy, and the proposed solution was forcible 
re-patriation. It was many years before colonial officials 
would dignify this new phenomenon with the term 'unemploy- 
ment'. But through the 1930s, the problem of 'derelict labour' 
or 'so-called unemployment' emerged onto the scene. It was 
not until work was no longer available, that the existence 
of a class of wage-labourers was finally admitted. 
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An early attempt to investigate unemployment was made 
by a 1935 Committee set up to enquire into the Question of 
Unemployment in Lagos (12). The Committee issued notice 
that all those without jobs or means of subsistence should 
report to a government office, and 4,000 (over 3% of the popu- 
lation of Lagos and the surrounding area) presented themselves 
for inspection. The unemployed divided almost equally into 
those born in Lagos and those from outside (2,180 and 1,764 
respectively), and the solution proposed for the latter was 
simply to send them back to their 'homes'. Nearly one-quarter 
(969) had never had a job, which was interpreted as evidence 
of 'higher aspirations than are warranted by their abilities' 
(13). For these, a land settlement scheme was suggested. 
The unemployed could be offered 4 acre plots of land, loans 
to cover them for the first two years, and if they deserted 
before repayment, they would be blacklisted from future 
employment by either government or private firms. The penalty 
made sense only within a much more regulated labour market 
than that which existed in Nigeria 
-a weakness which Commi- 
ttee members overlooked. The other main category of unemployed 
was those engaged in the building trades (919), and their 
plight was readily dismissed as one which would be solved 
in the expected resuscitation of the economy. The report was 
not considered important enough for submission to the Colonial 
Office, though it was published as a Sessional Paper in 
Nigeria; and the problem was set aside with hopes that it 
would simply dissolve itself. 
However, the existence of wage labour as a reality 
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which could no longer be ignored, was confirmed by other 
developments. The 1930s were a period of growing labour 
unrest, particularly in the gold mines of the Gold Coast, 
the coal mines of Nigeria, and among the railway workers 
employed by the state (Hughes and Cohen, 1978; Greenstreet, 
1972b; Silver, 1981). Trade unions were formed, and though 
usually short-lived, they indicated African refusal to remain 
within the boundaries of casual labour. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult to insist that these workers were 
merely temporary migrants, particularly as workers began to 
bring their wives and children with them to the mining villages. 
According to Greenhalgh (1975), the diamond mines in the Gold 
Coast wanted a more stabilised work-force from the 1920s, 
and from 1923 began to provide free housing, churches, and 
non-profit-making stores in the mining compounds so as to 
encourage more permanent employment. The 1938 Report on the 
Enugu coal mine showed that a similar stabilisation was being 
pursued there (14). A daily roster was set up to ensure more 
regular employment for the senior men, and in 1939, the prac- 
tice of keeping more on the books than could be employed was 
broken, as 600 employees were laid off. The changing con- 
ditions were described in the 1939 Report: 
'At the commencement of mining operations great 
difficulty was experienced in securing labour and 
in training the primitive men for the work. That 
period has passed and today there is considerable 
competition to work in the mine. A system of 
labour supply has grown up which is now proving 
uneconomic. Under it the men have worked at the 
Colliery as and when they liked and absented 
themselves at will to return to their villages 
to pursue their normal activities. Free housing 
for a considerable number of men was provided to 
enable those who wished to stay on to do so. But 
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the free lance system persisted, with the result 
that a great many more men than were actually 
needed obtained a place on the Colliery register. 
This in turn has led to an uneconomic sharing of 
the available work to the dissatisfaction of these 
men who prefer to work more regularly. ' (15) 
The move towards a more permanent labour force was uneven, 
particularly when the labour surplus of the 1930s offered 
periods of exceptionally cheap unskilled labour (16). In 
the Gold Coast mines, stabilisation barely entered into dis- 
cussion until 1945, and even then was not consistently 
pursued (Silver, 1981: ch. 5). Thus it is not surprising 
that within the space of a single decade, the arguments for 
'retaining the connection with the land' existed side by side 
with a new concern for settled wage labour, as providing more 
'economic' conditions. It was a decade of transition, as the 
migrant labour system, premised on a predominantly peasant 
society, began to dissolve into a recognition of an African 
working class. 
The gradual shift in colonial perceptions was speeded 
up by developments in other colonies. In 1935, largely in 
response to Parliamentary questioning, the Colonial Office 
sent a circular to all Governors, requesting information on 
their provisions f or inspection of labour conditions (17). 
The West African colonies, still regarded as essentially 
peasant economies, were not the prime target of this circular, 
and the Colonial Office accepted the negative replies of the 
various Governors, without complaint (18). But the 1937 
strikes and riots in Trinidad introduced a greater urgency 
into colonial labour policy, and a meeting of the Colonial 
220 
Labour Committee decided to press for the formation of 
Labour Departments wherever possible. In August 1937, a 
second circular was sent out, advising the creation of such 
departments for any colony with a 'substantial wage-earning 
community', and advocating the registration of trade unions 
(19). The concern now was to regulate and moderate the 
development of incipient workers' organisations (20), and 
the complacency of those Governors who denied the existence 
of wage labour came under scrutiny. In 1938, Orde Browne was 
appointed to the new post of Labour Advisor to the Secretary 
of State, and pressures on the West African colonies 
- 
among 
others 
- 
increased. The Colonial Office became impatient 
with local resistance, and the pattern of the earlier years, 
when colonial governors pressed for more adventurous land 
policies against Colonial Office conservatism, was reversed. 
By the late 1930s, it was the Colonial Office, with its sen- 
sitivity to developments in other colonies, which argued 
for change. 
The Gold Coast Government was the most responsive, and 
agreed that 'nothing short of the creation of a Labour Depart- 
ment will be adequate to the needs of the Gold Coast' (21). 
In this most developed of the West African economies, a 
skeleton labour department was inaugurated in 1938, while 
the other colonies continued to question its necessity. The 
Gambia set up a Labour Advisory Board as an alternative; 
Sierra Leone resisted pressures from London, claiming that 
the 'wage earning community is largely casual and of insigni- 
ficant proportions' (22); and the Nigerian Government reiterated 
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the claim that the colony was based on small peasant farmers, 
and had no urgent need for a Labour Department (23). The 
outbreak of war heightened Colonial Office fears of labour 
unrest, and led to increased pressure for action, until the 
Gambia accepted the creation of a Labour Officer, Sierra 
Leone agreed to set up a Department from 1941, and Nigeria 
consolidated its existing Labour Inspectorate into a full 
Labour Department in 1942. 
The more ready response from the Gold Coast was attri- 
buted by the Governor to the wave of strikes which occurred 
in 1937 and 1938 (24), and concern with labour conditions was 
sufficient to generate both a series of committees to examine 
wage levels, and an extensive Report on Labour Conditions in 
the Gold Coast (1938) (25). The committees were asked to 
consider ; (a) social conditions in the mines; (b) wage levels 
for government labourers; and (c) starting salaries for 
African civil servants. On the basis of their reports, the 
Governor argued for wage rises. Government employees in 
particular could no longer be paid as casual workers, on rates 
of pay for single men: they lived with their families at the 
place of employment, and wage levels must reflect this. The 
Colonial Office demurred at his proposed increases, but on 
the basis of financial restraint, rather than opposition to 
the changed conditions (26). 
The Report on Labour Conditions in the Gold Coast argued 
for further modifications in labour policy. It estimated the 
number of wage labourers at 120,000, and recommended formal 
contracts for workers on the African farms, so as to avoid 
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the problem of unpaid wages. Reflecting the new conditions 
of labour surplus, the report pressed for fully voluntary 
recruitment, with only a labour exchange to provide infor- 
mation on availability of work. It condemned those practices 
which had been the basis of recruitment in previous decades, 
and in particular, the employment of headmen. Trade unions, 
it argued, should be recognised, if only because 'if such 
recognition is made there will be less danger from the agi- 
tators and the secret societies' (27). 
The report did not break decisively with earlier assump- 
tions: it continued, for example, to view 'detribalisation' 
as undesirable, but questioned the claim that this necessarily 
attended wage labour. Conditions in the mines, particularly 
in the 'dreadful mushroom villages' around them, were consi- 
dered appalling, and tribal headmen were recommended as a 
solution to this. Thus while their recruiting activities should 
be curtailed, their role in imposing discipline among mine 
workers, and 'keeping the village clean', should be streng- 
thened. The problem, the report argued, was not wage labour 
itself, but the mushroom villages, and the Inspector of 
Labour hoped that 'something can be done to re-tribalise them' 
(28). 
When in 1941, Orde-Browne published his Labour Conditions 
in West Africa (29), he confirmed the devastating effects of 
the world crisis on West Africa, but continued to identify 
the problem of unemployment with 'vagrancy'. The fall in 
commodity prices had proved disastrous for the many Africans 
now dependent on the money economy, and meant that even with 
the considerable expansion in mining in the 1930s, there 
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was no problem in recruiting labour (30). There was however, 
no serious danger of 'de-tribalisation', and any unemployed 
should be dealt with through vagrancy laws: 
'evidence of lack of means of support should 
enable the necessary action to be taken to 
return them to the agricultural community from 
which they have originally come. (31) 
This reluctance to admit the full implications of the 
new conditions appeared also in the Annual Reports of the 
new Labour Departments, which nevertheless documented the 
rapidly changing situation. Labour was still presumed suffi- 
ciently casual to accommodate the large numbers of redundan- 
cies which accompanied the Second World War. In the Nigerian 
Cameroons, for example, 14,000 workers were sacked from the 
banana plantations in 1940, and the Labour Inspectorate con- 
sidered this no 'undue hardship' when most of these workers 
were seasonal (32). When thousands were re-employed over the 
next two years, the casual nature of the labour was cited 
as an advantage: 
'There is a constant coming and going of labourers, 
a system which has its advantages in an industry 
of which the economic condition fluctuates as much 
as it does in the plantations, and in which the 
labour force can be increased or decreased without 
provoking labour difficulties. ' (33) 
Similar arguments were employed when the Gold Coast Public 
Works Department cut its programme of work in 1939, and threw 
2-3,000 men out of work: 'We are fortunate in this country 
in having a sufficiency of land to which our labourers can 
return when unemployed' (34). The fact that many Africans 
could no longer make an adequate living from the land - as 
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later demonstrated in Orde-Browne's report 
- 
was not con- 
sidered relevant. Redundancies in the mines, where labour 
was not entirely casual, were however viewed with greater 
foreboding. In 1943, the Gold Coast Labour Department pre- 
dicted some unemployment problems, when the Tarkwa mines 
laid off 6,000 men (35); fortunately for the colonial state, 
this coincided with a railway construction project in the 
next province, and the skilled craftsmen at least were assumed 
to be capable of finding alternative employment (36). 
The problem of unemployment was thus initially dis- 
counted, though the 'derelict labour' which accumulated in 
Kumasi caused some concern. A Welfare Fund was set up to 
aid these victims of migrant labour, and the Medical Depart- 
ment had to deal with 1,469 cases of starvation in 1939-40 
(37). A combination of vagrancy laws and repatriation remained 
the favoured solution. Magistrates Courts in Kumasi were 
given the powers to send young boys to approved institutions 
if they had no visible means of support, and in 1943, a sub- 
sidised transport scheme was set up to convey unemployed in 
Kumasi back to the Northern Territories (38). The 1944-5 
Report of the Gold Coast Labour Department admitted a great 
excess of workers seeking employment in Accra, Sekondi and 
Kumasi, many of whom, it was feared, would soon become 
'unemployables' (39). Colonial officials continued however, 
to view this phenomenon as reflecting the lure of the towns 
rather than genuine unemployment: work was available in agri- 
culture if the migrants could only be 'persuaded' to return 
to it; and as late as 1950, they were described as only 
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`seemingly unemployed' (40). 
The first reference to unemployment in the Nigerian 
Labour Department Reports came in 1942 (41), when it was 
considered a problem restricted to Lagos. Again, the assump- 
tion was that these were only 'so-called unemployed', and 
the solution was to return them to the agricultural employ- 
ment from which they came. In 1943, an employment exchange 
was set up in Lagos, temporarily raising the hopes of these 
unemployed: 
'There is somewhat naturally the impression among 
the unemployed at present that it is the duty of 
the Exchange to guarantee them jobs and that the 
mere act of registration represents a promise of 
employment: but this conception is already dis- 
appearing and a more realistic view is gradually 
being taken. ' (42) 
The numbers registered at the exchange quickly rose, so that 
in February 1944,7,800 were registered as out of work, while 
only 350 found employment through the exchange. The numbers 
became too alarming, and within a year of its creation, the 
Labour Exchange had to falsify the figures by restricting 
registration to those 'normally' resident in Lagos. This 
brought the numbers down to around 2,000, and indicates the 
'back to the land' attitude of colonial officials. The 
problem of unemployment was thus blamed on the unemployed: 
it was their fault for leaving the countryside to seek work 
in the towns. 
'Unemployment due to people crowding into towns 
with no particular employment in view is a growing 
evil and it is unnecessary to emphasise the harm 
it does. Labour leaves the land where it is most 
needed, there are more unproductive people to be 
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fed in the towns, and if wages are increased, 
higher wages do not raise the standard of 
living if the increase is merely used to 
support a larger number of indigent relations 
and friends. Lastly if the unemployed remain 
unemployed for long they tend to become 
unemployable, and to form a discontented group 
of useless hangers-on to society. They sever 
their connection with the country, but never 
succeed in establishing themselves in town. ' (43) 
There was little expectation that the problem would be solved 
by an increase in wage employment; the only hope lay with 
improved attractions in the countryside: 
'It is difficult to venture any suggestion which 
might provide a solution to this grave problem. 
It will however be interesting to watch the effects 
of the proposed development policy which aims, 
amongst other objects at the provision of good 
water supplies in rural areas and at a general 
improvement in the standard of living in the 
villages. Perhaps the improvement of conditions 
in the country will in some degree help to arrest 
the drift of the country people to the towns. ' (44) 
In the Gold Coast, a 'back to the land' policy meant 
not a return to peasant agriculture, but an acceptance of 
wage employment on the African farms. The failure to regulate 
this labour market in those years when its existence was 
denied, now bore fruit. It became difficult to persuade 
unemployed Africans to take up alternative employment with 
farmers who could not even guarantee regular wages. Wages 
on these farms were normally paid at the end of the season, 
and the 1937 cocoa hold-up dramatically increased the numbers 
of farmers who refused to pay (45). As a result, labour for 
the farms was in short supply, even when there was a surplus 
of labour for other jobs, and large numbers of unemployed in 
the towns. The cocoa farmers used the Kumasi labour exchange 
(set up after the 1938 Report on Labour Conditions) to recruit 
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workers, but most migrants were suspicious, and now pre- 
ferred the dangers of mine work to the irregular conditions 
of agricultural labour. The Labour Department tried to ease 
the situation by aiding workers to recover their wages, and 
in this way restore confidence in the industry, but its 
efforts met only partial success, and successive Annual 
Reports referred to the shortage of workers for the Ashanti 
cocoa farms (46). 
The difficulties in persuading the unemployed to work 
in agriculture were intensified in the years after the war, 
when the colonial states faced the problem of demobilised 
soldiers. Nigeria had to deal with 100,000 ex-soldiers, many 
of whom had technical training and expected skilled or semi- 
skilled wage employment. With numbers of wage earners still 
as low as 300,000, it would be impossible to find jobs for 
all of the soldiers, and a return to the peasantry was the 
preferred solution. 
'Strong representations were made through the 
Secretary of State to the War office in early 
October £1945) to impress on the minds of serving 
Nigerian troops the correct state of affairs in 
order to eliminate from their minds any false 
impression that there was sufficient employment 
for all. ' (47) 
The Gold Coast faced 45,000 ex-servicemen, and though oppor- 
tunities for wage employment were in principle more encouraging, 
with vacancies on the cocoa farms, the soldiers had no inten- 
tion of taking up unskilled farm labour (48). As is well 
known, this problem was to contribute to growing nationalist 
agitation (e. g. Austin, 1964). 
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By the end of the war, wage labour was acknowledged 
as a permanent feature of the colonial economies, and the 
concern if anything, was to establish 'normal' trade union 
practices. Labour Departments with a substantial staff now 
existed to monitor conditions; trade union registration was 
regulated by Trade Union Ordinances (passed in 1939 in Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria, and in 1941 in the Gold Coast); and labour 
exchanges operated at Kumasi and Lagos. The war ended in 
widespread worker agitation over wages and the cost of living, 
and the Nigerian state was forced to set up a number of 
commissions to examine wage levels (49). Here, a general 
strike was organised in 1945, and significantly, it was 
difficult to find workers to replace the strikers, even with 
unemployment in Lagos at several thousands. Neither the 
ex-servicemen nor the registered unemployed were prepared to 
break the strike, and it became necessary to recruit 2,000 
from those 'non-residents' of Lagos who had previously been 
refused work, or the right to register as unemployed (50). 
The colonial governments were by this time convinced 
that modern trade unionism would be an advance on what they 
considered the irrationalities of the African workers. The 
1945 Gold Coast Report complained that strikes were difficult 
to settle when the workers had no clear demands (51), and 
there was concern in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria over 
the growth of 'unofficial' action. The 1946 Nigerian Report 
commented favourably on the development of the Nigerian TUC, 
which was, it believed, composed of 
229 
'sober thinking men, disseminating sound Trades 
Union principles, and 
... 
gradually taking over 
the functions of various mushroom and rival bodies, 
both rational and irrational, which grew up as a 
result of the 1945 General Strike and the presence 
of the Tudor Davies Cost of Living Commission. ' (52) 
The Department was encouraged when the TUC began to organise 
a summer school for trade unionists, with lectures on the 
functions of trade unions, and trusted that this would help 
dissolve the misconceptions over the range of issues appro- 
priate to union action. The Labour Departments became 
increasingly involved with the establishment of formal trade 
unionism. Trade Union Officers were created with responsi- 
bility for 'organisation of existing trade unions on sound 
lines' (53); and when the unsuccessful general strike in the 
Gold Coast in 1950 produced a temporary decline in union 
organisation, the Labour Department set about the re-estab- 
lishment of the Gold Coast TUC (54). The time for denial of 
wage labour was over; it was now necessary to regulate the 
working class. The colonial governments preferred to deal 
with national trade unions, rather than the multiplicity of 
transient local organisations, and they wanted to ensure 
that these unions would restrict themselves to purely indus- 
trial affairs. 
They were remarkably unsuccessful in their aims. In 
both colonies, nationalist parties allied themselves with the 
trade unions, and worker resistance to low wages fuelled the 
agitation for independence. The 1950 general strike in the 
Gold Coast was officially in support of a strike by govern- 
ment meteorological workers, but more importantly was part 
230 
of the campaign of 'positive action' declared by the Con- 
vention People's Party against the proposed constitution 
(Austin, 1964). The Nigerian Government faced in the same 
period extensive labour unrest. Fifty thousand workers were 
involved in strikes in the 15 months between January 1949 
and March 1950, and 577,000 working days were lost (55). A 
dispute at the Enugu colliery ended with 21 miners shot by 
the police, and nationalist parties lost no time in capitali- 
sing on such events (56). The emergence of wage labour confirmed 
Orde-Browne's earlier fears that such workers would be 'fertile 
ground' for 'inflammatory political propaganda', but by the 
end of the Second World War, it was no longer possible to 
ignore their existence. 
The attempts to regulate those in employment coincided 
with continued efforts to control unemployment by restricting 
migration to towns. The restrictions on registration at the 
Lagos labour exchange remained until 1952. By 1947, the 
Labour Department reported that the exchange was operating 
seriously as a regulation of the labour market, with 7,621 
vacancies notified to the office, and most of them subse- 
quently filled (57). Non-residents however, were still not 
permitted to register, and despite their assistance in 
breaking the 1945 general strike, they were not supposed to 
take up employment in Lagos. The system came under increasing 
press criticism in the following years, and a Labour Depart- 
ment Report confirmed the traditional arguments about peasant 
society: 
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'Nigeria is essentially an agricultural country 
and, whatever developments take place, the mass 
of the population must continue to gain its 
livelihood from the soil. For this reason the 
continued migratory movements of peasant farm 
workers who tend to be attracted to urban, mining 
and plantation areas in the belief of the exis- 
tence there of plentiful wage-earning opportunities 
constitute a serious problem. The retention in 
the employment exchange areas of orders restricting 
registration and making registration a condition 
for employment, has made it possible for a measure 
of control to be exercised over these movements, 
and schemes for the establishment of labour control 
centres in the Eastern and Western Provinces are 
also being considered. But a real and permanent 
solution can be found only in developing the agri- 
cultural resources of the country and in improving 
the economic and other living conditions of the 
villages to such an extent that the peasant farmer 
will be content to remain at home and realise that 
his lot is no worse or, may be, better than that 
of the wandering wage-seeker and detribalised fellow 
countryman. The fulfilment of the Development Scheme 
now being operated should play a big part in bringing 
this about. ' (58) 
The system did not, however, work. Migration to the towns 
continued to increase, and the non-residents were forced 
into either destitution or, for the more successful, bribery 
as a way of getting on to the register. A committee was set 
up in 1950 to investigate the workings of the registration 
restrictions, and two years later the system was discontinued 
as an ineffective solution to the problem (59). It was not 
possible to stem migration in this way, and mass unemployment 
in the West African cities was to become a permanent feature 
in the post-war years (Gutkind, 1967). 
The failure of the colonial dream was all too apparent. 
Peasant production could not be sustained as a permanent 
alternative to wage labour. Wage employment inevitably grew, 
if only in the towns and mining enclaves; peasant farming 
itself generated wage employment and extensive migration and 
thus to the colonial image; returns from 
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those small farms which did still fit the image were 
unattractive as compared with the rewards from wage earning. 
On all sides, the political economy of colonialism was in 
crisis. Stagnation in the countryside promoted migration 
to the towns, but employment in the towns could not expand 
rapidly enough to absorb it. Workers in more permanent 
employment were, as predicted, increasingly antagonistic to 
the colonial order, and provided much of the support for 
nationalist mobilisation. And in the final irony, the migrant 
labour which had appeared an ideal compromise in a world 
which could be neither capitalist nor exclusively peasant, 
was becoming a constraint on development. It did offer the 
advantages of a dispensable work-force, which could be 
taken on and thrown off at will. But set against that were 
problems of labour discipline and irregular attendance, prob- 
lems which were to pre-occupy many of the later development 
theorists. 
In 1948, the Gold Coast mines still relied on migrants 
from the Northern Territories and French West Africa for 50% 
of their labour force, and of these, less than 5% came to 
settle permanently in the south. A Labour Department Report 
from this period continued to support the principle of migrant 
labour, but with more reservations than previously: 
'This constant changing of labour may not be 
economically sound for the mining companies but 
its effect on the agricultural communities is 
more beneficial than the converse, and it is 
questionable whether a stabilised industrial 
population engaged in mining would be of permanent 
benefit to West Africa and its people. The 
example of other more advanced countries is not 
particularly encouraging. ' (60) 
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A 1951 committee on migratory labour returned to the 
question of the 'economic soundness' of such labour, and 
argued that steps must be taken to ensure healthy migrants, 
as a counter-balance to their inbuilt inefficiency (61). 
Similar concerns were being voiced in Nigeria, where 'an 
undesirably high rate of labour turnover' was mentioned in 
the 1950 Labour Department Report as a problem: the solution 
would not come until 'the new idea of regular wage-earning 
employment is more widely acceptable' (62). Annual turnover 
in the tin mining industry was particularly acute, with as 
many as 175,000 employed in only 50,000 jobs, and here the 
Report argued for a stabilised work-force as the 'desirable 
long-term aim' (63). Migrant workers were regarded as 
'unstable', difficult to subject to labour discipline, bad 
at time-keeping, and too inclined to abandon their work for 
religious or family celebrations. The novelty of wage 
employment, in addition, contributed to an 'obscurity of 
the relationship between work and wages' (64). Colonial 
officials in the early 1950s were beginning to express the 
anxieties which were summed up in the I. L. O. African Labour 
Survey (1958): 
'What has emerged is that 
... 
by tradition and 
background the African is singularly ill-adapted 
for assimilation as an effective element in a wage 
economy on the modern pattern, that the reason 
that leads him to seek wage labour heavily 
influences his attitude to work and his response 
to incentives and that his reactions differ widely 
from those of the European worker, whose back- 
ground and aims are so different. It has also 
emerged that the African's work performance is at 
present unsatisfactory in many respects by Euro- 
pean standards; that in quantity and quality it is 
often inferior; that the African sometimes lacks 
pride in his work; that he is often unstable and 
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restless and prone to absent himself apparently 
without valid reasons. ' (65) 
As long as West Africa was viewed as an alternative to the 
'wage economy on the modern pattern', migrant labour seemed 
a godsend. But by the time of decolonisation, its advantages 
were more ambiguous. 
Perceptions of wage labour thus changed rapidly during 
the 1940s. The image of the casual labourer was finally 
discarded, and the colonial states took on the new task of 
regulating the working class they had inadvertently called 
into existence. The traditional conceptions of peasant society 
remained mainly in the treatment of the unemployed, who were 
for many years defined as misplaced peasants who should be 
despatched home as soon as possible. But with this exception, 
post-war practice finally admitted the African worker as part 
of the political economy of colonialism. 
By the end of the war, the colonial project had been 
redefined in the new terms of 'development and welfare'. 
Annual reports no longer debated the issues of peasants 
versus plantations, or agonised over the ambiguous conse- 
quences of 'civilisation'. The technicalities of development 
increasingly dominated. The process of transformation dated 
back to the late 1930s, when a number of prominent colonial 
administrators attacked the complacencies of previous policy. 
Notable among these was Lord Hailey, formidable member of 
the Indian Civil Service and author of An African Survey 
(1938), who questioned the extent of colonial achievements. 
Capital investment, he pointed out, was abysmally low, and 
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largely concentrated in the mining enclaves. The raw materials 
exported from Africa were often irrelevant to modern industry, 
and substitutes could be found for most of them. Industrial 
production was virtually non-existent, yet no country could 
survive in the future world economy without some industrial 
base. On present patterns of development, the colonies had 
no future. Contemporaries went further, and argued that 'real 
development has been positively hindered' by colonial prac- 
tice (Macmillan, 1938: 291). 
Based partly on the arguments of Hailey and Macmillan, 
Governor Bourdillon of Nigeria produced a scathing attack on 
the doctrine of 'individual self-sufficiency', which for 
decades had constrained colonial states to work within a 
balanced budget and cut their development work to fit their 
(often declining) revenues (66). The Colonial Development 
Act (1929), he argued, was 'doomed to failure from the out- 
set', since a colony like Nigeria could not afford the risks 
of indebtedness which any major development scheme entailed. 
'Casual assistance' was not enough. Colonialism in Nigeria 
had generated little capital investment and no real market 
for British goods; set against this was an actual decline in 
soil fertility under British rule. 'Both socially and 
economically' he argued, 'progress has not gone very far, and 
is being unduly retarded at the moment' (67). 
Officials in London expressed some sympathy with this 
critique, but trusted that the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act (1940) would meet his demands. This provided 
up to £5 million each year for colonial development schemes, 
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and was amended in 1945 to provide £12 million. The real 
change, however, came in 1947 with the formation of a 
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), which was designed 
to promote investment in industry and trade, rather than the 
welfare projects which swallowed up so much of the earlier 
development fund. The CDC had authority to raise up to £100 
million in long term, and £l0 million in short term loans, 
and then devote these resources to development schemes in the 
colonies. The formation of the CDC marked the major shift 
in colonial thinking: from this point onwards, a machinery 
existed for the promotion of industrial capitalism within the 
colonies. 
Governors in West Africa were encouraged to draw up 
ten-year plans, though only the Nigerian Government responded 
fully to the new spirit. The Governor of the Gold Coast 
published in 1944 a General Plan for Development in the Gold 
Coast (68), which promised only an expenditure of £5 million 
over 5 years, and seemed if anything to reveal a 'loss of 
confidence' in the face of anticipated post-war difficulties 
(Kay, 1972: 44). In the following year, both Sierra Leone 
and the Gold Coast drew up official plans, projecting expen- 
diture of £5 million and £11 million respectively (Greenstreet, 
1971). In Nigeria, however, an entire development machinery 
was created, beginning in 1943 with the creation of an 
Advisory Committee on Economic Development and Social Welfare. 
Development Committees were set up in each of the 24 Pro- 
vinces, and in 1944 a Development Branch of the Secretariat 
was instituted (69). In 1945, a Ten Year Plan of Development 
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and Welfare for Nigeria was published (70), which proposed 
investment of over £55 million (£23m. to come from the 
Colonial Development fund, £16-17 from loans, and the rest 
from revenue). A panoply of development institutions was 
brought into existence: a Central Development Board; Local 
Development Boards; Area Development Committees; Provincial 
Development Committees. In Nigeria at least, the post-war 
pre-occupation with 'development' made its mark. 
This sudden conversion to a new paradigm had little 
effect on subsequent economic development, and the decade 
following the Second World War was necessarily taken up with 
debates on constitutional matters. But in the few years 
left to them, the colonial states had to discard the once 
treasured West African Policy. They had sought a middle way 
between subsistence production and capitalist development; 
they had promoted commodity production, but tried to contain 
this within the confines of small peasant farming. The pro- 
cess had got out of hand, and by the end of the war it was 
impossible to ignore the gap between image and reality. 
The Watson Commission (1948) was a last ditch attempt 
to restate the West African Policy. Set up to enquire into 
the post-war disturbances on the Gold Coast, it was forced 
to consider the question of industrial development. 'At 
every turn, ' the commissioners reported, 'we were pressed 
with the cry of industrialisation' (71). Nevertheless, the 
report argued, prospects for heavy industry must remain a 
dream in such an 'enervating climate', and with the tradi- 
tional warnings of 'unbridled private enterprise' and its 
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potential for 'future social strife' (72), it re-affirmed 
the advantages of co-operatives as the best basis for secon- 
dary industrial development. The report carried no conviction 
by this stage, and its proposals for further moderate adjust- 
ment were swept aside in the rapidly changing conditions of 
post-war Africa. 
By the early 1950s, it was clear that the colonisers 
intended to abandon their West Coast possessions, and extri- 
cate themselves from a situation they could neither control 
nor turn to their advantage. The most fervent nationalist 
could hardly claim that it was the political strength of 
the nationalist movements which dislodged the British from 
West Africa. More fundamentally, the colonial holding opera- 
tion had reached its limits; the West African Policy was in 
shreds; and the construction of a stable polity which could 
contain the process of accumulation, was so far beyond the 
resources of the colonial states, that they were happy to 
relinquish the task to their successors. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
What this study demonstrates is the essentially makeshift 
character of West African colonialism. As an agent for 
capital accumulation, it was severely limited. Constrained 
on the one side by existing capitals, which demanded cheap 
labour, cheap transport and cheap land, but generally depre- 
cated ambitious projects for change, and threatened on the 
other side by fears of political disorder, the colonial states 
could not formulate a satisfactory strategy for capitalist 
development. The first proposals for land reform suggested 
one possible direction, premised on private property in land 
and investment by European capital. In the absence of an 
adequate labour policy, however, this strategy was incoherent. 
It assumed a dual economy, with the new capitalist sector 
superimposed on existing, and expanding commodity production; 
as later became clear, the two sectors were potentially in 
conflict. As long as commodity production offered Africans 
a way to money earnings, labour would not come forward for 
the proposed capitalist enterprises. If colonial administra- 
tors used their powers to enforce wage labour, African farmers 
might simply uproot themselves and move off to more promising 
terrain, and in the process jeopardise the continuity of 
agricultural production. Without full-scale proletarianisa- 
tion 
- 
never a possibility for the colonial states - labour 
was necessarily the 'fly in the ointment'. The various ad 
hoc proposals of the early years - re-deployment of slaves 
as free labourers, recruitment from the urban centres of 
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Freetown and Lagos, recruitment of indentured labour from 
India or Ceylon 
- 
all foundered, and capital remained under- 
standably reluctant to invest directly in the West African 
colonies. 
Failing a solution to the labour problem, the colonial 
states retreated to their West African Policy, which affirmed 
the centrality of commodity production, and downgraded capi- 
talist enterprise to a subsidiary role. The expansion of 
agriculture was to rely on the African peasantry, secured 
in its access to land by traditional property relations. 
Investment in plantation production was dismissed as inappro- 
priate and unnecessary. Capital was welcome to continue in 
its merchant role, but beyond that, to invest directly only 
in mining and the processing of palm oil. This second 
strategy seemed to promise a happy unity of economic growth 
and political stability. The chiefs were confirmed in their 
position as political authorities, with continuing powers 
over the regulation of communal land. Hopefully, they would 
employ this authority in the interests of the colonial states, 
serving up the labour necessary for public works, and main- 
taining political order throughout the colonies. Agricultural 
exports would increase 
- 
as the example of Gold Coast cocoa 
seemed to indicate - and the mines would mop up those few 
Africans who nevertheless desired waged work. 
Though considerably more successful than the first pro- 
jections, this policy was again marked by inconsistencies. 
Even the limited work force required by private capital meant 
recourse to 'political persuasion', and the colonial states 
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came under recurrent pressure from the companies for freedom 
to operate different systems of labour supply. Moreover, 
the very success of African commodity production began to 
undermine the powers of the chiefs, as farmers migrated to 
new areas, and bought or leased land. The colonial states 
threatened to lose out on all sides. The commitment to peasant 
production and communal tenure deprived them of control over 
the labour process, and hindered attempts to impose new 
techniques of production. At the same time, the 'peasantry' 
challenged the constraints implied in the West African Policy, 
and demanded the right to buy land and raise mortgages, with- 
out reference to their supposed traditional authorities. 
In the case of palm oil, it proved impossible to sustain the 
limited strategy for change involved in factory processing 
without plantation production. As became clear in this instance, 
it was a question of all or nothing. Processing factories 
would survive only in association with plantation estates, 
and since with few exceptions, the colonial states refused 
to condone the latter, the former inevitably failed. 
When overall strategy lacked coherence, colonial prac- 
tice was often one of cautious delay. Far-reaching proposals 
for land and labour matters were debated in official corre- 
spondence, but few of these reached the statute books. The 
history of the draft report of the West African Lands Committee 
was typical here. Its arguments were broadly accepted within 
the Colonial Office and by many local administrators; its 
assumptions entered into colonial practice, and acted as a 
deadweight on the ambitions of those like Rowe, who sought 
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a more 'realistic' land policy. But the report was never 
officially confirmed, and its detailed recommendations were 
dismissed out of hand. With the exception of Northern 
Nigeria, and later the Northern Territories of the Gold 
Coast, its principles were not carried through into admini- 
strative action. Even when there was a consensus on policy 
- 
and as has been shown, this was tenuous and short-lived 
- 
the 
colonial states lacked the political confidence to impose 
unpopular legislation. 
Within this context, variations between individual 
administrators seemed to assume great significance. The 
history of colonialism sometimes reads as a history of eccen- 
tric individuals, each with his own pre-occupations, rising 
to influence and falling again, in a process without much 
pattern. Chamberlain, Maxwell, Morel, Lugard, Temple, Clifford, 
Rowe 
- 
how to detect strategic considerations in this world 
where policies became so identified with particular indivi- 
duals? I have argued that ideas took on strategic proportions 
when they were voiced sufficiently frequently to enter into 
the terms of debate, and that the occasional convergence of 
opinion makes it possible to define two major periods within 
British West Africa. But the recurrent failures of legis- 
lative proposals meant that much of colonial practice appeared 
as day to day adjustment to changing conditions. The capacity 
to generate strategy, and subsequently to implement it, were 
both severely limited. 
The subservience to African opinion, both in the retreat 
from the first strategy, and in the incomplete implementation 
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of the second, was remarkable. Time and again, proposals 
were shelved in the face of real, or more usually antici- 
pated, opposition. The spectre of de-tribalisation was 
invoked as an argument for cautious conservatism; but the 
strength of local attachment to the land was simultaneously 
used to deprecate excessive state intervention. This study 
has not documented the development of African opposition to 
colonialism, or the emergence of those political forces which 
gave weight to government fears. It had suggested only 
briefly the extent of African mobilisation over land issues, 
and has merely hinted at the development of class conscious- 
ness among African workers (a study pioneered by Hopkins, 
1966, and developed in Sandbrook and Cohen (eds. ) 1975; and 
Gutkind, Cohen and Copans (eds. ) 1978). This counts as a 
major absence, when so much of the argument rests on colonial 
fears of disorder. But it is partially justified by evidence 
that it was projected rather than existing opposition which 
so exercised colonial officials. For these officials, the 
'de-tribalised African' was more a theoretical construct 
than a reality, and if anything, colonial reports denied 
indications that the phencmenon already existed. The fragility 
of colonial control was such that proposals were abandoned 
on the faintest suspicion of disaster. The experience of 
India or East Africa was cited as proof of the dangers 
attending rapid change; even the experience of Britain was 
brought to bear on the projected problem of unemployment. 
It was not only active opposition within West Africa which 
paralysed colonial action; the mere thought of possible 
tension was often enough to justify delay. 
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This is not to say that colonialism in British West 
Africa was benign. When it came to the issue of forced 
labour, administrators were notably complacent in the exer- 
cise of so-called 'persuasion', and condoned it for public 
and private employment alike. But forced labour did not 
threaten the powers of the chiefs; nor did it imply the 
formation of that unknown quantity 
- 
an African proletariat. 
It was those changes which more fundamentally ruptured what 
was perceived as traditional society which had to be avoided 
at all costs. 
This sensitivity to potential unrest, often long before 
events confirmed the dangers, indicates the weakness of the 
colonial states. Their real power was minimal against the 
scale of the changes required for sustained capital accumu- 
lation, and it was only to be expected that they would seek 
compromise wherever possible. In other colonies, local 
interests sometimes acted as a counter-balance to official 
nervousness, but in British West Africa there was no settler 
community pressing its demands on the Government, and no 
concerted campaign by capital for alternative measures. 
The capital involved in West Africa in the late nineteenth 
century was merchant capital, and often dubious of expensive 
state initiatives. When the merchant firms were joined by 
representatives of industrial capital in the shape of the 
chocolate and textile manufacturers, the picture barely 
changed. Industrial capital on the whole preferred to 'mimic' 
mercantile capital, and leave production in African hands. 
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The relationship between capital and the state was 
always an uneasy one, but this did not mean that colonial 
states could ignore local pressures. When capital expressed 
clear interests, these usually received consideration. Even 
those administrators most committed to development on the 
basis of African commodity production lent a sympathetic ear 
to the demands of existing firms. When merchant companies 
pressed for better treatment in the allocation of land in the 
towns, they found themselves surprising allies within West 
Africa. And though colonial administrators frequently 
expressed impatience with the excessive demands of the mining 
companies, and complained particularly of the capacity of 
these firms to escape official regulation, the colonial states 
continued to accept responsibility for labour supplies to 
the mines. Relations with Lever were similarly ambiguous. 
Lever never got from British West Africa the kind of treatment 
he wanted, and fared much better in the Belgian Congo; his 
plans for the palm oil industry foundered on colonial resis- 
tance to plantation production. Nevertheless, he succeeded 
in extracting considerable concessions in the form of mono- 
poly privileges and financial subsidies. The anti-capitalism 
of the West African Policy was not meant as a rejection of 
existing capitalist interests, and colonial policy continually 
sought a compromise which could satisfy at least some of 
the demands of British firms. The colonial states were not 
disinterested arbiters of competing interests; they recog- 
nised and accepted a responsibility towards British capital, 
and did what they could to satisfy capitalist demands. 
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The point then, is not that the colonial states refused 
to serve capital, and pursued instead an altruistic trustee- 
ship. The point rather is that the strategies adopted arose 
from the interplay between private pressures and public 
disorder. Suspended as they were over societies in the throes 
of transition, and lacking as they did even the legitimacy 
of elected governments, colonial officials took the line of 
least resistance. Where an alternative to proletarianisation 
offered itself, they gratefully accepted. In British West 
Africa, there was no powerful settler body; merchant capital 
remained dominant; and even in the mining sector, the pro- 
minence of alluvial rather than underground workings permitted 
for many years an alternative to settled wage labour. In 
other parts of the colonial world, local capital demanded more 
forceful measures, and administrators often had to swallow 
their fears. But though the policy adopted in British West 
Africa was not in its content typical of the colonial era, 
the tensions through which policy was formulated were similar 
in other territories. 
To this extent, the history of colonial policy in West 
Africa has a wider significance. Colonialism was everywhere 
a precarious balancing act, though the pieces were differently 
weighted in different areas. As Lonsdale and Berman (1979) 
have shown, the Kenyan state too had to 'cope with the 
contradictions'. It had to regulate the conflict between 
settler and peasant production, and maintain some basis for 
social cohesion in the face of potential disintegration of 
indigenous modes of production. The presence of the settlers 
made for greater adventurism in 
both land and labour policies, 
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but even here, the strains showed through in official dis- 
quiet at destructive individualism, and the decline of 
'tribal discipline' (p. 503). The Kenyan state, like those 
in British West Africa, muddled its way towards a compromise, 
and reached a similar accommodation with African chiefs. 
The nature of colonialism militated against over-arching 
strategy, and favoured local adaption to local constraints. 
Policy was formed out of a tension between existing demands 
and potential unrest, and fears of political collapse were 
a continuing pre-occupation. The result, as the example of 
British West Africa indicates, was rarely coherent. 
The arguments of underdevelopment theory have tended to 
conceal this fundamental characteristic of colonialism. 
Implying as it does a capital which is both rational and 
omnipotent, and assuming a state which acts to promote the 
interests of this capital, underdevelopment theory is unable 
to comprehend the makeshift nature of colonialism. The 
debate has been set up between a colonialism which was 
largely benign, and not particularly dictated by capitalist 
concerns, or a colonialism which consistently and forcefully 
promoted the requirements of capital. Within the parameters 
of this debate, any suggestion that the colonial states 
faltered before African resistance, or retreated in the face 
of local constraints, reads as an admission that colonialism 
was not really a product of world capitalism. In its 
determination to resist this conclusion, underdevelopment 
theory has interpreted all colonial action (and inaction) 
as evidence of a capitalist strategy. The 
failure to create 
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conditions for capital accumulation has been taken as 
exemplification of the thesis that accumulation on a world 
scale demands the blocking of capitalist development in the 
peripheries. 
Capital, however, is not unitary. There are many capi- 
tals, with different immediate interests; and the capacity 
of a state to promote a pure 'strategy for capital' in the 
face of these conflicting and changing interests depends on 
a particular combination of conditions which was not present 
in colonialism. The state is not by definition a servant 
of capital; the precise relationship between the two is on 
the contrary historically contingent. We cannot assume in 
advance of analysis that any particular state can generate 
and implement a set of policies appropriate to the long-term 
interest of capital. The conditions which allow this are 
complex and varied, and stem from the nature of class forces 
at each point in time. 
In the colonial situation, such conditions were rare 
and hard to sustain. African societies were in a process of 
transition, as the impact of commodity production made itself 
felt. The state which supervised this process had little 
real power, a point which should not be lost in condemnation 
of the extensive use of force which characterised so much 
of colonialism's history. The reliance on direct coercion 
was in many ways the state's weakness rather than its strength, 
just as the freedom from the burdens of elected representation 
turned out to its disadvantage as often as not. In estimating 
the political consequences of proposed changes, colonial 
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administrators had to rely on guesswork, and tended towards 
caution as a result. They had little reason to expect 
substantial financial or military support from Britain, and 
every reason to fear a dissolution of the fragile colonial 
order. Their task was survival, and their success was the 
maintenance of colonial control into the 1950s and 60s. That 
they did not in the process ensure conditions for sustained 
accumulation is not surprising, and can be explained without 
recourse to a thesis that capitalism desires underdevelopment. 
As an analysis of the effects of colonialism, under- 
development theory retains some validity. There is little 
evidence from British West Africa of the forcible disruption 
which Rey attributes to the colonial period in the French 
Congo. Administrators in West Africa discouraged the forma- 
tion of an African capitalist class, and only reluctantly 
conceded the right to accumulate property in land and raise 
credit. More significant is the point obscured by under- 
development theory's obssession with indigenous capital, 
that colonial policy discouraged the formation of an African 
working class. Investment premised on substantial wage 
employment was accepted only within mining; and when a reserve 
army of labour emerged in the 1930s, the colonial states 
responded with vagrancy laws, and proposals for 'repatriation'. 
The weakness of the states meant that these attempts to 
block capitalist development were only partially successful, 
but the conditions inherited by the new states of independent 
Africa were not conducive to indigenous capital accumulation, 
nor indeed to massive investment 
by foreign capital. 
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What this indicates, however, is the contradictory 
nature of colonialism. Colonial power was far from absolute, 
and in the face of local constraints, policy was hesitant 
and often inconsistent. The transformation of African 
society was only briefly on the agenda, and most of the 
colonial era was dominated by more conservative concerns. 
Colonialism was severely limited as an agent for radical 
change, and from this perspective, the achievement of inde- 
pendence marked not so much a loss of empire as a chance to 
secure better conditions for accumulation. The post-war 
proliferation of development institutions should be viewed 
not as a 'smoke screen' (Baran, 1957: 11) for continuing 
underdevelopment, but as an ambitious (if largely unsuccess- 
ful) project to carry through the tasks which colonialism 
had so signally failed to perform. 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. A term used in Gann and Duignan, 1968: ch. 22, and in 
Suret-Canale, 1971, Part 2: ch. 1.3. 
2. Hailey, 1956: 1268. For further details on the paucity 
of foreign investment in Africa, see Frankel, 1938. 
3. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, 31 August 1953, quoted 
in Hailey, 1956: 1332. Hailey's vast African Survey was 
favourably received at the Colonial Office, and his 
criticisms were given considerable weight in the formu- 
lation of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. 
See Pearce, 1978, and Bowden, 1980. 
4. The Colonial Development Corporation was set up in 1948 
financed initially by Government funds, but with the 
expectation that it would ultimately attract substantial 
private capital. It was charged with responsibility for 
financing projects which were unattractive to private 
investors, but might be expected to achieve self-suffi- 
ciency within a few years. 
5. McPhee credited the colonial governments with the inspi- 
ration for this development but as others (e. g. Green 
and Hymer, 1966) have argued, the rise of the cocoa 
industry was very much an African affair. 
6. Underdevelopment theory's reluctance to examine production 
relations has been the object of a number of major criti- 
ques: e. g. Laclau, 1971, for a critique of Frank; 
Bettelheim, 1972, for a critique of Emmanuel; and Brenner, 
1977. This reluctance however, is not theoretical over- 
sight; it stems from the theory's insistence that 
capitalist exploitation rests on a variety of production 
relations. 
7. See particularly the debates on Kenyan capitalism: Leys, 
1975; 1978; 1980; Swainson, 1977; 1980; Henley, 1980; 
Kaplinsky, 1980; Langdon, 1981; Beckman, 1980. 
8. For discussions of Rey's work, little of which is avail- 
able in English translation, see Bradby, 1975, 
Foster-Carter, 1978, and Brewer, 1980. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
1. The official treatment of the Gold Coast cocoa farmers 
as mainly smallholders, with farms of 2-3 acres, is the 
clearest example of this. Until Hill's pioneering work, 
the role of migrant farmers, buying up several farms, 
and employing wage labour, was largely overlooked in 
studies of the cocoa industry (Hill, 1963: Appendix 1.1). 
2. Rodney argued a stronger case than this, that the Atlantic 
trade created slavery in Africa, but subsequent research (e. g. Goody, 1980) undermines this claim. 
3. This was the argument put forward by Fage (1969) as part 
of his attempt to minimise the impact of the slave trade 
on the development of slavery inside Africa. 
4. Miers and Kopytoff, 1977: 24. For a discussion of this 
view, see Klein, 1978; Cooper, 1979; Watson, 1980. 
5. For further details on the slave villages of the Sokoto 
Caliphate, see Lovejoy, 1973; Hogendorn, 1977. 
6. See especially the articles by Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
Meillassoux, Dupre and Rey, collected in Seddon (ed. ), 
1978. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
1. The Governor, Sir William Maxwell, made this announce- 
ment in 1896 to the Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce, and 
copies of his speech were subsequently distributed to 
the London, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow Chambers, 
with an appeal to them to extend their activities. 
C. O. to Chambers of Commerce, 25 April 1896, Further 
Correspondence Relative to Affairs in Ashanti, African 
West 504,1896. 
2. By the turn of the century, the number of requests from 
interested construction firms was such that the C. O. 
sent a statement of Chamberlain's position on railway 
construction to the Crown Agents, in the hope that they 
would then explain to these companies the very limited 
prospects for private contracts. See C. O. to Crown 
Agents, 25 June 1901, Further Correspondence Relating 
to Concessions and Railway, Gold Coast 1901, African 
West 652,1901. 
3. Notes on the meeting of Gold Coast traders held at the 
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7. C. O. minutes on Governor to Secretary of State, 20 
December 1897, CO 147/121. 
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Protection Society. 
9. C. O. minutes on Governor to Secretary of State, 17 
January 1894, CO 267/407. 
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11. Enclosure 1 in Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of 
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12. High commissioner to Secretary of State, 16 November 
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that full redemption price would be paid. The current 
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-a philanthropic venture, including William 
Wilberforce among its directors - arranged for the 
passage of 411 former slaves from England (and 60 Euro- 
pean prostitutes). The necessity for some such enterprise 
had been created by a court judgement in 1772 that all 
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File 9041, CO 267/625. 
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the chiefs had a leverage over the members of the lineage. 
79. The Poll Tax had been imposed in 1852 on the areas of 
the Gold Coast under British administration, and was 
finally repealed in 1866 after extensive refusal to pay; 
no further attempts at direct taxation were made in the 
Gold Coast. Yet when the 1896 Hut Tax Ordinance for 
the Sierra Leone Protectorate provoked the 1898 Hut Tax 
War in which 1,000 lost their lives, the colonial govern- 
ment insisted on enforcing the legislation. 
80. Report of Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances 
in the Egba Division of Abeokuta Province, enclosed in 
Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 21 January 1919 
CO 583/72. In this area there was a history of resis- 
tance to unpaid compulsory labour, and the introduction 
of direct taxation had been sold to the people as an 
alternative to such work. Yet the local Resident 
continued to make exactions of compulsory labour, writing 
to the Oshile in February 1918 as follows: 'If you are 
really serious, and understand the importance of this 
road, you will see that no less than 600 men work daily 
on this two mile portion, and that they all perform 
a full day's work. Two or three hours per them is 
ludicrous, and I can quite understand the Director (of 
the Public Works programme) having Iost his faith in 
Egba promises of labour when we are fully aware of the 
exceedingly bad progress of the embankment approaching 
Awba. ' 
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81. Silver gives a number of explanations for this divergence 
between the companies: ý1) Asante men preferred to work 
in the Ashanti mines, rather than migrate further south 
to the Tarkwa mines; (2) when workers from the north 
migrated south for work, they were intercepted by the 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, which thus had a geo- 
graphical advantage; (3) the A. G. C. provided better 
food, 
- 
(4) and most importantly, the gold in the Ashanti 
mines, -being visible gold veins, was an easier target 
for the theft of gold, and thus provided a useful 
supplement to the mine wages (Silver, 1981: 53n). 
82. Governor to Secretary of State, 15 March 1904, CO 96/ 
417. The Governor accepted the mining companies' 
presentation of their reasons for pursuing this legis- 
lation 
- 
that they wished to end the 
-practice in which 
workers left one mine for another before working for 
long enough to justify the advance the company had paid 
them. If this was indeed the only problem, then as 
the Governor suggested, it could be dealt with by the 
mine managers reducing the size of the advances, and 
thereby the temptation. 
83. Enclosure 17 in Governor to Secretary of State, 30 
October 1909, CO 96/486. (Thomas, 1973) The incidence 
of desertion alone indicates the unwillingness of the 
new 'recruits'; the most dramatic was that in May 1909: 
'Captain Warder originally left Gambaga with 500 
labourers, but by the time he reached Tarquah the 
number had been reduced to 258. These labourers worked 
in a fairly satisfactory manner until the 27th June [they had arrived on 22 May], on which day 153 men 
left their work. On being notified of this desertion, 
I went to the Abbontiakoon Mine and having collected all 
the labourers, including those that had left the camp, 
had a talk with them. It was impossible to reason with 
them, as their only reply to anything said was that 
they wanted to go home. I finally got the headman to 
promise that they would remain at Abbontiakoon until 
the arrival of Colonial Watherston [the Chief Commissioner 
of the Northern Territories who was expected with another 
batch of recruits] who was due to arrive in Tarquah on 
the lst of July. However the labourers next day began 
to desert and by the end of June there were only 27 of 
them left. These 27 men worked on until the 26th July 
when they also left the mine. ' Report by Secretary for 
Mines, enclosed in Governor to Secretary of State, 5 
January 1910, CO 96/493. 
84. Governor to Secretary of State, 30 October 1909, CO 
96/486. 
85. Enclosure 5 in Governor to Secretary of State, 14 
February 1910, CO 96/494. 
86. C. O. minutes on meeting held at C. O., CO 96/494. 
87. Between 1912 and 1920, the mines largely organised 
recruitment for themselves, and when in 1920 they began 
again to rely on the government, it was through their 
own choice. At this point the large-scale government 
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recruitment for railway work interfered with their 
labour supplies, and the mining companies came to 
realise that it was only through making use of the 
government that they could hope to satisfy their demands. 
The story of this is fully documented in Thomas, 1973, 
and Silver, 1981. 
88. C. O. minutes on Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 
17 June 1912, CO 446/105. 
89. Enclosur e1 in Governor to Secretary of State, 9 November 
1923, CO 96/641. 
Mortality rates from April 1923-September 1923 
Nos. employed Deaths per 1000 
Surface Face Surface Face (accident) Total 
(illness) 
Abbonitakoon 
Mines Ltd 637 917 10.99 17.45 1.09 15.44 
Taquah & Aboss 
Consolidated 1165 1051 6.86 64.70 1.90 35.20 
Prestea Block 
A Ltd 1284 752 8.56 22.60 1.33 14.24 
Ashanti Gold- 
fields 1688 927 1.19 
- 
1.08 1.15 
Corporation 
(The Secretary for Mines was dubious of the very favour- 
able figures from Ashanti, though one clear difference 
was that the Ashanti mine did not rely on Northern 
Territories labour. ) 
90. Governor to Secretary of State, 19 January 1924, CO 
96/644. He put this down to 'an excess of zeal on the 
part of Political Officers in their keen desire to help 
the mines'. 
91. C. 0. Minutes on Governor to Secretary of State, 19 
January 1924, CO 96/644. 
92. The Chief of Navrongo complained to the District 
Commissioner in 1923, that his people were already 
accusing the chiefs of this. Quoted in Thomas, 1973: 99. 
93. Guggisberg's remarks on Memorandum by Secretary for 
Mines for visit of Ormsby-Gore, CO 96/662. 
94. ibid. 
95. The system of payment preferred by colonial administra- 
tors was that workers from the Northern Territories 
would receive only subsistence pay while at the mines, 
then 2/3 of the balance in a bulk sum on leaving the 
mine (so that they could purchase goods for their return) 
and 3/5 from the District Commissioner on their return. 
See Enclosure 3 in Governor to Secretary of State, 5 
January 1910, CO 96/493. 
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96. Private Enterprise in British Tropical Africa. Cmd. 
6, London 1924. 
97. J. H. Balty to Private Enterprise Committee, CO 966/ 
1: 240. 
98. Private Enterprise in British Tropical Africa, Cmd. 
2016, London 1924z9. 
99. Secretary of State to Governor, 18 March 1901, Further 
Correspondence Relating to Concessions and Railways, 
African West 652,1901. 
100. Governor's Address to Nigerian Legislative Council, 
Lagos: Government Printer, 1923: 116. 
101. Governor's Address to Nigerian Legislative Council, 
Lagos: Government Printer, 1924: 243. 
102. ibid., p. 53. 
103. Report by the Honourable W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore on his 
visit to West Africa durinq the year 1926, Cmd. 2744, 
London 1926: 108. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
In 1897, the C. O. published its first collection of 
correspondence over land concessions in the Gold Coast, 
covering the preceding decade. Over the next few years 
the correspondence grew in volume, and provides clear 
testimony to the interest of private capital in the Gold 
Coast. See Correspondence Relatinq to Land Grants and 
Concessions in the Gold Coast Protectorate, African West 
513,1897; Further Correspondence (January 189-7-December 
1898) Relating to Land Concessions and Railways on the 
Gold Coast, African West 531,1899; Further Correspon- 
dence (December 1898-December 1900) Relating to Land 
Concessions and Requlations, African West 578,1900; 
Further Correspondence Relatinq to Concessions and Rail- 
ways, Gold Coast 1901, African West 652,1902; 
Correspondence (November 1909-September 1911)_ Relatinq 
to Concessions and the Alienation of Native Lands on 
the Gold Coast, African West 977,1911. 
2. Governor to Secretary of State, 25 June 1889, African 
West 513,1897. 
3. The Acting Governor finally acknowledged, 'Buried trea- 
sure, and Prempe's problematical reserve of gold dust 
must, I submit, not be regarded as probable assets to 
this Government'; alternative sources of revenue would 
have to be pursued. Acting Governor to Secretary of 
State, 14 May 1896, Further Correspondence Relative to 
Affairs in Ashanti. African West 504,1896. The Acting 
Governor suggested that the alternative might be simply 
to take over the mines which belonged to the Ashanti 
rulers, and claim a monthly share of the proceeds from 
the Africans who would continue to work them. The C. O. 
made no response to this suggestion. 
4. Governor to Secretary of State, 27 June 1895, CO 87/149. 
5. See the comments by the Chief Justice, 7 April 1891, 
who doubted the wisdom of a measure which would weaken 
the power and dignity of the chiefs, and simultaneously 
create hostility to the Goverment. African West 513, 
1897. 
6. Memorandum by Brandford Griffith, 21 January 1892, African 
West 513,1897. 
7. ibid 
- 
8. Governor to Secretary of State, 28 September 1896, 
African West 513,1897. 
9. Governor to Secretary of State, 9 May 1895, African 
West 513,1897. 
10. Governor to Secretary of State, 15 July 1897, African 
West 531,1899. 
11. Secretary of State to Governor, 28 August 1895, CO 87/149. 
12. Governor to Secretary of State, 8 February 1897, CO 87/153. 
13. Governor to Secretary of State, 28 July 1897, African 
West 531,1899. 
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14. See especially African West 531,1899; African West 
578,1900; African West 652,1902. 
15. For details of the proposed legislation and opposition 
to it, see African West 531,1899. 
16. Governor to Secretary of State, 11 March 1897, African 
West 531,1899. 
17. Chamberlain at meeting with Gold Coast traders, 28 March 
1899, African West 578,1900. 
18. James Irwine to C. O., 5 April 1899, African West 578, 
1900. 
19. The colonial state was prepared for example, to use con- 
siderable powers of persuasion to aid the prospecting 
mining companies. In 1898, the Colonial Secretary sent 
a sharp warning to King Amoaka Atta II of Akim, who had 
- 
with some justification 
- 
objected to the activities 
of the Gold Exploration Syndicate Ltd., which was pros- 
pecting for gold inside the town boundaries: 'It is only 
by assisting the miners and prospectors in your country 
in every way that it will be possible to ascertain 
whether gold exists in your country in sufficient quan- 
tity to render it worth while for the Syndicate to 
spend money in getting it. You must therefore assist 
the Company 
... 
This is the Acting Governor's Order and 
he hopes to hear nothing more about opposition on your 
part. ' Enclosure in Acting Governor to Secretary of 
State, 12 February 1898, African West 531,1899. In a 
similar incident in 1899, the Resident in Kumasi wrote 
to the Chief of Ekwanta: 'I am sorry to hear from Captain 
Campbell that you and your people are not showing him 
all the workings in your district. This is to tell you 
once again I want you to give him every assistance, and 
show him everything in the way of mines that are in your 
district. You are to keep nothing back but tell him 
everything, or I shall be very displeased with your 
conduct. ' Resident to Chief of Ekwanta, 6 March 1899, 
African West 578,1900. 
20. The full quote is as follows: 'I do not consider the time 
is yet ripe for concessions to be granted in the Pro- 
tectorate, more especially in the Bini country. The 
applicants as a rule have no intention of investing 
their capital in the country. What they would probably 
do would be to work their concessions with great energy 
so as to get as much out of it in the shortest possible 
time, and having drained these resources to seek con- 
cessions elsewhere, which means that in a few years the 
Natives of the Protectorate, instead of having benefitted 
by the Government granting such concessions, would be 
left with their country very much poorer in certain 
products. I am personally in favour of development by 
the Natives themselves, by whichý,: means the country's 
capital is best retained in the country. ' Acting 
commissioner, Niger Coast Protectorate, to F. O., 28 July 
1898, passed on to the C. O. for information 15 September 
1898, African West 531,1899. 
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21. Wedgwood was originally a member of the Liberal Party, 
but later became a Labour M. P. He was to become the 
main British advocate of the theories of Henry George, 
as President of the English League for the Taxation of 
Land Values, and wrote a pamphlet on Henry Georqe for 
Socialists, published by the I. L. P. in 1908. 
22. George's main work was Proqress and Plenty, first pub- 
lished in 1881. His ideas were taken up by many who 
shared the socialist antagonism to contemporary society, 
but resisted the conclusion of a necessary class con- 
flict between capital and labour. In the late 19th 
century, the debate between socialists and 'single- 
taxers' achieved some prominence, and Wedgwood's pamphlet 
was a contribution to this debate. George himself 
toured Britain in the 1880s, and debated publicly with 
H. M. Hyndman of the Social Democratic Federation. His 
ideas were sufficiently prominent in America for Engels 
to devote the preface of the 1887 American edition of 
Condition of the Workinq Class in Enqland to a critique 
of his work. 
23. See African West 977,1911, for various C. O. comments 
on letters from Morel, calling for public lands legis- 
lation. When in 1910 a District Commissioner produced 
a memorandum warning of the growing commercialisation 
of land in the Gold Coast, a C. O. official commented: 
'If Sir William Maxwell's Bill vesting all Waste and 
Forest Lands in the Crown had been carried all would 
have been well' 
-a comment which revealed considerable 
misconceptions of the objectives of Maxwell's legis- 
lation. Eliot to C. O., 6 July 1910. CO 96/504. 
24. See Hayford (1971) and the response of the Gold Coast 
Aborigines Rights Protection Society to the Times, 6 
June 1912, signed by E. D. Morel, Noel Buxton, J. Ramsey 
Macdonald, Philip Lorrell, Sir Albert Spiver and J. 
Wedgwood. The letter called for a Lands Act which 
could 'secure the threefold aim of legalising the rights 
of the natives to the occupancy and use of the soil, 
preventing the creation of monopolies in the soil's 
produce, whether natural or cultivated, and reserving 
the value of the land and freedom of access to it, for 
the future generations of our protected subjects'. The 
ARPS responded in a letter to the Times, 18 July 1912, 
and attacked the proposed legislation as yet another 
attempt to deprive the people of their ownership of the 
land. 
25. In reporting the emergence of an African Opposition, 
Maxwell claimed that there was 'not the smallest reason 
for apprehending any disturbance of any kind', and 
commented, 'I have remarked that such opposition as 
there is has originated in the places where the native 
middlemen who negotiate concessions 
for English 
speculators carry on their business'. Governor to 
Secretary of State, 1 July 1897, African West 531,1899. 
26. In The Tr ý West African Land Question (1971) 
J. Casely Hayford of the ARPS quoted approvingly Sir 
William Geary's statement that the arguments in favour 
nf lAnd nationalisation: 
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'are twofold, i. e. that by nationalising the land the 
introduction of freehold individual tenure, which has 
already shown a tendency to creep in, is prevented, 
and the alleged communal system preserved; and secondly, 
the chiefs are stopped from improvidently alienating 
the tribal lands. 
... 
Why should not individual ownership come in Northern 
Nigeria, as it has come in elsewhere',? Politically a 
peasant proprietorship owning security of tenure to the 
British Government seems a valuable asset. Economically, 
to forbid by law the individual African ever becoming 
the owner of the land he occupies, removes the strongest 
inducement to thrift, good farming, and development of 
the country. 
... 
The second argument is that by improvident alienation 
to Europeans, the tribe will be deprived of their land 
and reduced 
- 
the phrase is Mr. Morel's 
- 
to a landless 
native, proletariat. Even assuming this to be either 
true in the present or a risk in the future, this is no 
reason for interfering with native land tenure and 
dealings between natives. ' (p. 130) 
27. Governor to Secretary of State, 24 September 1901, 
African West 652,1902. 
28. Governor to Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce, 20 September 
1901, African West 652,1902. 
29. The Stamp Commissioner gave numerous examples of dubious 
concessions: 'I heard of a case a few months ago where 
a few "bookmakers" in England had purchased a "Gold 
Mine" and sent one of their number out to look at it. 
When the latter arrived he could not find the property. 
I was informed that the property did not exist. I saw 
the man myself and know that he went home very soon 
after he arrived; but I was under the impression, at the 
time, that he had found what shouZd have been his property 
but that it had been sold so many times before that he 
thought it better to let the other parties fight out 
the title; he and his partners looked upon their specu- 
lation in the light of putting their money on the wrong 
horse, and retired from Gold Mining on the West Coast, 
and resumed their more lucrative employment of "laying 
odds" at home. ' Enclosure 1 in Governor to Secretary 
of State, 24 September 1901, African West 652,1902. 
30. West African Lands Committee: Correspondence and Reports 
laid before the Committee, African West 1048,1916: 103. 
31. originally, the West African Governments agreed to pay 
the wages of the Associationis cotton experts who would 
be sent out to West Africa. By 1904, this had become 
a general financial contribution: il, 500 a year from 
Sierra Leone; 12,000 from Lagos; 13,000 from Southern 
Nigeria. The Association agreed in return to spend 
130,000 within three years in developing the experimen- 
tal plantations set up in each of the three colonies, 
and to purchase all cotton offered by Africans at a 
minimum price of ld. a pound. By 1907, Sierra Leone 
and the Gambia had dropped out, and the remaining 
administrations contributed sums varying from il, ooo 
to 15,000 on condition that they were matched by the 
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Association's contributions. By 1909, the colonial 
states preferred to take over the experimental/instruc- 
tional work on the small plantations, and possibly 
subsidise the ginneries and buying centres. For a 
summary of the relationship between the Association 
and the colonial states, see C. O. minute on BCGA to 
C. O. 5 November 1909, Further Correspondence Relating 
to Botanical and Forestry Matters, African 953,1912. 
32. BCGA to WALC, q. 9424, West African Lands Committee: 
Minutes of Evidence, African West 1047,1916. 
33. See for example W. S. Churchill, Memorandum on the 
Northern Nigeria Railway, 18 July 1907, Further Corre- 
spondence Relating to Railway Construction in Niqeria, 
African West 845,1908. 
34. The first agreement between the BCGA and the E. Africa 
Protectorate was made in 1907; from 1911 onwards, 
developments in Uganda came to dominate the correspon- 
dence between the BCGA and C. O., African West 953,1911. 
35. Cadbury Bros. were attacked in an article in the Standard, 
a Conservative newspaper which was delighted with this 
opportunity to undermine the pretensions of the Liberal 
Cadbury. Cadbury Bros. sued the Standard for libel and 
won. See Cadbury Paper 1(1-8), University of Birmingham 
Library; and Southall, 1975: ch. 2. 
36. Cadbury Bros. were in fact encouraged by the Gold Coast 
Government to set up a small 'model' plantation ascan 
example to African farmers, but the venture failed. 
Subsequently, they prided themselves on their resistance 
to approaches from land speculators with offers of cheap 
land for plantations. See W. A. Cadbury to WALC, 
q. 10669-10682, African West 1047,1916. The BCGA had 
considered plantation development on a larger scale 
than required by the proclaimed objectives of experi- 
mentations, and defended this on the basis that costs 
for a 10,000 acre plantation were comparable to those 
for 500 acres. However, the Association soon dropped 
the plans for plantations. BCGA to C. O. 30 March 1904, 
Correspondence (1902-1905) Relating to Cotton-Growinq 
in West Africa, African West 745,1906. 
37. W. A. Cadbury to WALC, q. 10682, African West 1047,1916. 
38. H. L. Galway, 22 July 1912, African West 1048,1916. 
39. E. C. Eliot to C. O., 6 July 1910, CO 96/504. 
40. ibid. 
41. William Cadbury financed Morel's tour of West Africa 
in 1910, and offered to pay a generous annuity if he 
entered Parliament to campaign for his ideas. Nworah, 
1966: 79. 
42. W. H. Himbury to WALC, q. 9537, African West 1047,1916. 
43. For example, Sir P. Girouard's Memorandum on Land 
Tenure, 1907, Northern Niqeria Lands Committee: Minutes 
of Evidence and Appendices, Cd. 5103, London 1910, 
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where he argues that the 'practically unearned incre- 
ment' from land sales should go to the Government 
- 
'the legitimate and best trustee for the people in 
their dealings with aliens' 
- 
through land nationali- 
sation. 
44. He was asked to consider: 
'How far the alienation of native lands to Europeans 
which is going on in the Gold Coast threatens 
- 
having 
regard to the probable increase of population 
- 
to deprive 
the natives of adequate land for their subsistence? 
Whether such alienation is beneficial to the natives by 
acquainting them with new and improved industries or 
enabling them to earn higher wages? 
Whether the present system under which the alienation 
of native land is controlled only by the High Court is 
satisfactory, or whether the control should be trans- 
ferred to the Executive Government? 
Whether in practice, the condition of the Concessions 
Court that the proper parties must be shown to have agreed 
to the grant is fulfilled, or whether the chiefs alienate 
land without consulting the tribe as a whole? 
Whether the consideration paid for the concession is 
actually adequate; and if not, whether it would be 
possible to lay down any general standard of adequacy? 
Whether the consideration received is spent by the chiefs 
in the general interest of the tribe, and if not, whether 
any, and what, steps can be taken to secure this object? 
Whether it is possible to take any better measures to 
secure better development of the lands granted, and to 
prevent them being mere counters for company promoters? ' 
C. O., to H. C. Belfield, 12 September 1911, African West 
977,1911. 
45. Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of 
Native Lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, Cd. 
6278, London 1912: 13. 
46. ibid., p. 14. 
47. Thus for example, Francis Dove, a lawyer resident in the 
Colony since 1897 said, 'I do not think that the natives 
in this part of the Colony are much inclined to engage 
in mining work. They are primarily interested in agri- 
culture, and they would reap more benefit from the 
example set by European planters than from the operations 
of a mining company. ' ibid. p. 50. H. C. W. Grimshaw, 
Acting Provincial Commissioner for the Wester Province 
was even more dismissive: 'I think the mining industries 
are of very little advantage to the people, it is true 
that they afford opportunity of earning higher wages, 
but mining does not appeal to the natives., ibid., p. 63. 
48. Belfield recommended that existing restrictions be 
reduced from 5 square miles to 1 for a mining concession, 
and from 20 square miles to 2 for an agricultural con- 
cession. Mining companies should begin operations within 
2 years, or forfeit their concessions, while agricultural 
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companies should begin work within a year, and should 
have 25% of the land under cultivation within 5. The 
restrictions suggested meant a radical reduction, but 
the rationale as presented in the report was not to 
prevent concessions, but rather to scare off speculators. 
49. The campaign reached its height in 1912, with the 
publication of the letter to the Times, 6 June 1912, 
signed by E. D. Morel, J. Wedgwood, Ramsey Macdonald 
and others. 
50. The Committee was chaired by Sir Kenelm Digby, and 
included Sir F. M. Hodgson, Sir W. Taylor, J. C. Wedgwood, 
E. D. Morel, C. Strachey, W. D. Ellis, R. E. Stubbs, 
and later Sir W. Napier. 
51. Osho Eremese (of Ife) to WALC, q. 13470-13473, African 
West 1047,1916. 
52. Quoted in W. D. Ellis. Memorandum on evidence as to the 
existence and origin of private property in land on the 
Gold Coast, African West 1048,1916: 299. 
53. Chief Adedeji (of Ilesha) to WALC, q. 13275, African 
West 1047,1916. 
54. W. H. Grey to WALC, q. 5345, African West 1047,1916. 
55. J. J. Thorburn to WALC, 22 July 1912, African West 1047, 
1916. 
56. Hayford to WALC, q. 677-690, African West 1047,1916. 
57. 'Our people are so strongly attached to their customs 
that they would at once punish any attempt on the part 
of any chief to depart from them. Therefore there is 
no fear of any permanent danger at all. Two or three 
chiefs, as I have said, who have attempted to do things 
differently from native law have been actually destooled., 
Hayford to WALC, q. 823, African West 1047,1916. 
58. West African Lands Committee: Draft Report, African 
West 1046,1916. 
59. ibid., p. 101. 
60. ibid., P. 81. 
61. '.. The results arrived at in the Krobo country 
... 
show 
that under an enlightened and progressive chief and 
with an industrious population some of the best results 
hitherto reached can be obtained. ' (Comment on the 
cultivation of palm trees by Mate Kole in Eastern KrobcQ 
ibid., p. 87. 
62. This was Clifford's response to a C. O. suggestion for 
emergency legislation to control land sales in the interim 
of the deliberations of the WALC. African West 1048, 
1916: 131. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Governor's Address to Nigerian Legislative Council, 
Lagos: Government Printer, 1920: 186. 
2. Acting Director of Agriculture, 21 December 1915, Papers 
Relating to the Cocoa Industry, Gold Coast Sessional 
Paper II of 1916-17. 
3. Director of Agriculture to Colonial Secretary, 3 July 
1915, Gold Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
4. Director of Botanic Gardens, 25 March 1915, Gold Coast 
Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
5. Acting Director of Agriculture, 21 December 1915, Gold 
Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
6. ibid. 
7. Clifford to Secretary of State, 1 August 1916, Gold Coast 
Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
8. Enclosure A in Gold Coast Sessional__Paper II of 1916-17. 
9. Acting Governor to Secretary of State, 10 September 1915, 
Gold Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
10. Comment by Clifford, 30 January 1913, Enclosure C in 
Gold Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
11. Commissioner of Eastern Province, 14 January 1913, Gold 
Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
12. Director of Agriculture, 8 February 1913, Gold Coast 
Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
13. Cocoa Plant (Diseases and Pests) Ordinance 1916, Gold 
Coast Sessional Paper II of 1916-17. 
14. W. S. Tudhope, Enquiry into the Gold Coast Cocoa Industry: 
Interim Report, Gold Coast Sessional Paper II of 1918-19: 7 
15. W. S. Tudhope, Enquiry into the Gold Coast Cocoa Industry: 
Final Report, Gold Coast Sessional Paper IV of 1918-19: 11. 
16. W. S. Tudhope, Enquiry into the Gold Coast Cocoa Industry: 
Interim Report, Gold Coast Sessional Paper II of 1918-19: 7 
17. Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Con- 
ditions of the Cocoa Industry, Gold Coast Sessional Paper 
XVIII of 1918-19: 5. 
18. For details of these later discussions on the cocoa 
industry, see Report of the Committee on Agricultural 
Policy and Organisation, Gold Coast Sessional Paper XVII 
of 1227-28; Memorandum on the Creation of a Fund for 
Improving the Quality and Marketing of Cacao, Gold Coast 
Sessional Paper XVIII of 1930-31; and C. O. File on 
Cocoa Industry 1927, CO 96/675/4442. 
19. 
- 
C. Y. Shephard, Report on the Economics of Peasant Agri- 
culture on the Gold Coast, Gold Coast Sessional-Paper I 
of 1936: 47. 
20. ibid. chs. III and IV. 
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21. In 1902, Lever told the representatives of his Belgian 
and Dutch subsidiaries, 'I want you to continue your 
efforts a little longer until we can put a Works down 
in your country and you are able to call upon your 
customers and say to them, "This soap is made in Belgium 
for Belgian people" or "This soap is made in Holland 
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the Oil Palm, Sessional Paper III of 1920-21. 
Correspondence relating to the Development of the Oil Palm 
Industry, Sessional Paper IV of 1924-25. 
Proposed Reforms in Respect of the Land Legislation of the 
Gold Coast primarily in order to promote security of title, 
Accra: Government Printer, 1927. 
Report of the Committee on Agricultural Policy and Organisa- 
tion, Sessional Paper XVII of 1927-28. 
Land Legislation of the Gold Coast, Vol. II, Accra: Govern- 
ment Printer, 1930. 
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Despatches Relating to the Oil Palm Industry with particular 
reference to a subsidy scheme for Oil Palm Mills, Sessional 
Paper III of 1930-31. 
Memorandum on the Creation of a Fund for Improving the 
Quality and Marketing of Cacao, Sessional Paper XVIII of 
1930-31. 
Enquiry into the wounding of 8 Africans at Prestea 
September 1930, Sessional Paper XIX of 1930-31. 
Papers relating to the Accident which occurred on 
June 1934 at the Prestea mine, in which 41 persons 
killed,. Sessional Paper I of 1935. 
C. Y. Shephard: Report on the Economics of Peasant 
on the Gold Coast, Sessional Paper I of 1936. 
Report on Mr H. A. Dade's visit to the Gold Coast; 
Shoot of Cacao, Sessional Paper V of 1937. 
on 15 
the 5th 
were 
Agriculture 
Swollen 
Sir Alan Burns; General Plan for Development in the Gold 
Coast, Sessional Paper II of 1944. 
Nigeria SessiOnal Papers 
Annual Reports of the Agricultural Department, Colliery 
Department, Lands Department, Labour Department. 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire 
into certain incidents at Opobo, Abak and Utu-Etun-Ekpo, 
Sessional Paper 12 of 1930. 
Report on the Commercial Possibilities and Development of 
the Forests of Nigeria, Sessional Paper 7 of 1934. 
The Nigerian Goldfield, Sessional Paper 17 of 1935. 
Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Question 
of Unemployment, Sessional Paper 46 of 1935. 
Report on the Progress of Co-operation in Nigeria 1935-37, 
Sessional Paper 2 of 1938. 
Report on the Progress of Co-operation in Nigeria for the 
year 1937-38, Sessional Paper 8 of 1939. 
Preliminary Statement on Development Planning in Nigeria, 
Sessional Paper 6 of 1945. 
A Ten Year Plan of Development and Welfare in Nigeria, 
Sessional Paper 24 of 1945. 
Sierra Leone Sessional Papers 
Report on a Journey through the Colony of Sierra Leone by the 
Commissioner of Lands and Forests, Sessional Paper 4 of 1923. 
Despatches relating to the Sierra Leone Oil Palm Industry and 
the Establishment of Oil Palm Plantations, Sessional Paper 12 
of 1925. 
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Report by c. Y. Shephard on his visit to Sierra Leone in 
1934, Sessional Paper 4 of 1935. 
Report by F. A. Stockdale, Agricultural Advisor to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, on his visit t 
Leone in January 1936, Sessional Paper 2 of 1936. 
Correspondence relating to the Colonial Development 
Assisted Schemes, Sessional Paper 6 of 1936. 
Parliamentary Papers 
the 
o Sierra 
Fund 
Compulsory Native Labour, Parlimentary Paper 20, Vol. LXX, 
London 1908. 
Northern Nigeria Lands Committee: Minutes of Evidence and 
Appendices. Cd. 5103, London 1910. 
Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown 
Colonies and Protectorates: Part I: Report, Cd. 5192, London, 
1910. 
Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown 
Colonies and Protectorates: Part II: Minutes of Evidence, 
Cd. 5193, London 1910. 
Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown 
Colonies and Protectorates: Part III: Papers laid before the 
Committee, Cd. 5194, London 1910. 
Memorandum on the Subject of Government Action in Encourage 
ment of Cotton Growing in Crown Colonies, Cd. 5215, London 
1910. 
Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native 
Lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, Cd. 6278, London 
1912. 
Palm Oil ordinance, Cd. 6512, London 1912. 
Correspondence respecting 
the extraction of oil from 
the Grant of exclusive rights for 
palm fruits, Cd. 6561, London 1913. 
Report of Committee on edible and oil-producing nuts and 
seeds, Cd. 8247, London 1916. 
Report to the Board of Trade of the Empire Cotton Growin( 
Committee, Cmd. 523, London 1920. 
Committee on Trade and Taxation for British West Africa, 
Cmd. 1600, London 1922. 
Private Enterprise in British Tropical Africa., Cmd. 2016, 
London 1924. 
Report by the Honourable W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore on his visit 
to West Africa during the year 1926, Cmd. 2744, London 1926. 
Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African 
Cocoa, Cmd. 5845, London 1938. 
Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare, 
Cmd. 6175, London 1940. 
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Labour Conditions in Africa, Cmd. 6277, London 1941. 
6. Unpublished private documents 
Papers of the British Cotton Growing Association 
The Cadbury Papers 
(both in the University of Birmingham Library) 
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